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Profiling of IDPs Affected by the Conflict in Sa'ada Yemen



December 2010

Survey commissioned by UNHCR to DRC in 2010 with the Support of the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS)
The Survey conducted in IDPs hosting locations (Sanaa, Amran, Hajjah, Aljawf Governorates & to IDPs & returnees in Sa'ada security belt.

Profiling of IDPs
Affected by the Conflict in Saa'da
Yemen

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Survey Commissioned by UNHCR to DRC

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Foreword

The IDP Profiling Project Yemen is the result of the Protection Cluster initiative that has developed and tested tools for profiling of internally displaced persons (IDPs) with the aim of providing overall information on IDPs for global monitoring, as well as providing context specific information to facilitate preparation of local assistance to IDPs.

Consequently, when circumstances permit, the profiling information will assist in finding durable solutions for IDPs, as a result of 6 wars in northern Yemen since 2004. The profiling project thus extends to all IDPs residing in the 4 host governorates of Sana'a, Hajja, Amran, and Al Jawf, and to IDPs and returnees in Sa'ada security belt.

The project has been guided and monitored by a core group of agencies consisting of the protection cluster leader agency UNHCR; Danish Refugee Council (DRC), which implemented the project; European Commission - Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (*ECHO*), which partially financed the project; and the Joint IDP Profiling Service(JIPS), which provided technical support. The project was supported by several participating NGOs, Yemen Red Crescent, and the governmental Executive Unit.

The project applied simple random sampling in defined IDP camps and spontaneous settlements. Given the nature of these IDP spontaneous settlements, this sampling method was found appropriate and sufficient. The sampling was made on the basis of an estimation of the IDP population in any given settlement. This estimation was based on previous surveys, reports and updates from agencies operating in the area, as well as information from local authorities and IDP settlement leaders. The tools applied were focus group discussions/participatory assessments, and household interviews.

The survey consists of 11 main concise chapters, presenting at the same time Key Messages, Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations.

UNHCR would like to thank the country's protection cluster team who helped undertake this profiling survey.

Sana'a 08 January 2011

KEY MESSAGES

1. Most displaced persons wish to return home (over 70%), but will do so only when conditions are right. Only 5% believe this can happen in 2010, while 90% do not know when return will be possible.

➤ Principal condition for return is trust in lasting peace.

After 6 phases of armed conflict in Sa'ada and the traumatizing experience of large scale destruction and displacement during the last round in 2009 the IDPs are concerned about ongoing conflicts and fearful of the outbreak of a '7th war'. Continued skirmishes and lack of progress in implementing the truce agreement seem to justify these concerns.

➤ Reconstruction of damaged homes is the next most important condition for return.

In Sa'ada city reconstruction moves at slow pace; no reconstruction is known to be underway in the inaccessible territory of Sa'ada governorate.

➤ Personal safety and security in home location are further conditions for return.

Fear of harassment from their home environment and lack of protective state institutions in home area discourage displaced persons to materialize their desire to go home.

2. A substantial number (over 25%) of displaced persons have decided not to return home. Without support for alternative solutions they risk protracted displacement.

➤ Socio-economic backgrounds

Comparing this group with the group that wishes to return we find a marked higher proportion of former **livestock owners** who do not want to return; obviously their source of income is gone.

Also people with government related income like **teachers, nurses or pensioners** are overrepresented among the group not wishing to return.

People who had based their livelihoods on **cross border trade** with Saudi Arabia are blocked from resuming their activities for unknown time.

Some of the formerly jobless and **marginalized people** do not want to return either, because humanitarian assistance provides them with better living conditions than they had before.

➤ **Prospect for alternative durable solutions**

Among the IDP who say no to return only very few have any concrete plan what to do except staying in displacement. They **lack information and material means** to plan for a sustainable new life away from home – the alternative durable solutions ‘local integration’ or ‘settlement elsewhere in the country’ appear out of reach to them.

3. In the short term and while working on durable solutions the living conditions for the displaced population need improvement.

➤ **Food and shelter are the focus of complaint. Job opportunities are missing.**

Food rations are insufficient; families complement them with purchased food. Shelters need renovation and/or are overcrowded and don’t provide the privacy for female family members that is culturally required. Nearly half of the IDPs live in rented accommodation, hence need to pay rent.

The productive capacity of the IDPs is idle, they want to use it even for minimal remuneration.

➤ **The main coping mechanism in displacement is borrowing money.**

Over 75% of the IDP households are indebted. This fact will impact on the recovery; new income will have to be used for paying back and cannot fully go in re-establishing the asset base. Even protection risks cannot be excluded when people are forced to borrow for their survival.

4. Lack of access to the conflict area prevented profiling from determining the full extent of the IDP crisis.

➤ **The conflict governorate – home to the displaced population - remained inaccessible to the profiling team except for the capital city and a security belt around.**

The number of people displaced within the area, of the returnees to the area and of other affected population is unknown. Their living conditions and humanitarian needs have not been assessed systematically. Lack of access excludes this population from international humanitarian assistance.

➤ **Displacement does not end with return.**

Displaced populations have the right to be assisted until reaching their full (re-) integration, which is completed when displacement related differences to the surrounding population have disappeared. Hence humanitarian access to the places of origin / return is vital to fulfill the right of IDPs to be supported in their achievement of durable solutions to displacement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Scope, objectives and limitations of profiling in Yemen

Profiling extends to all the IDPs residing in 4 host governorates Sana'a, Hajja, Amran, Al Jawf and to IDPs and returnees in Sa'ada security belt. Profiling does not include IDPs and those who have returned to the governorate of Sa'ada beyond the security belt. This limitation was imposed by security related inaccessibility of the Al Houthi held districts.

Profiling aims to provide a core data set about the displaced population. This can serve as a common basis to work from for all humanitarian actors and GoY when addressing the IDP crisis. The data, collected through individual interviews with 1683 heads of households (HH) and 50 Focus Group Discussions(FGD), reflect the general situation, the needs and intentions of interviewees in July /August 2010. They are useful to understand past and project future movements. They enable stakeholders to better plan the necessary durable solutions to end displacement and prioritize interventions to alleviate protracted displacement.

2. Demographics

Profiling estimates the number of IDPs in 4 governorates and the accessible area of Sa'ada at the time of survey at some 41 000 to 45 000 HH or 287 000 to 317 000, which is somewhat below the official number of 320 000 published for August 2010.

The bases of the exercise in 4 districts were the official registration lists modified by relatively small numbers of unregistered IDPs from NGOs and by the double registration indicated by IDPs during survey. The result is some variation from the official lists per governorate with higher numbers in Amran and Sana'a, lower in Hajja and Al Jawf (details in chapter 3).

With a range of 78 000 to 86 000 IDP the numbers profiling obtained for Sa'ada (accessible area only) from extrapolation of own counting/sampling, not regarding registration lists, are remarkably lower than the official estimation of 110 000 (WFP numbers in process of verification covering also beneficiaries outside the security belt).

3. Population movements up to date of survey

At the time of the exercise July/August the number of IDP families that had left the location where they were registered in the 4 host governorates is estimated at 11 000 to 12 000 or 84 000 to 93 000 individuals. Mainly in Hajja but also in Amran numerous families listed on the samples for interviews were not found by enumerators. If they have returned or chosen another place in their trajectory as

IDPs remains unclear, therefore we cannot simply deduct these numbers from the IDP lists in the respective governorates. We do not have conclusive information about the number of remaining IDPs until we gain more insight in the return situation of the still inaccessible districts of origin.

Reliable information about major return could be obtained in the accessible part of Sa'ada where we generated the sample interview lists from own counting and extrapolated the return movement to this part of Sa'ada as follows:

about 6700 to 7 400 HH or 35 000 to 38 000 individuals have returned.

Some of these families may have returned from the 4 hosting governorates where over 11 000 families have moved, others may have come back from displacement in Sa'ada governorate outside the security belt. In any case there remains a considerable movement which occurred up to July/August that may either be return to inaccessible areas of Sa'ada or secondary displacement. FGD with returned IDPs indicate that the ceasefire in February was a trigger for return during the following months.

4. Future population movement expected at time of survey

During interviews conducted with a representative sample of 1483 IDP HH and in focus group discussions (FGD) (25 with male, 25 with female members) profiling captured the views of the displaced families regarding their future:

About 72 % of the interviewed wish to return, the other 28% declare that they do not intend to return.

However return will be slow: of those who are still in displacement in July/August during our survey only about 5 % think that they can return in 2010, another 5% expect to return until mid next year, but most of those who wish to return don't know when this will be possible. In FGD we found this pattern in general confirmed. Skepticism about return is based on a number of obstacles that need to be removed first: the risk of renewed outbreak of fighting, the problem of destroyed houses, and the risk of harassment upon return, to mention only the most important problems. The absence of state institutions in home areas and fear of landmines are other factors slowing down potential return movements. Women often express in FGD their reluctance to return because of the traumatic experience during fighting and flight.

The message given by IDPs: trust in lasting peace is the decisive factor to trigger large scale return – ongoing skirmishes and fear of a new outbreak of war prolongs displacement.

At the time of editing this report no substantial improvement of conditions encouraging accelerated return is visible, on the contrary, anecdotal evidence from the field describes IDPs rather more pessimistic now about the situation

back home and their prospects for return. Also the update of the Sa'ada mapping report by Ramy Saliba (UNHCR) lists numerous security incidents throughout the governorate.

5. Durable solutions needed for IDPs NOT able or willing to return

About 28 % of the IDP interviewed during profiling clearly stated that they do not intend to return. They have the right to free choice of integrating in the location of displacement or live elsewhere in the country instead of returning to their place of origin. But only very few have the necessary information, networks and material assets to start a new life on their own. An estimated 25% of the displaced will need support to achieve a durable solution other than return in order to end displacement. The proposed 'Framework of Durable Solutions to Displacement in Yemen' (still in draft) sets out the conditions under which such solutions can be attained.

While the livelihoods basis of the IDPs from Sa'ada is mainly agricultural we find an overrepresentation of certain livelihoods' categories among the people not intending to return: former livestock owners, government related professions including educational and health personnel, extremely poor and marginalized people, those whose income was generated from cross border trade. New livelihoods opportunities can be facilitated for these categories of people by upgrading their existing skills or adding new skills so that they can insert into the labor market or gain a sustainable self-employed income. Others should be offered access to land - which does not mean necessarily ownership of land - so as to generate income from animal husbandry, gardening, crop planting or other agro-related activities.

With the information provided by the profiling exercise humanitarian actors can start to select and prepare candidates for integration and settling elsewhere in the country, plan suitable projects and start mobilizing funds immediately instead of waiting for a residual caseload after the majority has returned. This is particularly relevant in cases like the Sa'ada crisis where further voluntary return depends on two parties to the conflict to move from a truce to trusted peace, a process with an unpredictable timeline. Alternatives to return might even be faster implemented than return and recovery in the contested and war damaged home areas.

6. Socio-economic situation of IDPs before and during displacement

Livelihoods basis of more than half of the IDPs used to be crop farming and animal husbandry. Government related jobs including teachers, nurses, allowances provided for 12% of families. Trade and business stand out among the other sources of income. About 6% were jobless at home. In view of the

country wide problem of unemployment this rate appears low, yet some might be hidden in the 'no answer' category.

In displacement over one third of HH have some sort of income; without fully disclosing the source, some indicate government related income; others crop farming or small business. However they cannot or 'barely' make a living of it; those who can live of their source of income are estimated at 5% of all IDPs.

Yet all IDP HH have monetary expenditures to cover basic needs, most generalized is purchase of food – about 40% spent a weekly average of 3 000 Rials, another 40 % spent on average 7 500 Rials per week (equivalent to about 14\$ and 34\$).

Rent for housing is the other major cost factor for nearly 50% of the IDPs corresponding to the preferred residential category in displacement. The amount paid monthly varies in a broad range between 5 000 and 40 000 Rials with an overall average of about 15 000 Rials (around 68\$).

Money is further needed on a more or less regular basis for medicine, clothing, firewood, water, quat.

In absence of their regular income base IDP families cover basic needs through a combination of different measures: borrowing money is the mechanism used by over 70% of HH. Some 18 % of IDP families have accumulated debt amounts of 1000\$ equivalent and more since displacement. More frequent however are amounts of 100\$ to around 500\$ equivalent. Debts can be a burden for recovery, in extreme cases even a protection threat when exploited by ruthless lenders.

Humanitarian assistance is the second most important survival mechanism listed by over 60% of IDPs. About 50% say they reduce food quantity; over 40% reduce food quality. Harmful practices like scavenging, begging and child labor are mentioned in a long list of survival strategies, though at the lower end.

Needs expressed by IDPs

It is to be re-emphasized that only the IDPs in the 4 host governorates and in the GoY held security belt of Sa'ada had the opportunity to express their needs in this survey. Sporadic information, particularly nutrition assessments from the Western districts of Sa'ada suggest alarming humanitarian need, yet the access problem prevents comprehensive assessments and response.

At the time of interviews in July/August 2010 food and shelter topped the list of needs with about equal urgency. In FGD participants expressed despair about the reduced rations lasting barely half of the month and sparking anguish about further cuts of assistance. Subsequently rations have been increased though large families still complain about insufficient quantities.

Inadequate or overcrowded shelters put pressure on IDPs who value high their families' privacy.

The third strongly felt need is the lack of jobs. In FGD participants say providing for the family through a job would be preferred over receiving assistance; any occupation at minimal remuneration would be better than enduring idleness during displacement.

Discrimination by the local community, in particular in school is another major problem in displacement. Loss of documents is also mentioned, it causes problems even for children to be admitted in schools. Need for better health care is stressed by FGD participants, in particular for the chronically ill. IDPs complain in general that not enough attention is given to the vulnerable members, even if they are identified and advocated for by their surrounding communities.

The ranking of needs differs somewhat across governorates and residential categories.

The food problem dominates in Sana'a and Al Jawf, while Sa'ada IDPs suffer most from the housing situation. Jobs are less a problem in Al Jawf - here people are more interested in their livestock - and in Sana'a where IDPs have some job opportunities and make use of it as we know from FGD.

Host families suffer most from overcrowded shelter, camp dwellers complain about lack of job opportunities, people in spontaneous settlements lack supply for animals and drinking water. The residents in rented facilities have problems to find cash for the monthly rent and water trucking.

In general it appears from FGD that the assistance level outside camps is lower than for camp residents.

7. Gender and vulnerability aspects of profiling

Among the IDP HH 9% have a female head of family. Half of them live in rented accommodation, only 16% in camps, which underlines again the importance of non-camp assistance.

The general proportion of yes and no to return is the same as for the total sample, yet female family heads in Sana'a and Al Jawf are less inclined to go home than the average. The obstacles that prevent female headed families from going home are the same as for all with one remarkable difference: women fear less the potential revenge in home area, but they insist on strong protective government presence as a precondition for return.

Economically women headed HH are worse off than the average. They cope like all IDPs by borrowing money and relying on humanitarian assistance.

A comparison between all HH and female HH of the needs in displacement reveals a much higher need for an improved shelter situation of this vulnerable category than is expressed already by families in general. Food is of similar urgency in both groups, but as can be expected female family heads suffer more from the fact that family members are missing.

Profiling identified also about 5 % of disabled persons among the displaced population. During FGD participants emphasized the need to help support this segment of their communities. They also advocated for older persons and for the chronically ill who suffer in displacement even more than they did already in their original places of residence. The recent assessment by a specialist advisor to UNHCR, confirmed existing gaps in assistance to disabled and older IDPs, but also highlighted possibilities to capitalize on their capacities.

8. Summary conclusions and recommendations

All national and international actors engaged in the solution of the IDP crisis should focus their efforts on this set of three problems:

A - Ensure access to humanitarian assistance of ALL displaced populations including those who have moved between the AI – Houthi held districts of Sa’ada governorate and those who have moved back to their homes in these districts.

B - Work towards fulfilling the conditions for voluntary return in safety and with dignity of the displaced population. Alleviate living conditions and prepare people for return while still in displacement.

C – Accept the free choice of displaced persons not to return, and support with concrete programs their plight for durable solutions other than return, i.e. integration at the location of displacement or settling elsewhere in the country.

Details on roles and responsibilities of all actors in addressing this set of problems can be found in chapter 11.

Chapter 1

Context, justification and objectives of IDP profiling in Yemen

1.1 General context

The conflict started years ago in Sa'ada¹ between a group called "Al Houthi" after the family name of its leader, founder of the movement "Believing Youth" "(Al-shabab almu'min)" and Yemeni army together with government-backed tribal fighters. The government accused the rebels of trying to install an Islamic Imamate government which allegedly challenges government power. The Al Houthi accused the government of stopping them to promote religious education on Zaydi doctrine in Saada'a. They claim the right to defend their beliefs and doctrine.

The conflict began with isolated clashes between army and Believing Youth, escalated into anti Israel and anti America demonstrations led by Houthis in Sana'a which resulted in arrests of Houthies and further clashes leading to outbreak of open conflict on 18 of June 2004.

Six rounds of armed conflict took place between 2004 and 2010.

In each successive round the scope and intensity of the conflict has significantly increased. There are no clear estimates of the number of people killed or injured. Reports² suggest that six years of conflicts have killed thousands of civilians, as well as Houthi fighters and government military personnel.

In the fifth round, the conflict affected the governorates of Sa'ada, Amran, and Sana'a witnessing usage of aerial bombardments, tanks and heavy artillery.

As of the sixth round hostilities extended to Al Jawf, and Hajja governorates, and involved also Saudi Arabian military forces in the fighting alongside the Yemeni government against Al Houthi movement. Border districts controlled by Houthis were heavily bombarded by Saudi air raids in reaction on border infractions, leaving villages completely destroyed along the border. Throughout the sixth round there were numerous allegations of violations of humanitarian and human rights law by all parties to the conflict. Independent verification of these allegations however has been difficult because of the restrictions of access to Sa'ada.

As a consequence of these intense hostilities, particularly the air raids - as focus group participants emphasize - the population fled in large numbers. It is estimated that over 300 000 persons were initially displaced by the fierce fighting in Sa'ada governorate to the neighboring governorates of Sana'a, Hajjah, Amran, and Al Jawf and to other parts of Sa'ada governorate itself. This movement has to be put into the perspective of the

¹ See Annex 0: Sa'ada map

² See i.e. Salmoni, Barak A., Regime and periphery in Northern Yemen, Washington 2010

overall population of Sa'ada governorate : 791 823 persons (by 2009 extrapolated from 2004 census), hence more than one third of the population had left home.

The 6th round of fighting between the Government of Yemen (GoY) and Al Houthis brought about large - scale destruction and damages to both private households and public infrastructure. Services were disrupted in Sa'ada governorate, particularly affected are health, education, and social sectors. Thousands of private properties were either destroyed or damaged during the conflict. Public buildings were used as a safe refuge for IDPs until they had found other alternatives for shelter/accommodation. In areas under the control of Al Houthis, public buildings were used as military position to hide during the fighting or as detention facilities. Many of these buildings were heavily bombed, damaged and even completely destroyed³.

The war ended on the 11th of February 2010 when a Qatari brokered truce was signed between Al-Houthis and the Government of Yemen, an agreement that includes 6 points:

1. All parties are to abide by the declared ceasefire.
2. Opening of roads, removal of mines, and ending of military stationing in positions and on side roads are to take place.
3. Withdrawal of Houthis from occupied districts.
4. Non interference of Houthis in the affairs of the Local Authorities.
5. Release of prisoners, civilians and military, Yemenites and Saudis.
6. Houthis to abide by the Yemeni Constitution, Law and Order, and not to assault any neighboring country.

A new more detailed agreement was later signed as a supplement consisting of 22 points to carry out the previous truce agreement⁴. With this the war should cease definitely and the displacement crisis should be brought to an end. The hope is that the peace agreements dissipate fears of new fighting and instill trust in lasting peace with the displaced populations, so that they would envisage return to their districts of origin. Although this new agreement provides more detailed steps to implement the *Truce Agreement* and can be regarded as a positive step to move towards a sustainable peace, nonetheless it remains only a more precise guideline or condition of the measures to be

³ See results of recent research by Ramy Saliba, UNHCR, Mapping Report of affected districts following the Conflict in Sa'ada Governorate, September 2010, p 10

⁴ See annex 1 – Truce agreement

undertaken by both parties. A clear timeframe is lacking and the steps to take are not concretely operationalized.

The credibility of the newly signed agreement is undermined by recent developments in the conflict affected areas of Sa'ada Governorate: rumors about rounding up of troops by both Saudis and Houthis on borders separating them; newly constructed military positions and fortifications by Houthis in districts under their control; spreading of clashes to neighboring governorate of Amran into the districts of Harf Sufyan and Huth resulting in expanding Houthi control; clashes of Houthis with tribes in the district of Al-Hashwah in August 2010⁵.

1.2 Justification, objectives and outcomes of profiling

1.2.1 Justification

The main established mechanism for data collection in the IDP situation in Yemen is the registration conducted by the Government of Yemen with UNHCR support. This database contains the absolute numbers of IDPs in their location of displacement, differentiated by age and sex. The main purpose of registration is the provision of information for basic emergency operations in life saving support of the displaced population⁶. Profiling of Yemen IDPs relies largely on this data collection and – in technical terms – draws samples from it for further research.

Beyond these core data of registration more information is needed for humanitarian actors to plan more comprehensive and better targeted interventions for IDPs. Profiling is a process to gather and analyze and make available such information.

In the Yemen context the humanitarian actors who initiated the profiling exercise considered important to know for example more about the pattern of movement like time and reasons to flee, to select the host location, the choice of the type of residence in displacement. Profiling also captures the displaced persons' intentions to return, impediments and expectations for such prospect at the time of interview, as well as their interest in and ideas about solutions alternative to return. This is valuable information to shape strategies for durable solutions and advocate for support by donors or political actors as needed.

The nature of this displacement crisis does not inspire hope in a fast solution for all uprooted families. Provisions need to be made for alleviating the situation of displacement while it lasts. Profiling contributes information about the key problems

⁵ See Ramy Salibi, p 13

⁶ Registration is an administrative measure and does not grant a special legal status; IDPs need not and cannot be granted a special legal status, they are entitled to all relevant guarantees of human rights as citizens of their country. Lack of registration would not deprive IDPs of their entitlements under human rights and humanitarian law.

See W. Kaelin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Annotations, Washington 2008, p 5

and needs expressed by the concerned population. This does not replace comprehensive needs assessments of sectors and clusters, but points in the direction to focus assistance upon.

Profiling provides also information on vulnerable groups among the IDPs and protection concerns. Numbers of single parent families and their specific needs and perceptions can be identified. Another example is the number of IDP families separated and the reasons for family members missing or separated.

Bringing protection issues to light through profiling may not be constructive for all types of protection concerns in the Yemen context. The protection cluster decided that gender based violence is a very sensitive issue that should be explored with other than profiling methods in order to prevent further harm to the concerned persons.

Profiling is a flexible process to fill gaps in knowledge about the IDPs in general and segments of this population identified by the humanitarian community.

Socio-economic information like sources of income before and during displacement, expenditure and coping strategies in displacement were considered such a gap to fill for better targeted interventions in view of achieving durable solutions and raising the standard of living in the current situation of displacement. Hence profiling included such questions in the research.

The Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights of IDPs during his visit to Yemen in April 2010 also recommended to *“undertake a general profiling of the displaced population to assess the overall magnitude of the displacement, the location of the displaced, as well as their needs and prospects for their return.”*⁷

1.2.2 Objectives and outcomes

The objectives of the profiling exercise are:

- To provide a baseline information about :
 - Numbers and locations of IDPs including non registered , disaggregated by sex, age, and vulnerability
 - Return movements of IDPs - Intentions and obstacles to return
 - Alternative solutions for those unwilling/unable to return – problems and needs
- To provide a basis for planning of durable solutions for IDPs
- To provide a basis for planning of humanitarian interventions addressing protracted displacement

⁷ Memorandum on key findings and recommendations, working visit of the Representative of the Secretary general on the human rights of the internally displaced persons to Yemen, 04-10 April 2010

The outcomes expected are:

- A core data set on IDPs and returnees that is relevant to all clusters. This will ensure that all humanitarian actors and the government are working with a common understanding of the magnitude of the situation
- Facilitation of cross-sectoral needs assessments
- Useful combination of qualitative and quantitative information for humanitarian actors to target and prioritize their interventions and plans
- A more accurate estimation of the IDP/returnee population where we apply counting; adjustments of the used registration data where we incorporate additional information such as 'unregistered lists' and identified double registration
- A baseline that could be used for future population movement tracking. Updates could be timed in coordination with the mid-term CAP review. The impact on return of specific political decisions could be measured through updated profiling.

Chapter 2 – Organization and Methodology**2.1 Organization**

The cluster approach is adopted in Yemen.

The profiling exercise has been done in collaboration with the UNCT and Humanitarian actors, in particular with the protection clusters, who were informed about the methodology and work progress.

The operation in Yemen is coordinated by the Government of Yemen through the IDP Executive Unit (ExU). The IDP ExU has representatives in all the affected governorates and are at different stages of building up their response capacity. Working closely with them at the field level was crucial in order to:

- benefit from their local knowledge
- benefit from their role to introduce the project to the local community through the customary channels
- include them in the process as part of the team and build local capacity of officials and locally based enumerators /coordinators.

In some governorates, Al Jawf in particular, the involvement of key players, such as the tribes and local leadership, was important.

On the more general level, the profiling exercise is supported by the Minister responsible for the ExU for IDPs. At interim stage the Minister was informed about initial findings, challenges and expected results.

A number of NGOs was involved in the design and execution of the project. ADRA, Al-Amal, CSSW provided specific information about their areas of operation, contributed lists of non registered IDPs and made available coordinators and enumerators. Their contacts to local governments and other local actors like the Yemen Red Crescent in Sa'ada proved very helpful.

2.2 Components of the methodology

The methodology applied in Yemen IDP profiling is a combination of two methods:

Household Survey based on stratified cluster sampling approach targeting 1900 households in the five governorates of Sana'a, Amran, Hajjah, Al Jawf and Saada. The questionnaire is answered by the head of household, with a specific part- livelihoods and needs - directed to the wife, or oldest daughter (above 15 years old) in case it is not a female headed household. Such a differentiation gives due weight to the female voice in the household.

The Household survey provides quantitative data. The sampling across the IDP population allows for generalizing the results.

Community focus group discussion targeting one male group and one female group in each of the selected survey sample districts. Within each focus group, different age categories were represented including children above 12 and old persons above 60 years. The focus groups do not need to follow the statistical rigor of the quantitative methods and their results cannot be expressed in numbers or percentages. Focus groups are more flexible and use the group dynamic to discuss a set of questions with the input from 8 to 12 members of the community gathering around the facilitator.

The combination of the rigorous quantitative and the flexible qualitative method allows for an adequate representation of the findings with in-depth discussion for better analysis and understanding of the intentions and dynamics of displacement and return.

2.2.1 Household survey

2.2.1.1 Sample universe: Households of IDPs and returnees in the five governorates of Sana'a, Hajjah, Al Jawf, Amran and Saada.

2.2.1.2 Target population: Households of IDPs in Sana'a, Hajjah, Al Jawf and Amran and Households of IDPs and returnees in Saada. Screening questions were used to differentiate between IDPs, returnees and affected population in Saada.

2.2.1.3 Sample frame: In Sana'a, Hajjah, Al Jawf, Amran the universe was the registration database of the IDP Executive Unit, and collected lists of presumably non-registered IDPs.

In Saada, the frame was defined through a counting exercise of the IDP and returnee population in Saada city, and numbers collection from the IDP camps and the villages in

Safra and Sahar. The other conflict affected districts of Sa'ada remained inaccessible and could not be included in the sample frame.

2.2.1.4 Type of sample: Household Survey based on stratified cluster sampling approach.

2.2.1.5 Sample size: The survey targeted 1900 households in the five governorates. The formula used to decide on the size of the sample per governorate is the following:

$$n = t^2 * P*(1-P)/m^2$$

where

n = 1,918 size of the sample

t² = 3.84 for a confidence rate fixed at 95% t is estimated to be 1.96

p total = 0.05 probability of one of the key indicators of the study: in this case it was the proportion of the IDPs within the total population

1-p = 0.95

m² = 0.000100 margin of error estimated at 1%

2.2.1.6 Method of data collection:

- Method of household selection: For the sample drawn for Sana'a, Al jawf, Hajjah and Amran, a list of names was selected for the interviews from both the registration database and the non registered population list. The enumerators had to find the exact family that is selected in the sample. For the sample drawn in Saada, following the counting system identifying an estimation of the numbers of IDPs and returnees, a target number of interviews was assigned for IDPs and returnees for geographical zones where interviewees were randomly selected within their own categories.
- Method of respondent selection: The questionnaire was answered by the head of household, with a specific part directed to the wife, or oldest daughter (above 15 years old) in case it is not a female headed household.
- Method of data collection: face to face in respondent's household.

2.2.1.7 Details of the methodology:

In order to ensure a sound representation of the sample, the selection of the statistical units takes into consideration the different residential characteristics of the surveyed population. Below table shows the mapping of existing categories in the governorates.

Table 2.1:
Residential characteristics mapping

Residential. Characteristics	IDPs living with host families	IDPs in Camps	IDPs renting dwellings	IDPs/Returnees In own house	IDPs in settlements
Sana'a					
Amran					
Hajjah					
Al Jawf					
Saada					

- **Sample size**

The first step was to determine the sample size of the survey. The statistical unit in this exercise is the governorate, thus, we had to decide at an initial stage the number of households to be interviewed in total and per governorate.

The used sources for this calculation are:

- The statistical yearbook 2009 issued by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation – Central Statistical organization to define the total number of population per governorate including IDPs and non IDPs.
- Registration figures of the IDP Executive Units of the Government of Yemen supported by UNHCR to determine the total number of IDPs per governorate. Even though we expect that the numbers have changed due to the return, the registration figures provide an indicative basis on which to design the sample.

Table 2.2:
Sample size

Governorate	Target
Sana'a	150 Households
Amran	250 Households
Hajjah	700 Households
Al Jawf	100 Households
Saada	700 Households
Total sample size	1900 Households

- **Survey baseline**

In order to have a clear representation, the baseline, i.e the number of the IDPs in the surveyed area is determined. In the context of Yemen we have a baseline given through the registration exercise where we have the numbers of the registered IDPs per Governorate / per District both in camps and outside camps. While these figures are changing on the ground due to the return process and these movements are difficult to track and update continuously and in all locations, while registration may have temporary access problems even in certain locations of the government held 4 governorates or other problems that render the registration numbers inaccurate, they still represent the best available basis for drawing the sample for Sana'a, Hajjah, Al-Jawf and Amran.

In fact, the alternative would have been to do a full re-counting of IDPs per Governorate / per District. This would have required a considerable amount of time and resources in the counting phase. For the reduced area accessible to us in Sa'ada we applied this alternative procedure, creating there a new data base for a limited subgroup of IDPs and returnees encountered in this particular accessible area of Sa'ada, the Sa'ada city district and adjacent parts of Saher and Al Safra districts⁸.

Since one of the objectives of the exercise is to "provide baseline information about numbers and locations of IDPs disaggregated by sex and age, including the unregistered ones", and since the profiling aims at taking a snapshot in a dynamic phase of return, we have collected lists of the non-registered IDPs from organizations operating in Hajjah, Amran and Sana'a and we have drawn samples from them. For Al Jawf however, no list of unregistered IDPs was available at the time of field work.

Non-registration of IDPs can occur of numerous reasons from not wanting to be identified to be denied registration.

The questionnaire allows us to have an estimated number of non registered IDPs and to determine the reasons of non-registration through the explanations given and cross checks like linking non-registration with arrival time.

- **Registered IDPs**

A sample has been drawn from registered IDPs in Sana'a, Hajjah, Al-Jawf and Amran.

- **Counted IDPs and returnees**

A counting process with related sampling was conducted in Sa'ada. The return movement affects Sa'ada only. The initially planned exercise in all affected Sa'ada districts had to be cancelled due to security constraints imposed officially. The exercise needed to be restricted to Sa'ada city and the safe areas of Al Safar and Sahar district around the city of Sa'ada (safety belt). The other districts remained closed to the profiling team throughout the exercise and information about district – internal displacement and arrival of returnees to other Sa'ada districts unavailable.

⁸ See details in annex 2: Sa'ada counting report

- **Unregistered IDP's**

A list of Yemeni households claiming to be none registered IDP's per Governorate/per District was collected by DRC from the available lists at the Executive unit level by governorate as well as from NGO's working there, during preparation period. For Al Jawf no list of unregistered IDPs was available at the time of field work.

2.2.2 Reality encountered

Substantial numbers of interviewees “not found” at address drawn from registration lists

Major movement was noticed especially in Hajjah and Amran. The enumerators could not achieve the targeted interviews in many districts.

The enumerators faced difficulty to find IDPs listed, because the addresses sampled from the registration data base were not – respectively not any more - correct.

A second sample had been drawn in Amran and Hajjah according to the methodology.

Even then the enumerators could not reach the full target number of interviews.

Instead of drawing further samples to complete the initial target numbers, it was decided to introduce adjustments during extrapolation to correct the sample.

Security concerns:

As the security situation is not stable, the IDP profiling team could not reach some districts in Amran, Al Jawf and all the affected districts in Sa'ada except the security belt around Sa'ada city.

As a consequence of the reality encountered we present the following synthesis table with the numbers of interviews achieved in each governorate.

Table 2.3:

Interviews achieved from the samples

Sana'a	149 Households
Amran	170 Households
Hajjah	550 Households
Al Jawf	88 Households
Sa'ada	726 Households , (529 IDP, 197 return)
Total interviews	1683 Households

2.3 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

2.3.1 Applied methodology

The FGD aims at providing more qualitative data at the community-based level, especially on the dynamics of return. The selection of location where to conduct the FGD was done as follows:

- Within each Governorate there are a number of different residential characteristics that were indicated in the table above.
- The coordinators per governorate mapped zones where each category exists and conducted at a minimum 2 focus groups per category (1 for male / 1 for female), or more if they deemed necessary following additional criteria developed at the governorate level. For example not only the main settlement near Harad town was visited but also a more remote small and obviously less served spontaneous settlement; also out of the 3 camps, not one but 2 were visited, camp 1 and Emirates camp. In Sa'ada as many FGD were organized as time allowed and returnees from outside the area invited.
- It was suggested 22 FGD as minimum number but in reality we achieved 50 FGD.
- The FGD were conducted simultaneously to the survey interview, which meant that results from interviews were not yet known and could therefore not be followed up specifically. In some cases this might have been interesting and should be considered in future exercises.
- The selection of the members of FGD was as per the following table indicating age groups.

Table 2.4:

Focus Group Discussion

FGD Male	12-17	18-25	26-59	60+
FGD Female	12-17	18-25	26-59	60+

- For each age cohort 2 representatives were selected.
- The selection of these representatives was done randomly and not through strictly official channels in order to avoid a leaders meeting. Nevertheless, a preparatory meeting before the FGD was held with the leadership of camps and settlements to explain the process. This belonged to the duties of the coordinator, familiar with the area and in charge of the profiling in a governorate.

2.3.1.1 Reality encountered on the ground

The number of FGD is more than what we targeted; our facilitators could conduct more discussion and could get better quality.

Yet the reality on the ground, particularly the insecurity, impacted also on the Focus Group Plan.

- **Sa'ada**

Due to restrictions imposed by security concerns, FGD facilitators could not conduct discussions in the districts outside the security belt in Sa'ada, but we could mitigate this shortfall by inviting some people from those districts to the secure area and conduct discussions there.

- **Amran**

Our team in Amran was not allowed to access Khaywan camp, due to sudden heightened tension in the area at the planned time.

- **Al-Jawf**

Due to the high safety risk in Al-Jawf and the strict tribal tradition prevailing in this governorate we could not send a woman to manage the Female FGD there.

Also our male facilitator could not move outside the security area which is al Hazm district.

Fortunately and surprisingly our male FGD facilitator had been invited by a group of women to conduct a discussion with them.

- **Sana'a**

It proved difficult to find hosted IDPs willing to gather and spend time for interviews.

Not less than 8 persons participated in a FGD, often more, sometimes up to 12 depending on the meeting place, which in camps and settlements, in open shelters attracted more people than invited.

In some places the age composition of the group was difficult to maintain, when more persons entered the location where the interview was conducted. But the facilitators could ensure that the voice of each age group was heard.

Table 2.5:

FGD plan achieved per governorate and residential categories

Residential Characteristic	IDPs living with host families	IDs in Camps in Settlements	IDPs renting dwellings	Returnees
Sana'a 4			2f+2m	
Al-jawf 3	1m+1f		1m	
Amran9	1m+1f	1m+2f Settlements	2f+2m	
Hajjah 14	2m+2f	2m+2f camps 1,2 2m+2f Settlements	1m+1f	
Sa'ada IDP 10 Returnees 10	1f	4m+4f	1m	5m+5f
Total 25m+25f	4m+5f=9	9m+10f=19	7m+5f	5m+5f=10

Chapter 3

Expectations and limitations of profiling in Yemen

Profiling in Yemen is expected to give insight in the dynamics of return. These expectations can be fully met for the future dynamics – less so for the return process that has happened in the past up to the time of field work End July/August 2010.

3.1 Future return

The applied methodology of HH interviews in combination with FGD gives a reliable picture of IDPs motivations and own perceptions of their future under different conditions⁹. IDPs in their majority wish to return, but will not do so in the current situation. They express clearly what the main obstacles are, that are preventing them from return: general and individual safety concerns and the destruction of homes.

Return can be expected to happen as a function of progress on these fronts.

A smaller proportion of IDPs indicate that they do not want to return. Yet , given the lack of own resources, the lack of information about potential assistance in pursuit of alternatives, most of them do not know what else to do but to wait in displacement. Alternative durable solutions will need to be developed and materially supported with this group.

These detailed profiling results are useful information for humanitarian and other relevant actors to shape their future strategies for a solution of the IDP crisis.

3.2 Past return

The return process that had already happened in the past from the peak of the hostilities in September 2009 or substantially from the truce agreement in February 2010 until the profiling field work end July/August is more difficult to capture and to ascertain its scope through profiling. In the four 'host' governorates we can only indirectly estimate return of IDPs through the fact that survey teams did not find a number of IDPs sampled for interviews. Throughout the profiling period there was no access to the districts of origin /potential return of IDPs – except for Sa'ada city and its safety belt. Hence, these IDPs, who had left their displacement location for another place, were not subject of the household survey. Their number can only be estimated through extrapolation of the number of interviewees not found where they were expected. Even then we cannot determine if they went back to their place of origin or to

⁹ See detailed results in chapter 7

another place or if any other factor played a role. Once access is granted the returnees can be counted and sampled, their numbers could be extrapolated and compared with numbers from displacement areas. The sampled returnees could be addressed with questions that would reveal their trajectory of displacement and more importantly we could find out what characteristics distinguish these (early or past) returnees from the IDPs still reluctant to return. If a fully developed survey would not be possible a broad FGD exercise could already give indications. However, safe access to the areas is a precondition not yet in place.

3.3 Extrapolation results

In light of these limitations we have estimated the numbers of IDPs and of ‘possible returnees’, meaning those who were not found at their stated displacement address.

3.3.1 Estimated numbers of IDPs¹⁰

In order to underline the fact that estimation does not give a precise number we prefer to indicate a range for the numbers of HH and for the numbers of individuals.

Table 3.1 :

Estimated numbers of IDP HH and individuals at the time of profiling in 4 governorates and Sa’ada city with Saher, AISafra

	IDP HH range		IDP Individuals range	
Amran	6402	7076	53140	58734
Sana’a	3115	3442	23359	25818
Al Jawf	2092	2313	13600	15032
Hajjah	14443	15963	106879	118129
Sa’ada	15061	16646	78317	86561
Total	41 113	45 441	286 972	317 179

The numbers of the 4 governorates Amran, Sana’a, Al Jawf and Hajjah are extrapolated based on the values from the registration list, plus those from the non registered lists minus the double registration identified during survey.

The estimations for Sa’ada are not based on registration as in the 4 governorates, but on the counting in Sa’ada city and in the accessible areas of the two districts Saher and AISafra’a, done by the profiling team in Sa’ada.

It is to be noted that the extrapolation from the counting/sampling cannot be extended to all Sa’ada governorate districts.

¹⁰ Details for all calculations can be found in Annex 3 : Extrapolation

3.3.5 Estimated numbers of 'possible returnees' from 4 governorates

At the time of the exercise the estimated number of IDPs that left the district where they were registered in the 4 host governorates is estimated as follows:

Table 3.2 :

IDPs in 4 governorates who had left their registered location of displacement / 'possible returnees'

	IDP/returnee HH range		IDP/ returnee Individuals range	
Amran	2817	3114	23382	25843
Sanaa	31	34	234	258
Al Jawf	251	278	1632	1804
Hajjah	7944	8780	58783	64971
Total	11 043	12 205	84 031	92 876

This extrapolation result suggests that major movements of IDPs had happened up to the the time of profiling in Hajjah and to a considerable extent also in Amran. If they have returned or chosen another place in their trajectory as IDPs remains unclear. We know from the household survey that many of the IDPs in Hajjah are originated in the neighboring and for us inaccessible Sa'ada districts of Al-Dhafer and Haydan. However, we cannot conclude from this fact that some of the 'Hajja IDPs' have returned to these places . This may be the case or not, we do not have conclusive information until we gain more insight in the return situation of the districts of origin.

3.3.6 Estimated numbers of IDPs and returnees in Sa'ada city and 2 districts

The applied methodology in Saada allows extrapolation from the base of own counting and sampling done immediately before interviewing. This procedure avoids the problem of 'not found' at the time of survey. Extrapolation has generated the following result for returnees:

Table 3.3 :

Returnees in Sa'ada city and 2 districts – based on counting/sampling

	Returnee HH range		Returnee Individuals range	
Sa'ada city	3556	3930	18491	20437
Sa'ada 2 districts	3124	3453	16245	17955
Total	6680	7383	34736	38392

Table 3.4 :

IDPs in Sa'ada city and 2 districts – based on counting/sampling

	IDPs HH range		IDPs individual range	
Camps	3411	3770	17735	19601
Sa'ada City	7305	8074	37988	41987
Sa'ada 2 districts	4345	4802	22595	24973
Total	15061	16646	78317	86561

Conclusion from extrapolation

Various complications in terms of information and conditions in Yemen prohibited a straightforward sample design. Therefore, sampling procedure required a stepwise and differentiated approach. The complications at hand included:

1. A universe of the IDP population of unsure size
In the absence of a solid de-registration procedure, the registered IDP population is to an unknown extent inaccurate due to an unknown percentage of secondary displacement and return, thereby possibly inflating or underestimating the actual numbers.
2. Lack of precise information on the unregistered IDPs if any and their geographic distribution.
3. A variety of residential characteristics of IDP households, including the following:
 - a. Established camps
 - b. IDP households in villages
 - Living in with the host community
 - Renting separately or moving into free dwellings

- c. IDP households in urban areas
 - Living in with the host community
 - Renting separately or moving into free dwellings
 - Other living arrangements, e.g. in communal buildings, on the street
 - d. Spontaneous IDP settlements outside villages or urban areas:¹¹
 - Grouped household settlements – a concentration of five or more households settled in close proximity. These may include spontaneous settlements directly outside camps.
 - Scattered individual households – single or less than 5 households in close proximity
4. Difficult or impossible access to conflict areas where the estimation of the numbers within Saada governorates was limited to Saada city and Sahar and Safra.

The findings of the exercise in terms of IDPs presence are mainly limited by 3 facts:

1. Lack of elaborate method to identify non-registered IDPs, partially because of the cost of such a method, second because it is believed that the registered IDPs would capture at least a very high percentage the most vulnerable IDPs. The risk remains in cases of double registration or non-vulnerable IDPs not wanting to be registered for assistance purposes.
2. The design of the sample is based on the registration database that assumes that the people are still located in the governorate where they were registered. In the cases where the survey proved this incorrect, the findings and extrapolation were re-adjusted through modifications of the weights.
3. The extrapolation in Saada is based on the figures of census conducted in 2002 with extrapolations that are challenged by repetitive displacement during the last 8 years, making it a basis that could be improved, thus challenging the accuracy of the findings.

Nevertheless, the findings of the survey in terms of numbers of the IDPs are considered representative of the reality.

One of the results of the survey outside Sa'ada was to estimate the number of households that are not anymore located in the governorates where they were registered. This category of some 11,043 to 12,205 households could be:

¹¹ The cut-off point between 4 and 5 households (approximately 28 and 35 persons) is arbitrary and may be adjusted in accordance with practical survey and assistance considerations. For 'close proximity' no pre-defined measure is suggested, as this is probably better determined on the basis of the obviousness in the field.

1. Returnees to Sa'ada
2. Secondary displacement outside Sa'ada
3. Secondary displacement back to Sa'ada (still IDPs in Sa'ada)
4. Enumerators unable to find them.

In comparing this number to the number of returnees estimated in Sa'ada - some 6,680 to 7,383 households - we find that there is a gap of number that could be explained as follows:

1. Returnees to Sa'ada in areas not covered by the survey
2. Secondary movement outside Sa'ada

Finally, a better explanation of the found numbers could be realized once more data is collected from the remaining affected areas within Sa'ada governorate.

Chapter 4

Demographic and household characteristics

Table 4.1 summarizes the basic figures of the survey population of IDP and returnee individuals and households. The returnee numbers reflect only those that the profiling team has counted and sampled in the accessible part of Sa'ada governorate, which is Sa'ada city and the security belt in 2 districts Al Safar and Saher. Sa'ada IDPs are also those from the accessible area, there is no information available of IDPs and returnees within the major part of Sa'ada governorate. IDPs from Sa'ada in following tables are those found displaced in 4 governorates and in the accessible area of Sa'ada governorate.

Table 4.1:

IDPs and Returnees Population

IDP population	10 938	IDP HH	1 486	Average HH size	7.4
Returnee population	1 534	Returnee HH	197	Average HH size	7.8
Total IDP & R	12 472	Total IDP &R HH	1 683	Average HH size	7.4

Over 12 000 persons live in 1683 HH, the average statistical HH size is 7.4 members. The returnee HH is slightly larger. No particular reason could be found to explain any difference. For example split families that might distort the results, are found in both

groups. HH members are considered all who live in the HH, even if they are not immediate kin.

4.1 Demographic profile


4.1.1 Population differentiated by age and sex



The demographic profile is shown in below table by age group and sex for IDPs and returnees. We have grouped children under 5, children above 5 to 18, adults up to 60 and the older population over 60.

Table 4.2:

IDP & Returnees by age and sex

	AGE GROUP				Total
	0-4	5-17	18-59	60+	
Male	833	2762	2495	240	6330
M Percentage	13%	44%	39%	4%	100%
Female	797	2498	2658	189	6149
F Percentage	13%	41%	43%	3%	100%
Grand Total	1630	5260	5153	429	12479
Grand %	13%	42%	41%	4%	100%





The largest group with over 42 % of the total population is the children above 5. Together with the small children they make up more than half of the population (55%). Adults up to 60 are 41 % and the number of old persons is remarkably low with only about 4 % of all people surveyed.

In comparison with Yemen population figures from the census, the low number of old persons in our sample reflects exactly the proportion in the total population. The ratio child (up to 17) to adults (18-59) is more even in the total population than we found in our sample population, but children remain the majority age group in the total population.

Among Sa'ada returnees we see some difference in age composition: adults are about equal to children numbers and also the older persons are relatively more than among the IDP population. The proportion of male to female is slightly in favor of males, which is inverse to the usual demographic pattern. We found this confirmed in many other sources we consulted, yet nowhere an explanation is provided.

Table 4.3 captures the proportions of the two variables age and sex for each governorate and reveals some deviations from the general pattern for Al Jawf and Sana'a.

Table 4.3:

IDPs by Age Group and Sex in Governorates

Location		AGE GROUP				Total
		0-4	5-17	18-59	60+	
Sa'ada	Male	250	788	786	80	1904
	Female	250	714	860	66	1890
	Total	500	1502	1646	146	3794
Hajjah	Male	298	1002	760	65	2125
	Female	270	854	769	44	1937
	Total	568	1856	1529	109	4062
Amran	Male	99	304	273	32	708
	Female	97	269	305	25	696
	Total	196	573	578	57	1404
Sana'a	Male	88	253	193	15	549
	Female	70	231	243	18	562
	Total	158	484	436	33	1111
Al-Jawf	Male	28	124	117	5	274
	Female	41	126	125	1	293
	Total	69	250	242	6	567
TOTAL	Male	763	2471	2129	197	5560
	Male %	13.7	44.4	38.3	3.5	100
	Female	728	2194	2302	154	5378
	Female %	13.5	40.8	42.8	2.9	100
	Grand total	1491	4665	4431	351	10938
	Age Group Total	6156		4431	351	
	Percentage	13.6	42.6	40.5	3.2	100
Age Group %	56.3		40.5	3.2	100	

In Annex 4: 'IDPs by five age groups ' a table with an additional age group of children can be found for an even more detailed picture.

Table 4.4:

Returnees by Age group and Sex

Returnees		AGEGROUP				Total
		0-4	5-17	18-59	60+	
Gender	Male	70	291	366	43	770
	Female	69	304	356	35	764
Total		139	595	722	78	1534
Percentage		9.1	38.8	47.1	5.1	100

Within the returnee population we see also the gender bias towards the male except for the second age group.

4.1.2 Diversity/Vulnerability of the population

In situations of displacement vulnerable persons are at heightened risk. They are less resilient than other people against the hardship of flight and life in displacement. In addition they may suffer from neglect and disruption of usual support by caregivers and surrounding community. Even deliberate rights violations have been observed: people with impairments have been ‘forgotten’, abandoned and left behind during flight. But mostly the problem is the complete lack of resources of the IDP community in combination with the high level of dependency from others that expose vulnerable persons to extreme risk. As much information as possible on numbers, locations and conditions of vulnerable segments among the displaced is imperative for upholding the rights and providing appropriate assistance to these persons. The survey gives details on numbers and types of disability differentiated between full impairment and difficulties, i.e. ‘blind ‘or ‘difficulties to see even with glasses’.

Table 4.5:

Disabilities among IDPs and returnees – fully impaired persons

Type	Degree	Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-Jawf	Total	%
Seeing	Full impairment	11	4	2	2	0	19	0%
Hearing	“	16	12	3	5	2	38	0%
Walking	“	14	9	1	1	0	25	0%
Self care	“	14	7	2	4	6	33	0%
Remembering	“	2	5	3	0	0	10	0%
Communicating	“	10	4	1	3	0	18	0%
Total		67	41	12	15	8	143	1%
Percentage of sample pop.		0,5%	0,3%	0,1%	0,1%	0%	1%	

Table 4.6

Disabilities among IDPs and returnees – partial/ with difficulties

Type	Degree	Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-Jawf	Total	%
Seeing	with difficulties	49	21	8	0	3	81	1%
Hearing	“	56	25	14	2	10	107	1%
Walking	“	41	17	5	3	10	76	1%
Self care	“	11	11	6	2	7	37	0%
Remembering	“	27	12	11	1	10	61	0%
Communicating	“	44	9	11	3	11	78	1%
Total		228	95	55	11	51	440	4%
Percentage of total sample population		2%	1%	0,5%	0%	0,5%	4%	

In summary we find a proportion of 1% disabled persons among the population. If we add the persons who express ‘difficulties to see, to hear, to walk..., ‘we come to an estimation of 5%. We need however to consider the category ‘with difficulty ‘as a subjective judgment, that may vary from one person to the other, while the category ‘full impairment’ indicates objective disability.

4.2 Household characteristics**4.2.1 Female headed households**

The demographic profiling also allows to identify the number of female headed HH. This is an indicator for another type of vulnerability among the population. In a male dominated culture where the function of head of HH is in the hand of the husband and in his absence passed on to the oldest son rather than the wife, a female headed HH signals problems. Lacking male support can result in social marginalization and poverty. Women have responsibility as head of the family in 9 % of the HH inquired.

Table 4.7:

IDP heads of HH by age group and sex

Age group			Sex		Total	% age group
			Male	Female		
	0-18	Number	30	6	36	3%
		%	83%	17%	100%	
	19-59	Number	1025	92	1117	86%
		%	92%	8%	100%	
	60+	Number	125	15	140	11%
		%	89%	11%	100%	
Total		Number	1180	113	1293	100%
		%	91%	9%	100%	

Also the age of the head of household – adolescent / child age or over 60 years old – can be an indicator for vulnerability. The head of HH in active working age may be missing and the young or the old generation must step into this function. This can be a heavy burden on persons not yet or not any more able to provide for others and it may expose the dependent family members to protection risks.

Regarding family responsibility by age group we find that old persons are in charge of a family in 11% of the cases, and 3% of the families have a child as head of HH.

It is interesting to note that among the old and young heads of families the proportion of females taking on this responsibility is higher than on average. Most likely it is more difficult for a young girl and an aged woman than for a woman in active working age, to earn the necessary income for themselves and a family. Hence these may be cases of extreme vulnerability.

In FGD the concerns of female headed HH were not frequently brought to our attention. Participants were more preoccupied by chronically ill members of family or community and disabled persons.

Conclusion of chapter 4

- The demographic analysis reveals that over half of the IDP/returnee population is younger than 18. This is consistent with the national census of the Yemeni population.
- The gender ratio is in favor of males – a finding also of other research, yet it is in contradiction to general population patterns. No explanation could be found in spite of follow up on this phenomenon.
- We have 9% of female headed HH.
- 11% of HH are lead by aged men or women (over 60) – mostly men.
- 3% of HH are lead by boys or girls - mostly boys.
- 5% of our sample population is fully or partially disabled.

Chapter 5

Patterns of displacement

5.1 Current residence and residence before displacement (origin)

5.1.1 IDPs and returnees in their current location

The overall number of surveyed HH is 1683, a proportion of 12 % or 197 HH are returnees, IDPs are 1486 HH or 88% of the total sample. The Sa'ada numbers refer to

the accessible area of the governorate only, which is Sa'ada city (old and new), and the 'safety belt' around Sa'ada city with part of two districts, Saher and AlSafra. As explained the profiling team counted, sampled and interviewed population there. However no IDP nor returnee HH WITHIN the other districts of Sa'ada was part of the sample, hence no interview was conducted with the population in other than the accessible districts of Sa'ada governorate.

Table 5.1:

IDPs & Returnees by Current Location


		Returnees	IDPs	Total
Governorate	Sa'ada	197	529	726
	Hajjah	0	550	550
	Amran	0	170	170
	Sana'a	0	149	149
	Al-Jawf	0	88	88
Total		197	1486	1683
Percentage		12%	88%	100%

The population displaced FROM their districts of origin is distributed over the five governorates in the proportion shown by below table. Three sample families came from the border area indicating Saudi Arabia as their place of origin.

Table 5.2:

IDPs by Current location and Origin

Current Location of Displacement	Location of origin					Total	%
	Sa'ada	Amran	Al-jawf	Hajjah	Saudi Arabia		
Sa'ada	529	0	0	0	0	529	36%
Hajjah	538	2	0	7	3	550	37%
Amran	127	43	0	0	0	170	11%
Sana'a	127	22	0	0	0	149	10%
Al-Jawf	9	16	63	0	0	88	6%
Total	1330	83	63	7	3	1486	100%
	89.5%	5.6%	4.2%	0.5%	0.2%	100%	



The IDPs are concentrated in Sa'ada (accessible area) and Hajjah (combined over 70%), nearly equal proportions of IDPs, 36 % and 37% , are displaced internally in Sa'ada and hosted in neighboring Hajjah. Amran and Sana'a put up around 10 % each and Al Jawf the remaining 6 % (see pie chart).

Obviously Sa'ada bears the brunt of the displacement problem with considerable internal movements and with receiving back a number of those who had fled across the boundaries of their governorate. This happens on the background of major damage to homes and public infrastructure.

Table 5.3:

IDP HH by current location and by origin in %

Current Location of Displacement	Location of origin					Total
	Sa'ada	Amran	Al-jawf	Hajjah	Saudi Arabia	
Sa'ada	529	0	0	0	0	529
	100.00%					100%
Hajjah	538	2	0	7	3	550
	97.80%	0.40%		1.30%	0.50%	100%
Amran	127	43	0	0	0	170
	74.70%	25.30%				100%
Sana'a	127	22	0	0	0	149
	85.20%	14.80%				100%
Al-Jawf	9	16	63	0	0	88
	10.20%	18.20%	71.60%			100%
Total	1330	83	63	7	3	1486
	89.5%	5.6%	4.2%	0.5%	0.2%	100.0%

The overwhelming majority of IDPs – 90 % - is originated from Sa'ada governorate, the main conflict area. But we find also some IDPs that have their original place of residence in Amran or in Al Jawf. The conflict creates repercussions in neighboring governorates that have to deal with internal movements in addition to the influx from Saada.

In **Amran** governorate the conflict district generating displacement is **Harf Sufian**.

Out of 83 Amran originated IDP HH 75 come from Harf Sufian. About half of them (39 HH) remain within the governorate, the others go to Sana'a (22) or Al Jaw (13).

In **Al Jawf**, the governorate internally displaced come from various districts. A major proportion fled the district of **Az Zahir** (35 HH out of 63); Al Matammah and Bart Al Anan are home to 9 sample families each, while Rajuza district was fled by 4 sample families. These districts are known for high conflict potential and repeatedly make headlines for outbreak of fighting.


The numbers of internal movements in the two governorates may appear low, but they indicate unrest and insecurity beyond the focus area of the conflict.

5.1.2 IDPs by DISTRICTS of origin in Sa'ada governorate and their distribution to receiving governorates


Our methodology allows us to identify the **districts** of origin of the people displaced from Sa'ada governorate. We have illustrated this pattern in below chart based on the related tables attached in annex.

Most of the IDPs in our sample come from Al Dhaher and Haydan . Together these two districts are home to 45% of the displaced. It is worth while bringing in here the population numbers of the districts (year 2009): Al Dhaher has with 25 000 inhabitants


less than half of the population of Haydan, yet it suffered a loss of displaced higher than Haydan. This gives an impression of the severe impact of war on Al Dhaher district, on the likely destruction of homes and infrastructure that has caused the flight of such large numbers of its inhabitants.




In which governorate did the people from the diverse districts find refuge?
 Following charts illustrate their distribution over the hosting governorates including the accessible part of Sa'ada governorate itself.




The displaced interviewed in the safety belt of Sa'ada come mainly from Razeh, Haydan, Saqyan and Saada city in nearly equal proportion.




In Hajjah we find a very different pattern. The IDP group is relatively homogeneous, composed from Al Dhaher and Haydan origin mainly. In fact, nearly all Al Dhaher originated IDPs chose Hajjah as their refuge. This information could be useful for information campaigns or other targeted interventions addressed to groups of same origin.



In Amran the composition of the IDP caseload is very diverse, with an emphasis on neighboring Sahar.



Sana'a was chosen by RazeH and Haydan originated people, the movement from Saher followed the road Sa'ada –Amran- Sana'a with most IDPs stopping in Amran, but some moving on to Sana'a.



Al Jawf is mainly affected by internal displacement; the few from Sa'ada come from neighboring Al Safra district.

5.1.3 IDPs and Returnees by residential category

We introduced the dimension of residential category into our analysis according to the situation the affected population lives. Displaced persons in Northern Yemen live in spontaneous settlements, in IDP camps; they rent houses or are hosted by others. The returnees are likely back to their own houses, even if damaged. This can be concluded from a comparison between the residential pattern of Sa'ada IDPs alone and Sa'ada IDPs & returnees. Having more accurate data about the housing situation of IDPs will allow for better targeted humanitarian and recovery interventions. Later we will see that one of the biggest problems that people face in displacement as well as in return is indeed their housing/shelter situation.

In the context of the displacement in Northern Yemen the host situation is least relevant – only 9 % of the interviewed HH (based on IDP and returnee numbers) are hosted, while renting a house in displacement is the preferred option with 37 % of the HH. Settlements are preferred over camps where 22% respectively 18 % of all responding HH live.

The culture of highly valued privacy for the family is reflected in this pattern. FGD confirm that people try to leave the embarrassing and overcrowded host situation that they may have found initially with relatives or friends, as soon as possible and try to rent.


The camp situation is also nothing to aspire to for a displaced person except for some who live even in worse conditions at home. The undignified closeness to other families, the exposure to risk of SGBV is mentioned as a negative characteristic of the camp situation.

Settlements can provide the advantage of space for animals, important as a livelihoods base for many rural families displaced from the countryside of Sa'ada.

Table 5.4:

IDPs & Returnees by Residence type and Displacement governorate

Displacement Governorate	Residence type					Total
	Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlement	
Sa'ada	44	307	135	173	42	701
Hajjah	52	60	150	15	253	530
Amran	23	92	9	33	7	164
Sana'a	8	131	0	2	1	142
Al-Jawf	21	10	1	0	51	83
Total	148	600	295	223	354	1620
	9%	37%	18%	14%	22%	100%



Above table reflects the residential situation of the caseload in each governorate. The related charts visualize remarkable differences between governorates.

In **Hajjah** nearly half of all HH are found in settlements, others in the 3 camps.

In **Al Jawf** settlements are available to the displaced, some are hosted, others can rent.

In **Amran** the preferred situation is renting a house. A substantial number of IDPs live in own houses. This may indicate family ties between Amran and Saada, where the parents' or other close relatives' house is considered 'own house'. Focus group facilitators in Hajjah came across a wealthy family displaced from Saada to their own second house in Harad vicinity. There may also be cases where IDP families have given up on returning home and have bought a house in the location of displacement.

In **Sana'a** the displaced have mostly rented, there is even a shift from host to rental situation, as people try as soon as possible to lift the burden and re establish privacy for both families, the own and the hosts. The challenge then is the rent, as emphasized in many FGD. In Sana'a people find job opportunities as daily workers, which is more difficult in other places like Harad. In Amran a rented place is more affordable than in Sana'a, which may explain the high proportion of this residence type.

In **Sa'ada** we have a mixed residential situation with the returnees included here, who are living in "own houses". In Sa'ada city a number of camps managed by Yemeni Red Crescent are home to families displaced from Western districts. Most IDPs within the security belt live in rented places.

5.2 Reasons of displacement

Out of 1486 IDP head of HH we have interviewed, 1425 gave us their priority reason to flee out of a list of optional answers. In below table we have organized the responses in descending order according to their importance for the total of respondents.


Table 5.5:

IDP HH by reasons of fleeing

*Rank No.	Reasons to flee	Priority					
		1st		2 nd		3rd	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1	Armed conflict in or near area of origin	1036	73%	97	7%	35	3%
2	House damage or destroyed	135	9%	498	36%	199	15%
3	Expulsion by non-government forces	75	5%	171	12%	78	6%
4	Tension between tribes in area of origin	41	3%	151	11%	41	3%
5	Presence of landmines or UXO'S	28	2%	51	4%	111	8%
6	Others	26	2%	15	1%	47	4%
7	Expulsion by government forces	22	2%	53	4%	27	2%
8	No humanitarian assistance available	15	1%	61	4%	294	22%
9	Disappearance of family members	11	1%	21	2%	8	1%

10	House occupied without consent	10	1%	90	6%	124	9%
11	No school available	8	1%	36	3%	75	6%
12	No health services available	7	0%	58	4%	122	9%
13	Economically not viable	6	0%	43	3%	102	8%
14	Fear of forced conscription by armed forces	4	0%	21	2%	14	1%
15	Immediate family is elsewhere	1	0%	21	2%	54	4%
Total		1425	100%	1387	100%	1331	100%

*Ranking of 1. priority



As is to be expected the “armed conflict in or near the area of origin” is the prime reason accumulating 73% of the votes. The next most frequently mentioned priority reason to flee was “damaged or destroyed house” by 9% of the respondents. In third order of importance ranks the reason “expulsion by non-government forces”, mentioned by 5%. All other reasons rank lower in importance.

Each respondent could choose his first, second and third priority reason. The conflict and the damage of homes are the first and second priority, but lack of humanitarian assistance comes up as the third priority reason, when the person himself ranked his three reasons.

We can look at the reasons to flee, that especially the IDPs originated from Sa’ada express and compare to the overall pattern – though, given the weight of 90% of these

HH in the total there should not be much deviation. Indeed the ranking and the proportion are nearly identical. The corresponding operation can be done for the small number – 10 % - of IDPs originated in Amran and Al Jawf. The sequence of ranking and also the accumulation of votes change. Armed conflict ranks still highest, but does not receive the high number of votes as in Sa’ada. Instead the second reason to flee “damaged or destroyed house” is mentioned by more HH (25%). “Tension between tribes in area of origin”, and “expulsion by non government forces” change the place of third and fourth reason on the list of first priority.

The tribal tensions in Harf Sufian and Al Jawf find their reflection in peoples’ reason to flee.

From the perspective of each head of HH ranking his three most important reasons, the main drivers “conflict, house damage, and lack of humanitarian assistance” remain the same all over and for governorate breakdown.

Table 5.6:

Reasons to flee by governorate-Saada'a

Rank No.	Reasons to flee-Saada'a	Priority					
		1st		2 nd		3rd	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1	Armed conflict or near area of origin	950	74%	88	7%	30	3%
2	House damage or destroyed	100	8%	439	35%	189	16%
3	Expulsion by non-government forces	70	5%	160	13%	75	6%
4	Tension between tribes in area of origin	33	3%	137	11%	33	3%
5	Presence of landmines or UXO'S	27	2%	49	4%	102	9%
6	Others	23	2%	14	1%	42	4%
7	Expulsion by government forces	17	1%	48	4%	23	2%
8	No humanitarian assistance available	13	1%	58	5%	248	21%
9	Disappearance of family members	9	1%	19	2%	6	1%
10	House occupied without consent	8	1%	75	6%	110	9%
11	No school available	8	1%	29	2%	68	6%
12	No health services available	7	1%	46	4%	110	9%
13	Economically not viable	6	0%	41	3%	90	8%
14	Fear of forced conscription by armed forces	4	0%	20	2%	12	1%
15	Immediate family is elsewhere	1	0%	15	1%	46	4%
Total		1276	100%	1238	100%	1184	100%





Table 5.7:

Reasons to flee by governorate-Amran and Al-jawf

Rank No.	Reasons to flee-Amran and Al-jawf	Priority		
		1st	2nd	3 rd
		%	%	%
1	Armed conflict or near area of origin	58%	6%	3%
2	House damage or destroyed	25%	38%	7%
3	Tension between tribes in area of origin	5%	10%	5%
4	Expulsion by non-government forces	4%	7%	2%
5	Expulsion by government forces	3%	4%	6%
6	Others	2%	1%	3%
7	Disappearance of family members	1%	1%	1%
8	House occupied without consent	1%	10%	8%
9	No humanitarian assistance available	1%	2%	32%
10	Fear of forced conscription by armed forces	0%	1%	1%
11	Presence of landmines or UXO'S	0%	1%	4%
12	No school available	0%	5%	5%
13	No health services available	0%	9%	8%
14	Immediate family is elsewhere	0%	4%	6%
15	Economically not viable	0%	1%	8%
Total		100%	100%	100%




5.3 Reasons to choose the location of displacement

Table 5.8:

Choice of displacement location

Governorate	What was the main reason to come to this place								Total
	Family living here	Presence of families from place of habitual residence	Proximity to place of habitual residence	Better job opportunity	Availability of humanitarian assistance	Security	Other Specified	Other	
Sa'ada	58	17	6	13	85	309	26	15	529
Hajjah	114	29	7	2	86	274	1	37	550
Amran	77	8	7	11	13	47	1	6	170
Sana'a	46	35	0	7	3	26	24	8	149
Al-Jawf	16	11	5	1	0	50	0	5	88
Total	311	100	25	34	187	706	52	71	1486
Percentage	21%	7%	2%	2%	13%	48%	3%	5%	100%



The main reason to go to a specific location is to find safety and security from the armed conflict.

The next important factor influencing the choice of location is own family living there. Less important is the fact that other families from home area are there.

To some extent - 3. rank with 13% - the availability of humanitarian assistance plays a role.

Remarkable exceptions to this overall pattern are those who chose Amran and Sana'a as location of displacement. They wanted primarily be close to family already living there. For Amran we saw this already reflected in the pattern of residence with IDPs living in own (family) houses. The choice for Sana'a was also motivated by the presence of families from the home area.

The displaced in Hajjah emphasize the family factor, but also access to humanitarian assistance and the proximity of people from the home area as decisive for their choice of location.

Sa'ada internally displaced rank availability of assistance second high after security, which is for them more important than it is on average.

5.4 Timing of displacement and multiple displacement




5.4.1 Timing of displacement




In the table below we have analyzed the movement of IDP HH by year of flight. Over 80 % of the IDPs fled in 2009, which indicates that the 6. outbreak of conflict was the driver of displacement. Interesting is however, that a certain movement had happened already in previous years, at previous peaks of conflict. A movement on low scale continues into 2010.

Table 5.9

Time of flight

Governorate	Year of flight					Total
	2000-2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Sa'ada	34	45	50	346	54	529
Hajjah	2	3	8	525	4	542
Amran	6	3	17	128	16	170
Sana'a	4	6	16	115	8	149
Al-Jawf	0	1	0	80	5	86
Grand Total	46	58	91	1194	87	1476
Grand Total %	3%	4%	6%	81%	6%	100%





The analysis per governorate reveals certain differences, though the peak of flight in August /September is the same for all displaced.

Among the IDPs in Sa'ada we find a number of 'old' IDPs who fled their home in previous years, even back to 2000. The IDPs we interviewed in Hajjah are 'new ' displaced. In Amran and Sana'a we found a certain number of families that had fled already in 2008. In Al Jawf displacement began in 2009 only.




More details of the time pattern of the flight we can extract from the statistics per month and year. They allow to associate historic events to the time of flight.

Table 5.10:

**Month and year of flight of IDPs in Sa'ada
(city and safety belt)**

Month	When did you flee from your place of habitual residence?			Total
	2000-2008	2009	2010	
Jan		5	28	50
Feb		4	7	14
Mar		1	5	21
Apr		3	2	20
May		7	2	16
Jun		9	7	23
Jul		12	1	28
Aug		124	0	145
Sep		66	0	75
Oct		25	0	27
Nov		41	0	51
Dec		46	0	48
Total	123	343	52	518
Percentage	24%	66%	10%	100%

For example the truce in February 2010 has considerably reduced the flight of the population, which was still ongoing from its peak in August 2009. The flow came to a halt only several months after the peace agreement because those who were blocked by the fighting took the opportunity to flee when the roads were safer. At the peak of the crisis areal bombardments had triggered the massive wave of flight. Subsequently the movement slowed down relatively. Later in the year the conflict flamed up again in certain areas and the movement intensified also.



5.4.2 Multiple displacements

Most of the displaced persons moved directly from their place of origin to the host area. A proportion of 14 % of the IDP families however had to displace several times. Two moves were needed mostly. Three moves were not uncommon for IDPs in Sa'ada and Hadjja. But there are families that moved even 4 times until finding a host location.

Table 5.11:

IDPs HH with single/multiple movements

Governorate	Did you come directly to this place?		Total
	Yes	No	
Sa'ada	449	80	529
Hajjah	474	76	550
Amran	159	11	170
Sana'a	121	28	149
Al-Jawf	81	7	88
Total	1284	202	1486
Percentage	86%	14%	100%

This happened particularly to the internal IDPs in Sa'ada as below table indicates.

In FGD participants reported that they were hosted initially by relatives, but after a while felt compelled to look for a rented place and leave, in order to alleviate the burden of the host family and find more space for the own family.

In Hajjah governorate the FGD team came across a case where a group of IDPs claimed to be threatened with expulsion by the owner of the land they settled on. The IDP did not know what to do to avert this threat or where to turn for help. The case was reported to the protection cluster for follow up.

Table 5.12:

IDPs HH with multiple movements

Governorate	No. of movements						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Sa'ada	6	40	27	5	1	1	80
Hajjah	5	46	23	1	1	0	76
Amran	2	7	2	0	0	0	11
Sana'a	8	15	4	1	0	0	28
Al-Jawf	0	6	0	1	0	0	7
Total	21	114	56	8	2	1	202
Percentage	10%	56%	28%	4%	1%	0%	100%

Multiple displacements are a challenge for any registration system. Records are difficult to keep updated as affected persons are not interested to ‘unregister’ when leaving, yet might be able to re-register at the new location. The consequence will be inflated numbers and - as happened to the profiling team particularly in Hajja - people ‘not found’ at their registered address.

5.5 Family unity of IDPs

A displacement situation bears high risk of family separation. There are many reasons why family members may be staying behind when the others move. This can be on purpose, when the hardship of fleeing is considered more damaging than staying behind. Old people sometimes remain with the argument that fleeing is too difficult for them. Disabled persons are sometimes forgotten, when sudden onset disasters or attacks drive people out of the homes. Even if the family was separated already for economic reasons, the usual contact can get lost during displacement, which puts additional strain on an already dire situation. In any case family unit strengthens resilience during crisis, while separation causes heightened anxiety and stress for those who fled and for those who remained. We are therefore interested to find out to which degree family unity is preserved or negatively affected in this displacement crisis.

Out of all IDP families 89% have all their members with them in displacement. Just over 10% are separated families.

Table 5.14:
IDP family union

Governorate	Are all family members who lived with you?		Total
	Yes	No	
Sa'ada	458	71	529
Hajjah	524	26	550
Amran	149	21	170
Sana'a	120	29	149
Al-Jawf	76	12	88
Total	1327	159	1486
Percentage	89%	11%	100%

The IDP in Hajjah managed to preserve family unity relatively well, while a relatively high proportion of families displaced to Sana’a is separated. Also the families in Sa’ada are split at a higher than average rate.

What happened to the members who are not in displacement together with their families? The next table gives details of their whereabouts.

Of the persons missing most had died as a consequence of the armed conflict(28% of all missing).

The other important reason for family separation is 'remaining to look after property at home'. The third reason is 'moving elsewhere'. Illness or old age was the reason to stay behind in 10% of the cases.

Table 5.15:

Where-Abouts of members missing to IDP HH

Where are they?	Governorate					Total
	Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-Jawf	
Stayed behind to look after land/property	22	2	12	5	3	44
	26%	8%	46%	19%	27%	26%
Stayed behind due to illness/disability/old age	9	1	3	1	1	15
	11%	4%	12%	4%	9%	9%
Stayed behind for other reasons	5	3	1	3	0	12
	6%	12%	4%	12%	0%	7%
Went check the situation in place of habitual residence	4	1	1	1	2	9
	5%	4%	4%	4%	18%	5%
Went elsewhere	14	5	3	3	0	25
	17%	20%	12%	12%	0%	15%
Died	23	12	3	6	5	49
	27%	48%	12%	23%	45%	28%
Don't know	1	0	1	1	0	3
	1%	0%	4%	4%	0%	2%
Other	6	1	2	6	0	15
	7%	4%	8%	23%	0%	9%
Total	84	25	26	26	11	172
Percentage Total	49%	15%	15%	15%	6%	100%

**** Summary**

No Answer	7	4	1	6	1	19
Total responses	84	25	26	26	11	172
Grand Total	91	29	27	32	12	191

****** Some of the 159 HH with missing members gave no answer, while others gave multiple answers if they had more than one member missing.

Among Sa'ada IDP families are some with more than one member missing. They suffered most from loss of human lives, 23 members from 71 Saada families died as a

consequence of war and displacement. While among the Hajjah displaced less families are affected by separation, these however suffered the death of members in half of the cases.

Deliberate decision to leave behind family members to look after property, was taken by all separated families, most pronounced by those in Amran, least by those in Hajjah.

The reason for this difference is not clear. Did the people fleeing from Al Dhaher and Haydan who escaped from the air raids, fear too much leaving anybody behind? While Amran IDPs who came from different districts and at different times did not receive such a strong impact of life threatening attacks and therefore decided to protect their property by a family member staying behind?

Conclusion of chapter 5

- The IDPs are concentrated in Sa'ada (city with safety belt – other governorate internal movements remain unknown due to lack of access) and in about the same number in Hajjah. Amran and Sana'a host each about 10 % of the total IDPs, Al -Jawf just over 5%.
- A total of 15 districts in Sa'ada governorate suffered population displacement across governorate borders. Al Dhaher, Haydan and Razez were the most affected. Al Dhaher lost the largest number of people while it has a relatively small population.
- IDPs from Al Dhaher and Haydan chose the governorate of Hajja as their preferred location for displacement.
- Displaced families try to avoid camps unless they are extremely poor and marginalized in their home areas, in which case a camp provides unknown comfort. In FGD participants explain that camps do not provide the necessary privacy. This is also a problem for the families hosted by others. In general Yemen IDPs prefer to rent a private place, even though the rent and purchase of water is a burden on an IDP budget. Settlements are preferred by IDPs with animals as a livelihoods base.
- The peak of movement of the IDPs was in August /September 2009 as a consequence of aerial bombardment in Sa'ada; 80 % of IDPs fled in this time. The flow subsided with the ceasefire in February 2010, yet continued to a small extent as people then made use of the open roads to move out.
- We observe 'old' displacement among Sa'ada IDPs from former outbreaks of conflict, even back to 2006 and before.
- Multiple displacement has happened to 14% of the IDPs, with the people inside Sa'ada being the most affected by multiple displacement, not least because they

have also the largest number of 'old' IDPs. Multiple displacement poses a severe challenge to the accuracy of registration.

- Separation of families during flight is a major risk, which places additional hardship on a population in distress due to conflict and loss of home. Out of all families displaced 11% claim missing members. Most of these missing have died in and after the armed clashes. Others stayed deliberately behind to watch property. Some have moved elsewhere.

Chapter 6

Registration Pattern of IDPs

Some questions on registration posed to the heads of IDP HH may give us information about the registration pattern in our sample, from which we could draw conclusions about eventual gaps in the registration system.

6.1 Non- registration

We drew our samples in 3 governorates largely from the official registration lists, combined with up to 10 % HH not officially registered. In Al Jawf no unregistered list was available at the time of profiling, hence the sample is purely from the registered list. In Sa'ada, as mentioned in the chapter 'Methodology', we did not make use of any official registration list, but counted and sampled following our established method.

Upon the question if registered or not after arrival in current location, we received answers from nearly all interviewees in 4 governorates, only from IDPs in Sa'ada some 10% are missing. The pattern of registration of returnees in Sa'ada is captured separately in chapter 8 – Returnees.

A proportion of 13 % of the answering IDPs declared not having been registered.

Table 6.1 reflects the result by governorate.

Table 6.1:

IDP Registration Pattern

Governorate	Have you become registered as IDP by the government after arrival in this place?				Total
	Yes	%	No	%	
Sa'ada	370	79%	101	21%	471
Hajjah	516	95%	25	5%	541
Amran	158	95%	9	5%	167
Sana'a	117	79%	31	21%	148
Al-Jawf	68	82%	15	18%	83
Total	1229	87%	181	13%	1410

The response from Al Jawf is surprising, because only the registered list served as basis for sampling, and therefore 100 % of registration could be expected. However 18% claim not to be on the official list. May be there are irregularities in the registration list or people give inaccurate answers hoping to obtain assistance. According to the respondents claiming not being registered, they “did not have the ability to go”, “did not know where to go” or “registration service was not available”.

The relatively high number of non registered persons in Sana’a is due to “ignorance about registration “ or “ inability to go”. In Amran “registration was not available “ according to those who were not registered.

Among the respondents in Sa’ada, who were not drawn from the official list, we find 21% not registered. They claim that registration was “not available” or admitted that they “did not know “about it. Over 25 % were denied registration. This only happened in Sa’ada. The reason given was “discrimination” without further specification by the respondent, “registration was over”; some complained about registration staff, some had not the requisite documents.

6.2 Arrival time of the non- registered IDPs

In order to clarify further we identified the arrival time of the non – registered persons. In Sa’ada we find an ongoing, though reduced flow of arrivals up to July 2010 (time of survey), we also know that Sa’ada counts ‘old IDPs’ from former rounds of conflict. Among them are also unregistered ones. The unregistered in the other governorates reflect the general pattern of movement in the last months of 2009 after the outbreak of conflict in August. There seems not to be a particular connection between arrival time and registration.

In annex 6: Unregistered IDPs – arrival time, we have captured full details, arrival month and year per governorate.

6.3 Double registration

Out of the registered IDPs 9% said they were already registered as IDPs elsewhere before. Such cases are found in all governorates, but concentrated among IDPs in Sa’ada.

Table 6.2 :

IDP already registered before in another place

Governorate	Answer & %	Were you registered as IDP before in another place?		Total
		Yes	No	
Sa'ada	Answer	45	318	363
	% of Total	4%	26%	30%
Hajjah	Answer	29	483	512
	% of Total	2%	40%	42%
Amran	Answer	3	152	155
	% of Total	0%	13%	13%
Sana'a	Answer	31	83	114
	% of Total	3%	7%	9%
Al-Jawf	Answer	3	62	65
	% of Total	0%	5%	5%
Grand Total	Answer	111	1098	1209
	% of Total	9%	91%	100%

Conclusion of chapter 6:

- In Sa'ada 21% of IDPs sampled from counting, not from a registration list, declared not being registered.
- Among the reasons given was outright denial of registration for a major number of persons. Yet it is not possible to decide without further information, if denial of registration was justified or not.
- Some unregistered IDPs could be expected in the other governorates as samples from unregistered lists were included.
- The result of 18% unregistered for Al Jawf is unexpected as no unregistered list was used there. If interviewees gave incorrect information or if other factors are to be blamed would need to be clarified in a following step.
- The arrival time of the IDP is obviously not linked to the registration, because we find unregistered persons at all times of the flow of displacement.
- 9% have been registered as IDPs before, mostly in Sa'ada.(Many responses there are missing.)

Chapter 7

Intentions of IDPs for the future and obstacles to return


The synopsis on the following page captures our sample population at the time of survey. We have 1683 HH participating in the survey. IDP HH are 1486 or 78 % and returnees 12 % of the total sample population.

We should recall that at the time of survey about one year has elapsed since the massive influx of displaced persons as a consequence of the 6. outbreak of war in Sa'ada. Prior to this survey movements of IDPs have occurred. During our data collection in the field we had difficulties to find all the persons on the interview lists drawn from the registration list. In fact, we failed to locate nearly half of the sampled interviewees in Hajja and Amran. We cannot establish to which extent these absent families have returned or moved to another location of displacement or if other factors play a role. Only upon full access to Sa'ada governorate we can ascertain a past return to the districts of origin in numbers and by characteristics of such returnees. Our chosen methodology allows however making projections for future return dynamics. Household interviews can capture intentions, plans, and motivations and reflect perceptions of the concerned persons. We have explored the potential for return or alternative solutions, respectively the risk of protracted displacement. The synopsis reflects peoples' intentions formed on the basis of their current information – lack thereof - about the situation back home, their knowledge about progress of peace agreement implementation, their understanding of rights and duties in case of such crisis, their knowledge about potential support programs to facilitate durable solutions.

7.1 Intentions

We asked heads of displaced households about their intentions to return and found that over 70 % of them intend to return, less than 30 % don't want to return.

In FGD we found a marked difference between male and female groups about the attitude towards return. For women home is now associated with the traumatizing experience of war. When asked about return they expressed fear and anxiety and hesitated to give a quick determined answer. In male groups the question about return triggered less the memories of the horror of war, but rather a discussion about the changed environment to go back to or not.




From the total return potential – all those who say yes to return – the largest number comes from Hajja, followed by Saada IDP's. While this is no surprise, as it reflects the pattern of displacement with Hajja hosting most IDPs, Sa'ada the second highest number, we can find differences between the governorates when we look at the proportion of Yes to No in each governorate and compare them.

7.1.1 Intentions to return by governorate of displacement

Table 7.1

IDP HH by governorate of displacement and intention to return

Governorate	Would you like to return to the place of usual residence before displacement?				Total
	Yes	%	No	%	
Sa'ada	373	71%	156	29%	529
Hajjah	394	72%	156	28%	550
Amran	131	77%	39	23%	170
Sana'a	114	77%	35	23%	149
Al-Jawf	50	57%	38	43%	88
Total	1,062	72%	424	28%	1486



From above table we can read different intensities of the wish to return prevailing among the displaced population in different governorates. The displaced in Amran, also those in Sana'a seem to be eager to return, because 77% say YES. Those in Al Jawf seem to be reluctant, only 57 % say yes to return, 43% don't want to return.

7.1.2 Intentions to return by district of origin

The survey allows to take the analysis of the intention to return from the level of governorate of current displacement to the level of district of origin, though some responses are missing. We can find out if the inclination to return expressed by persons displaced from different districts varies from one district to another. Below table

reflects the details from all districts of origin represented in the sample, located mainly in Sa'ada governorate, but also including the Amran and Al Jawf districts of origin.

The table contains two types of information: the yes/no proportion left of the IDP number indicates the contribution of the district to the total number of yes/no. The columns YES/NO to the right reflect the proportionate intent to return or not to return in each district.

Table 7.2:

IDP HH by DISTRICT of origin and intention to return

District of origin	yes		no		IDP number	YES	NO
Al-Dhaher	211	15%	79	6%	290	73%	27%
Haydan	182	13%	77	6%	259	70%	30%
Razih	133	10%	34	2%	167	80%	20%
Sa'ada city district	91	7%	44	3%	135	67%	33%
Sahar	83	6%	39	3%	122	68%	32%
Saqayn	93	7%	22	2%	115	81%	19%
Harf Sufian (Amran)	55	4%	20	1%	75	73%	27%
Majz	32	2%	13	1%	45	71%	29%
As Safra	25	2%	12	1%	37	68%	32%
Az Zahir (Al Jawf)	23	2%	12	1%	35	66%	34%
Shada'a	24	2%	9	1%	33	73%	27%
Baqim	7	1%	3	0%	10	70%	30%
Ghamr	10	1%	0	0%	10	100%	0%
Al-Matammah (Al J.)	4	0%	5	0%	9	44%	56%
Bart Al-Anan (Al J.)	1	0%	8	1%	9	11%	89%
Kitaf wa Al Boqe'e	4	0%	3	0%	7	57%	43%
Harad (1702)*	4	0%	2	0%	6	67%	33%
Rajuza (Al J.)	0	0%	4	0%	4	0%	100%
Monabbih	3	0%	1	0%	4	75%	25%
Khabb wa ash Sha'af	3	0%	0	0%	3	100%	0%
Qatabir	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%	100%
Al-Hashwah	1	0%	1	0%	2	50%	50%
Kharif (Amran)	0	0%	2	0%	2	0%	100%
Al-Maton (Al J.)	1	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0%
Jabal Iyal Yazid	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%	100%
Amran	1	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0%
Khamir (Amran)	1	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0%
Sana'a (1310)*	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%	100%
Khayran (1711)*	1	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0%
Total *probably district of Displacement	993	72%	394	28%	1387	72%	28%

Among the first 6 districts listed above and representing 78% of Total we find some deviation from the average 72/28 proportion. Those from Sa'ada city and from neighboring Saher have a somewhat higher than average number of people who do not want to return, while Razeh and Saqayn show a lower than average number of no to return.

The reasons for this variation are not obvious. We know that Sa'ada city residents suffered heavy destruction of homes, shops, and infrastructure, potentially more than rural population. In FGD we heard statements like "we have lost everything; we have nothing to go back to". This might be the case for many IDPs who had fled Sa'ada city. The results from the livelihoods chapter suggest that IDPs with non-agro related sources of income are less inclined to return. This might apply to the IDPs originated from Sa'ada city, however we have no further statistical tool in the current approach to ascertain this assumption.

The reason why IDPs from Razeh district would be more eager to return than other conflict and damage affected IDPs might also be their socio-economic situation. In Razeh people make a living of Quat planting and trading. They have land and other property that they would not give up.

Among the districts of origin we have listed 5 Al Jawf districts (marked in the table). All of them have a higher than average proportion of IDPs who do not want to return. Given that these are governorate – internal IDPs and they are the majority of IDPs found in Al Jawf, we have a confirmation of the above stated result that IDPs in this governorate are remarkably unwilling to return. Their districts of origin are subject to tribal tensions, acute risk of renewed fighting and progressive intrusion of Al Houthi fighters.

Harf Sufyan, the conflict district in the north of Amran governorate, contributes about 5% to the IDP caseload. The displaced from this area are not particularly reluctant to return, in fact, the proportion of yes to no is about average with 73 % to 27%.

Preliminary conclusion

At the time of survey 28% of the displaced families expressed their intention not to return home. While this is a snapshot of opinion at a given moment, which can change over time it signals a problem of finding alternative durable solutions for a certain caseload without option of return.

The IDPs in/from Al Jawf, mostly displaced from conflict districts within their governorate, appear to be particularly exposed to this problem with over 40% not intending to return.

Between the other major districts of origin there is some variation in the intent to return, yet not as pronounced as for Al Jawf. The reasons for the difference for

example between Razeh and Sa'ada city originated IDPs regarding their wish to return or not is not obvious and will need further, more targeted exploration. Possibly ownership of land and other property is a pull factor to consider for an explanation.

7.1.3 Timing of return plans

Going back from the governorate and district level to the global level analysis, we follow up separately on each of the two IDP groups – those that say YES to return and those that do NOT want to return, in order to obtain a clearer picture of their potential future.

YES to return - 72 % of IDPs

We ask the heads of HH: When do you plan to return?

Table 7.3

Timing of return

Governorate		When do you plan to return?						Total
		Within the next month	Between 1 and 3 months	Between 3 and 6 months	Between 6 and 12 months	After more than one year	Not sure / don't know	
Sa'ada	Number	5	3	8	8	8	336	362
	%	1.4%	0.8%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	91.2%	100%
Hajjah	Number	12.0	10	4	4	2	363	384
	%	3.1%	2.6%	1.0%	1.0%	0.3%	91.9%	100%
Amran	Number	4	4	2	3	9	114	135
	%	3.0%	3.0%	1.5%	2.2%	6.7%	83.7%	100%
Sana'a	Number	0	3	1	0	2	106	111
	%		2.7%	0.9%		1.8%	94.6%	100%
Al-Jawf	Number	0	0	0	3	2	45	43
	%				7.0%	4.7%	88.4%	100%
Total	Number	21	20	15	18	23	964	1061
	%	2,0%	1.9%	1.4%	1.7%	2.1%	90.7%	100%

We realize that only 5 % have a plan to return within the next half year, other 4 % plan a return during or after another half year. **Over 90 % do not know and are not sure when their return will happen.** This high level of uncertainty about the future is a sharp contrast to the expressed desire and determination to go home of over 70% of the IDPs.

The displaced in Amran have the most defined plans in terms of timing – but only comparatively to the others, still 84 % of them don't know and are not sure when their intended return will happen.

The FGD reflect this uncertainty even sharper. There is not one FG whose members would have expressed a timeline for return. Interviewees immediately turned to the conditions of return, which are not under their control and elaborated on the problems and obstacles. They did not feel to have the capacity to determine when the conditions for return would be fulfilled. This is in the hand of other actors beyond their reach. IDPs live in the undignified situation that – even having a clear vision of return – they depend on others to enable this move.

7.1.4 Intentions for alternatives to return


NO to return – 28% of all IDPs

We now follow up on those that do NOT want to return, in order to obtain an idea of their potential future.

Displaced persons who are not willing or able to return are a category among the IDP caseload that requires specific attention due to their likely high vulnerability. Some of them may have sufficient own capacity to overcome the phase of displacement and find their own solution for a sustainable future away from home. The vast majority however is likely to be exposed to a heightened risk of continued displacement with own resources depleting and dependency from humanitarian assistance and harmful coping strategies for the entire family increasing. If and to what extent this negative prospect of descent into the misery of protracted displacement materializes depends on decisions and corresponding actions taken by those responsible for a solution to the displacement crisis. Minimally actors need to be aware of the existence of the problem of ‘no return’ and the numbers of affected families. Also awareness and acceptance of the right to free choice of ‘no return’ with the ensuing consequence of a right to support for alternatives needs to be promoted with all involved including the concerned IDPs themselves, in order to facilitate for this group the way out of displacement and into integration in a new environment.

Profiling with the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods can contribute the following to the question of ‘no return’:

The 28% out of all IDPs who declared in interviews not wishing to return, face the alternative of starting a new productive life away from home or staying in displacement.



The alternative of setting up a new life away from home can be considered in the current district or governorate of displacement – local integration - or in other governorates within the country – settling elsewhere - or even going abroad. A new life in any of these places takes a minimum of material and immaterial assets to start, including self confidence, hope, family support, relationships in business or private sphere, a general information and knowledge level, that reaches beyond the home area, competitive technical skills in the profession to exercise, access to minimum of monetary and/or in kind material capital.

At the time of survey 3% of the IDPs considered either to integrate in the area of displacement or to settle elsewhere in the country. No intention to go abroad was expressed. The plans for such move are however not very concrete in terms of timing.

The heads of HH who do not want to return, but have a positive alternative of starting a life away from home with their families are few. This leaves 25% of all IDPs with no better option than staying in displacement. Given the gravity of the decision not to return and the time elapsed since fleeing from home, it could be expected that more families would have come to an alternative solution for establishing their household sustainably in the future.

The discussion with FG members gives some indication why this has not happened and points to practical measures that can increase access to productive alternatives for more families:

Displaced persons do not know about their right to free choice of settling anywhere in the country. If the road to return is obstructed the remaining option in their own perception is protracted displacement and dependency unless they have own means. The possibility to be supported and receive assistance for pursuing alternative opportunities in and after a displacement crisis is beyond the expectations of displaced persons. Obviously, up to the time of survey no public discussion has taken place about alternatives to return and support to such options. When this possibility was brought to attention, some participants of FGD expressed interest in considering particularly integrating in the local environment. Sana'a was the preferred place for local integration. Schooling and job opportunities are the advantages of urban integration perceived by FG participants. Young people seem to be attracted more than older by the idea of local integration in urban environment.

The option of 'settling and integrating elsewhere in the country' sparked a discussion around the type of the support that might be provided – a piece of land and access to pasturage for animals would be attractive to start life elsewhere for IDPs unable or unwilling to return to their rural areas in Sa'ada.

The residual category of staying in displacement for undetermined time is what most of the people are facing who have decided not to return. FGD members commented on this with resignation and helplessness. It is not an option of choice but a reflection of lack of information, support and access to alternative solutions.

Conclusion:

The Synopsis above summarizes the overall pattern of future INTENTIONS of IDPs given their level of information and their 'state of mind' at the time of interview. Turned into the terminology of a 'Framework for Durable Solutions', the displaced population aims for the following solutions:

RETURN - 72%

NON – Return – 28%

- **With ideas about alternative DURABLE SOLUTIONS for about 3%**
 - Settlement ELSEWHERE in the country – 2%
 - Local INTEGRATION - 1.5%
- **With the risk of PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT for 25%**

This is a snapshot of intentions for their future, expressed by IDPs who find themselves displaced from home since nearly one year.

- The analysis reveals however, that the desire to return as the largely preferred durable solution is not matched by concrete plans to do so, not even by the confidence that this will happen in a foreseeable future. In the next chapter we will find out about the obstacles that prevent the displaced from materializing their preferred choice and that keep them in displacement.
- The analysis reveals further, that alternative durable solutions to return have not entered into the spectrum of options of the displaced – the alternative to return is the status quo of displacement. During FG discussions about potential alternatives available and support provided, IDPs open up to other choices than facing protracted displacement.
- Protracted displacement is not a choice, it happens by default. The displaced, blocked from return for a variety of reasons, are at risk to enter into long term dependency from humanitarian aid. The challenge is to reduce this caseload by raising awareness for all potential durable solutions and providing material support to achieve a solution. The level of ignorance among the concerned people and other stakeholders about rights of IDPs in general and the right to be supported for other solutions than return requires a major effort of information/communication/education. Special attention must be paid to reaching illiterate or otherwise disadvantaged segments of the population.
- Information is a necessary start, but durable solutions require a dialogue between concerned IDPs and supporting stakeholders aiming to match needs and capacities with available resources.
- In the meantime humanitarian aid must provide a reasonable standard of living under the conditions of displacement.

7.2 Obstacles to return

In spite of a large proportion of displaced people with outspoken return intentions there is a lot of uncertainty and hesitance. What are the obstacles to return? Below table ranks the answers given by the interviewed heads of households.

Table 7.4

Obstacles to return ALL IDP HH:

No	Obstacles to return	1st Priority	Percentage
1	Ongoing fighting	474	35%
2	Risk of renewed fighting	465	34%
3	Damage to house	171	13%
4	Fear from harassment in return area	92	7%
5	Non existence of State institutions	86	6%
6	Inability to travel	18	1%
7	Lost Land	13	1%
8	Fear from loosing humanitarian assistance	12	1%
9	Mines and UXO\'s	8	1%
10	Other	7	1%
11	Food insecurity / lack of livelihood	6	0%
12	Lack of health services in home area	6	0%
13	Lack of employment in home area	3	0%
14	Lack of education in home area	2	0%
15	Lack of other services in home area	1	0%
Total		1364	100%

We got a fairly clear answer to this question. The questionnaire offered a list of 15 different possibilities from which interviewees could choose their first, second and third priority. Ranking the first priority issues mentioned by the IDPs, the first five received 95 % of the votes given. The first two issues sum up to nearly 70% of the votes for priority obstacles. The third one follows at a distance with 13% of votes and obstacle four and five receive each 7 and 6% of the votes.

The biggest obstacles to return are:

1. Ongoing fighting

and

2. Chance of renewed fighting

With about equal percentage of the votes for a first priority reason of not returning

3. Damaged houses.

4. Fear of harassment in return area

and

5. Non existence of state institutions

With about equal percentage of votes.

The fear of mines and UXOs has overall and statistically less importance than the anecdotal evidence from reported individual experiences may imply. Fear to lose humanitarian assistance does exist, but is not a decisive deterrent from return. Also the lack of diverse public services back home is not a first priority obstacle to return. It is the fear of war that overshadows all other reasons to delay return. The destruction of homes – obstacle 3 - is an obvious impediment as long as there is no offer for support to repair and reconstruction.

Fear from harassment and lack of state institutions are related hindrances for return. The FGD gave a vivid impression of the gravity of these problems in the own perception of the IDPs. FG members – male and female alike – described the impossibility of returning to a place that is dominated by a hostile group from which they fled. Those who must fear to be seen by this group as associated with the government, expect revenge killing if they would return. This is probably the extreme case for government officials and members of the military. But others expect to be harassed in other ways like having to follow religious beliefs they do not adhere to or sending their children to schools with a new curriculum they do not want to accept. Returnees in Sa'ada have confirmed that they faced this problem and have taken their children out of school.

FG members insisted that only when a strong government is established in their home area, which will protect them from such harassment, only under this condition they would consider to return.

The pattern of main obstacles expressed by all IDPs as reflected in table 7.4 applies to each governorate, but with some change in ranking:

The IDPs in Sa'ada fear renewed fighting much more than ongoing fighting – vice versa in Hajja. We see here probably a bias reflecting the reality of fighting ongoing during the time of survey in Hajja.

The obstacle 'damaged house' is on a similar level of perceived gravity for IDPs in all displacement areas except in Hajja where it gets a comparatively low voting. Obviously the fear of fighting dominated at the time among the Hajja IDPs and distracted from other problems.

Expected harassment in the return communities and lack of state institutions to protect from it are a particular concern of the IDPs who found refuge within the government held area of Sa'ada.

Table 7.5

Obstacles to return per governorate

Obstacles to return	Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-Jawf
Ongoing fighting	12%	58%	23%	57%	19%
Risk of renewed fighting	43%	24%	47%	21%	31%
Damage to house	17%	6%	17%	11%	20%
Fear from harassment in return area	11%	4%	7%	1%	7%
Non existence of state institutions	11%	3%	4%	4%	6%

Conclusions regarding obstacles to return:

- General safety and security is the overwhelming concern of IDPs and their main obstacle to return. With 70% out of 100% of the voting it overshadows all other concerns that under the perceived threat of new outbreak or continued armed conflict appear of minor importance.
It is the obligation of political actors on the national level to remove this prime obstacle to return. Other actors can play a complementary and supportive role in the achievement of sustainable peace i.e. by addressing some of the grievances that fuel the conflict such as economic underdevelopment of the governorate.
- Individual safety and security is the concern expressed by obstacle 4 and 5, personal harassment and ensured protection from this by public institutions on communal level.
This can be achieved by civil society, local level reconciliation committees and strengthening of local governance.
- The 3. rank concern 'individual home destruction' is the one that can be removed by targeted material assistance of humanitarian and development actors in the context of national and international recovery and reconstruction programs.

Chapter 8

Returnees¹²

8.1 Pattern of return

Different from the 4 'hosting governorates' where we based profiling on existing registration lists, we have done a counting in the accessible part of the 'return governorate' Sa'ada. Thus we have avoided eventual shortfalls of the registration lists such as lack of timely update. However, the analysis of returnees suffers from an other shortfall. As already mentioned, profiling teams were extremely restricted by security concerns. Even though we recruited enumerators from the very area of survey and the coordinator and supervisor are members of El Amal, a national NGO with long history of humanitarian work in all Sa'ada governorate, we could not go beyond the borders of the security belt traced around the city of Sa'ada and including only small parts of the adjacent districts of Saher and Al Safra. In this zone government is present while in the rest of the war affected potential return area the Al Houthi hold power. For a considerable number of the population still in displacement half a year after the truce this is one of the deterrents to return as we know from FGD and responses during interviews. So the return dynamic to the government held area can be different from the dynamic to return to the Houthi held areas we cannot access, particularly when we project future return. Generalization of the findings from the limited area to the entire governorate will not be possible.

Annexes 7 a and b – 'Return to Razeq; return to Malahed ' capture two detailed testimonials from the Sa'ada districts inaccessible to the profiling team – returnees travelled to Sa'ada to meet the team.

For the return to the safety belt zone around Saada city we found the following:

The composition of the sample is 529 IDPs and 197 returnees, which is a proportion of **73 % IDPs to 27% returnees**. These returnees are largely governorate internal displaced persons. Only few returned from other governorates like Sanaa and Taiz. We have however to take into account that not all returnee families responded to our respective question, and in FGD we had participants returned from Sana'a and Amran, even from Hodeida.

Their reason to flee had been – as for all interviewees – primarily the war in home area or nearby, in particular the air raids and the artillery fire that terrorized women and children in a lasting way. Their decision to choose the location of displacement was

¹² It is to be emphasized that the term 'returnee' does not describe a legal category; these are displaced persons who have returned home and have the right to be assisted if in need until their full re-integration.

consequently driven by security reasons (80%), further 11% mentioned to have gone where family lives. Availability of humanitarian assistance was a lower ranking reason to choose the place to flee to.

Most likely these people had fled the fighting in the city and found refuge in the surrounding country side from where they returned when they felt confident enough about security. The returned participants in FGD were mostly people who decided to return soon after the cease fire. Those in and around city met with the governor who encouraged return. People displaced in Amran or Sana’a mentioned the burden on the hosts or the heavy load of rental that pushed them to the decision to return upon ceasefire, in one case the landlord had received threats from the Houthis and urged them to leave.

All returnees in FGD give vivid descriptions of the state in which they found their homes and properties – houses totally or partially destroyed, so that they were put up first by neighbors, or lived in one single room they could fix or in the animal quarters. Many had stores, some had animals of which they found nothing left. Fields were dried out and difficult to rehabilitate as water pumps are looted and tanks destroyed; water has to be bought now. Only one participant mentioned that he had been visited by a reconstruction committee, others complain about in-transparent procedures, others want to see the tight controls lifted, so that they can bring in building materials and repair their houses themselves.

8.2 Returnee registration

As our sample had disregarded the official registration lists, it will be interesting to see how many of our randomly sampled returnees are actually captured by the registration mechanism in place. Following sequence of tables give some insight.

Table 8.1:

Former registration as IDP

Were you registered as IDP before in another place?			
		Number	%
Valid	Yes	92	58.6
	No	65	41.4
	Total	157	100.0
No answer		40	
Total		197	

Table 8.2:

Returnee registration

Have you become registered as returnee by the government after arrival in this place?			
		Number	%
Valid	Yes	111	56.9
	No	84	43.1
	Total	195	100.0
No answer		2	
Total		197	

Table 8.3:

Reason for Non-registering

What is the main reason that you were not registered as returnee?			
		Number	%
	Just arrived	3	4.1
	Did not know of registration	13	17.8
	Did not know where to go	5	6.8
	Did not have the ability to go	5	6.8
	No need to be registered	1	1.4
	Do not want to be registered	1	1.4
	Registration service was not available	45	61.6
	Total	73	100.0
	Not concerned/no answer	124	
Total		197	

We can conclude about return registration:

- More than half of the returnees had been registered as IDPs elsewhere in displacement; not all did answer this question.
- Upon return over half (57%) of the returned families got registered as returnees, yet a major number of returnees (43%) is not captured by the registration mechanism.
- Most of the non registered ones claim that no such service was available. Some did not know of registration. Even if they had registered as IDPs, they possibly did not know that return is also registered officially. They may even not know that they are entitled to assistance not only as IDPs in host locations, but also as returnees in home location until they have fully integrated again and have no further need that is caused by displacement.

8.3 Needs upon return

Below we reflect the full table summarizing the needs and problems faced by the displaced returning home. We have ranked the priority problems in descending order and included also those concerns that received low or no attention at all from respondents.

Housing is by far the biggest concern of returnees.

Remarkable is also the water problem that ranks above food in the surveyed Saada return area. Focus group participants also underpinned this most urgent problem. Destroyed and looted water tanks and pumps are the cause of this concern. Returnees lack the necessary means for replacement and repair. FG participants confirm that they receive monthly food rations, but quantities are insufficient and the short supply for large families is criticized as unjust.

Access to pasturage is a concern for the returnees inside the security belt, who want to stock up their herds as a livelihoods basis.

Table 8.4

Priority needs and problems of returnees

Rank	Highest priority need	Number of HH	%
1	Inadequate or overcrowded housing/shelter	60	30%
2	Inadequate drinking water supply	28	14%
3	Insufficient food supply	24	12%
4	Lack of/Insufficient food/water/pasturage for livestock	17	9%
5	Lack of job/self-employment opportunities	10	5%
6	Armed conflict here or nearby	9	5%
7	Conflict or tension with local community/tribe	9	5%
8	Immediate family members are missing	5	3%
9	Absence or loss of identity/education certificates/official documents	5	3%
10	Difficult access to humanitarian assistance	4	2%
11	Other, specify	4	2%
12	Lack of clothes/shoes	3	2%
13	Lack of privacy for family members	3	2%
14	Risk of forced recruitment to armed forces	2	1%
15	Women or girls are insecure in area	2	1%

16	Lack of/insufficient land for garden or crops	2	1%
17	Lack of freedom of movement in area	2	1%
18	Discrimination by local community/tribe	1	1%
19	Difficult access to health service	1	1%
20	Criminal violence in area	0	0%
21	Widespread presence of guns/weapons	0	0%
22	Presence of landmines or UXO's	0	0%
23	Difficult access to school	0	0%
24	Difficult access to mosque	0	0%
25	Behavior of local law enforcement officers	0	0%
26	Behavior of humanitarian assistance personnel	0	0%
Total		191	97%
	No answer	6	3%
Total		197	100%

The fear of war and tensions among those returned to the government held safety belt is still there, but far less dominant than among people still in displacement. However, we will see below that this is a factor to leave family members behind in the safety of displacement location and put up with the temporary separation of family.

In the return area of Sa'ada city and around there seems to be no problem of mines and UXOs, at least not to a degree noticed by returnees.

Returnees rather notice problems caused by missing personal documentation and the difficulties to access humanitarian assistance. Both types of problems are confirmed in focus groups. It is again the documents needed for school attendance and issuing of certificates that are a major concern for students and parents. Dysfunctional and fraudulent practices of humanitarian assistance in Sa'ada camps (concerning IDPs, less the returned) and beyond were a topic each focus group dwelled upon. Electricity is a problem highlighted by returnees in FG; they are requested payment for the time of absence, lines are cut if they cannot come up with the payment.

Missing family members are another cause of anxiety and stress for returnees, which can even weaken the capacity of the family to recover from the trauma of war and rehabilitate their livelihoods. In the next chapter we will analyze to which extent this problem exists and what people's perspectives are for achieving family unity.

8.4 Family unity of returnees

From all 197 returnee HH there are 168HH who have their family members with them now; 29 HH have missing members, which does not mean these are unaccounted for, it means they are not together with the family in the same place. This is a considerable proportion of 15 % of the returnee families.

What has happened to these missing family members?

We received an answer to this question from 23 HH.

Table 8.5

Where about s of members missing from returnee HH

Family members	Saada	Total
1. Stayed behind in last area of displacement	19	19
	82.6%	82.6%
2. Went elsewhere	4	4
	17.4%	17.4%
3. Died	0	0
Total	23	23
	100%	100%

Some of the missing family went elsewhere, but the majority has been left in displacement.

We even have estimates of the number of persons left behind in displacement. Unfortunately though, only half of the interviewees shared these details with us.

In Table 8.6 we see that 15 returnee HH have left 57 family members in displacement.

Table 8.6.

Return HH with individuals left in displacement

Governorate	No. HH	No. of members
Saada	4	1
	3	2
	1	3
	1	4
	2	5
	1	6
	1	8
	1	13
	1	15
Total HH	15	57
No response	4	0
Grand Total	19	57

The details of this table give an impression of the type of family split.

We have numerous cases where obviously the head of HH returned alone while the major part of the family remained in displacement. In half of the cases of split families only one or two members are left behind while the major part of the family returned.

In summary, 15 % of returnees are affected by family separation. While some of the missing members have gone elsewhere, most are expected to rejoin the family.

Asked about the plans of returning, two thirds of the responding heads of HH believe that they will be united within the next year, the others are less optimistic or not sure at all when this can happen.

Table 8.7

Time of expected family reunion

Timing	Answers	Percentages
Within the next month	8	36%
Between 6 and 12 months	4	18%
After more than one year	3	14%
Not sure / don't know	7	32%
Total	22	100%

Why are family members remaining in displacement?

The reasons given by the head of return HH are similar to the general obstacles for return of IDPs. Ongoing fighting and fear of renewed fighting in return area prevent two thirds of families to reunite.

Damaged houses are the obstacle to other 20 % of the separated families. Inability to travel is expressed by 7%. Yet fear of mines or fears of losing assistance are less relevant reasons to stay in displacement.

Table 8.8

Main Reason to Stay in Displacement

Main reasons for family to remain in displacement	Sa'ada	Total
Ongoing fighting in place of habitual residence	12	12
	41.4%	41.4%
Chance of renewed fighting	7	7
	24.1%	24.1%
Damage to the house	6	6
	20.7%	20.7%
Inability to travel	2	2
	6.9%	6.9%
Fear from harassment in return area	1	1
	3.4%	3.4%
Other (Mines/UXOs, Fear loosing Humanitarian assistance)	1	1
	3.4%	3.4%
Total	29	29
Percentage	100%	100%

In summary, not all, but the vast majority of separated and returned families hopes for family unity and expects that this may happen within the next year.

The reasons to remain still in displacement are related to security and to problems of reconstruction of own homes. Support for travel may help in some cases to overcome family separation.

Comparing IDP and returnee families under the aspect of family unity we find an interesting difference: While among the IDP there are 10 % separated families, we have 15% among the returnees. The family split in the return movement is probably a more deliberate one than at the moment of fleeing.

Also during or just before flight IDP families suffer the loss of family members who have been victims of armed conflict. Death of family is not mentioned by returnees.

Chapter 9

Livelihoods analysis

The livelihoods section of the survey will give insight in the socio-economic situation of IDPs and returnees during this crisis. The results will broaden the basis of knowledge about humanitarian and recovery needs of IDPs and returnees. It will be useful to direct humanitarian actors for more focused interventions in favor of the target population.

This part of the interview was conducted by a female enumerator with the woman in the household. Only when no woman was around, the male head of household was asked to respond. In Al Jawf only men were involved in the interviews due to cultural restrictions in a very traditional environment.

In addition to the results of the HH interviews we refer to the findings from the focus group discussions.

9.1 Source of income before and during displacement

Before displacement the main source of income for the now displaced persons was

1. Crop farming and 2. Livestock

Table 9.1:

IDP HH with main source of income

Main source of income before displacement			
		Number	%
1	Crop farming	494	43.8
2.	Livestock	143	12.7
3.	Trade	97	8.6
4.	Business	76	6.7
5.	Government job	66	5.9
6.	Other salaried job	65	5.8
7.	No income	65	5.8
8.	Teacher	40	3.5
9.	Remittances	23	2.0
10.	Government allowance	23	2.0
11.	Mechanic	13	1.2
12.	Engineer	7	0.6
13.	Nurse	6	0.5
14.	Bee hiving	9	0.8
	Total	1127	100.0
	No answer	359	
TOTAL		1486	

The agro-related income provided for over 50% of the families, while the other households lived on a range of different professions. Government related jobs including teachers, nurses, allowances provided for 12% of families. Trade and business stand out among the other sources of income. Some of the interviewees were unemployed before displacement.

Income during displacement

Currently only 39 % of the responding IDP have an income.

The source of it is not fully revealed as 40% used the answer “other” without giving any indication what this might include.

Those who identify their source of income have a government job, which probably means that they get pension or continued payment as a government employee temporarily suspended. Crop farming and small business contributes to a small extent to the current income.

These sources of income “barely” allow for a living, only 10% of respondents say that they can make a living of it. It is to be noted that only half of all interviewees responded to the question. This means in consequence **that less than 5 % of all IDP HH can make a living from their current source of income.**

9.2. Expenditures of IDP HH

9.2.1 Food

The women of the IDP HH addressed with the livelihoods questions were nearly all willing to answer the question of money ‘spent last week’ for food for the family.

Table 9.2

Expenditure food weekly

How much did your household spend last week on food?			
	Rials	Number HH	%
	0- 999	70	5.0
	1 000 – 4 999	536	38.5
	5 000 –10 000	544	39.0
	10 000 -14 999	166	11.9
	15 000 –19 999	47	3.4
	20 000	30	2.2
	Total	1393	100.0
	No answer	93	
Total		1486	

We asked not for a precise amount, but for a range of expenditure.

Nearly 40% of HH spent between 1000 and 5 000 Rials. Nearly the same number of HH spent between 5 000 and 10 000 Rials. The average of the first category is 3 000 Rials, equivalent to about 14\$ per week. The corresponding calculation for the other category is 7 500 Rials, about 34\$ per week.

9.2.2 Rent /shelter

We asked also how much families ‘spent last month on rent/shelter’. Out of the total number of sample IDP HH 48% responded, which is consistent with the high proportion of rented accommodation , maybe some IDP contribute also to the hosting HH.

Following table shows that the amounts paid fall into a fairly broad range between 5 000 and 40 000 Rials. The average amount of the most frequent category (10 -15 000) is 12 500 Rials equivalent to 57 \$. Yet the number of people paying more sums up to a higher percentage than those who pay in lower categories, so that the all over average is above 15 000 Rials , more than 68 \$.

Table 9.3:

Expenditure /rent shelter month

Expenditure last month on rent/shelter			
	rent/shelter Rials	Number HH	%
	0 – 1 000	27	3.8
	1 000 – 5 000	53	7.4
	5 000 – 10 000	146	20.4
	10 000 – 15 000	194	27.1
	15 000 – 20 000	141	19.7
	20 000 – 40 000	118	16.5
	40 000 – 80 000	27	3.8
	80 000 +	10	1.3
	Total 48%	717	100.0
	n/a	769	
Total 100%		1486	

Beyond food on which nearly all families spent money, and shelter which is a cost factor for close to half of IDP households, some IDPs also pay for medicine, for firewood, for water, for clothing, even for quat. Though we do not know what their money income is – such question is unlikely to trigger a useful answer - we were told that only a small number of families can make a living from money income. Exploring this problem further reveals a series of other strategies to cope with the situation.

9.3 Other strategies to make a living

There is a clear ranking of other strategies than job income as shown in below table.

Preferred strategies are

1. **Borrowing money**
2. **Humanitarian assistance**
3. **Reduce food quantity**

Table 9.4

Strategies to make a living

Rank No.	Other strategies used to make a living	HH	%	Total HH Answers
1	Borrow money	997	74%	1347
2	Humanitarian assistance	804	62%	1304
3	Reducing food quantity	650	51%	1281
4	Reducing food quality	545	43%	1271
5	Selling jewelry	353	28%	1253
6	Selling livestock	341	27%	1241
7	Working for kind	306	25%	1235
8	Sending family member away for work	244	20%	1236
9	Support from host community	220	18%	1205
10	Support from family members	214	17%	1228
11	Selling household assets	197	16%	1230
12	Living together with host family	166	14%	1206
13	Selling other production assets	133	11%	1203
14	Sharing costs with host family (e.g. cooking meals)	116	10%	1204
15	Child labor	80	7%	1211
16	Scavenging	54	4%	1207
17	Begging	40	3%	1208
18	Other strategies	30	3%	996

Borrowing money is the preferred way of getting economically through the crisis.

For the recovery phase it should be taken into account that over 80% of IDP HH are indebted and will need to pay back this money once earning income. The questionnaire allows for more details and - different from the income question - we received answers from most IDP HH.

Table 9.5:

Levels of debt among IDP HH

Debt levels since displacement			
		number	%
	0-999 Rials	12	1.0
	1000-4999 Rials	32	2.7
	5000-10000 Rials	83	7.0
	10000-14999 Rials	74	6.2
	15000-19999 rial	70	5.9
	20000-39999 Rial	159	13.4
	40000-79999 Rials	205	17.3
	80000-119999 Rials	128	10.8
	120000-159999 Rials	68	5.7
	160000-199999 Rials	59	5.0
	200000 >	216	18.2
	Don't know	79	6.7
	HH with debts 80%	1185	100.0
		301	
Total HH	100%	1486	

Some 18 % of families accumulated debt amounts of 1000 \$ equivalent and more since displacement. More frequent however are amounts of 100 \$ to around 500\$ equivalent. Together with other factors the duration of displacement possibly influences the level of debt – some families were 12 months or more away from home at the time of interview.

Reducing food quantity and quality are also widely used strategies to overcome the problem of minimal income. These practices will have consequences for the health of vulnerable persons – at least if insufficiency persists over longer periods.

Even more harmful practices were revealed in the FGD – scavenging, begging and child labor. We found parents who admitted that they could not send their children to school because they have to contribute to the family income by above mentioned practices.

In the survey we find this anecdotal evidence also statistically represented, but it ranks at the lower end of a long list of strategies used to make a living.

Humanitarian assistance ranks **second** among the survival strategies in displacement. FGP participants acknowledge that assistance is provided, but in the discussions the complaint about insufficient amount and poor quality dominate. The decrease from a reasonable quantity in the beginning to trickling supply is a big source of concern. IDPs fear that they will be completely cut off from assistance – What then? They ask. We

heard this sarcastic comment on the dire situation: “Before we die here from hunger, we will join the Houthi – they will give us food.” Food aid is special among the distributed items – its reduction caused panic among recipients. Deliberate communication about reasons and duration of cuts could ease this pain.

In FGD participants complained also about in-transparency of entitlements and injustice of distributions, perceptions that cause additional stress for recipients and should be dissipated by improved information and inclusion of IDPs in distribution management.

9.4 Needs and problems in displacement

In spite of the humanitarian assistance provided, displaced persons face numerous problems in their daily life. We asked interviewees to name these shortcomings, and we ranked and grouped them in the table further down.

Out of 1483 IDP HH 1417 have chosen answers from a list of 25 problems and 38 HH gave free answers.

Food and shelter are the top priority needs, followed at some distance by job opportunities. These three types of needs are labeled as most important by more than 50% of the IDP.

It is noteworthy that the food rations have been increased since the time of interviews, which is acknowledged by IDPs met randomly at a later stage. But complaints about insufficient quantities for large families persist. Humanitarian actors need to be aware of the importance of a steady food supply for people uprooted, dependent and facing an insecure future. What is technically announced as ‘break of pipeline’ translates into a life threatening shock in the perception of recipients in such vulnerable situation and causes psychological damage in addition to the physiological effect of hunger on weakened bodies. Utmost efforts need to be made to ensure stable food supply; at minimum any disruption needs to be accompanied with an information campaign that explains reasons, mitigation measures and creates transparency in particular about the duration of ration cuts.

The following three most important problems are ‘armed conflict here or nearby’, lack of pasturage and water supply. Even in displacement people don’t enjoy peace and relaxation from the war experience; instead they are concerned about tension and conflict around them.

Among the lower ranking needs and concerns we find the problem of privacy, which is related to the high priority problem of overcrowded shelters. We find also ‘discrimination by local community’. Both problems were frequently coming up in the FGD. Discrimination and harassment including corporal punishment of children in school by teachers and by students discourages parents to send their children to school. The privacy for the family was mentioned not only as the main reason to avoid camps, but

also as the reason to move out of a host situation to a rented place, this in spite of the difficulties to gather cash money for the rent.

Access to humanitarian assistance is mentioned on a lower level of importance as well as problems with the behavior of humanitarian staff. In FGD people shared some concerns, i.e. health centers are far away, health personnel does not treat them like resident patients. 'Access to health services' was mentioned often directly after the food rations that barely last for 10 days. Complaints focus not only on the distance to health facilities, but also on the cost for medicine and for treatment, they cannot afford. Chronic diseases are not any more treated, which causes particular anxiety and suffering for the affected patients and their families.

Half of the 25 listed problems were less relevant to respondents, mentioned by less than 10%.

The interviews rank problems like discrimination, behavior of humanitarian personnel and loss of documents on a low level, while the FG participants elaborate much more about such issues, than the low ranking in the quantitative analysis suggests. The FGD usually settle quickly on the key issues which tend to be the same as in the survey. Then the forum of the meeting is used to debate and exchange experience on other relevant issues that often spark emotions like the rejection of children in school due to lack of documents or even poor clothing. Also tragic events like cases of land mine accidents are topic of vivid group discussions. Fear that this might happen to the own family amplifies the effect of single known or heard of cases.

Such emotions coming to light in FGD must be captured and factored in as they help explain attitudes and decisions of the displaced persons.

Discrimination in school by teachers and students is a problem that in some cases leads even to abandoning school attendance. Children are called names, are punished by teachers, and are harassed because they have no school uniforms, often not even shoes. Discrimination is felt also by the adult IDP population, some of whom feel suspected as criminals, labeled as 'Houthis', as dangerous elements. Reaction of IDPs is to avoid contact with their environment. Life in isolation is the consequence. This problem needs attention on socio-political level - in particular when IDPs face protracted displacement or when alternative durable solutions (local integration) must be found for those who have no return perspective.

Loss of documents is often the cause of discrimination in school; no certificates are issued to IDP children at the end of the course. Refused access to school on grounds of missing documents from home school is repeatedly indicated in FGD. Simple

administrative orders can grant the right to school also to IDP children. Ared their experien

Loss of ID cards was less frequently mentioned, but members of one FGD in Amran shared their experience when trying to replace the loss. Administrative personnel asked for considerable fees that they could not afford to pay.

Behavior of assistance personnel is criticized and some examples of individual misbehavior are given, but in general the complaint is about felt injustice of distribution, futility of complaints, ignorance or inexistence of responsive complaints mechanisms, which results in frustration, anger, and summary accusation of corruption, helplessness and resignation. Service providers and other actors should consider strengthening systems that mitigate such problems even in a situation of insufficient material assistance.

Table 9.6:

Priority needs of IDPs

Rank	Priority Needs	Total	Percentage
1	Insufficient food supply	293	21%
2	Inadequate or overcrowded housing/shelter	280	20%
3	Lack of job/self-employment opportunities	183	13%
Total Percentage			54%

Rank	Priority Needs	Total	Percentage
4	Armed conflict here or nearby	93	7%
5	Lack of/Insufficient food/water/pasturage for livestock	92	6%
6	Inadequate drinking water supply	87	6%
Total Percentage			19%

Rank	Priority Needs	Total	Percentage
7	Lack of privacy for family members	57	4%
8	Discrimination by local community/tribe	52	4%
9	Immediate family members are missing	45	3%
Total Percentage			11%

Rank	Priority Needs	Total	Percentage
10	Difficult access to humanitarian assistance	42	3%
11	Lack of clothes/shoes	26	2%
12	Difficult access to health service	24	2%
13	Behavior of humanitarian assistance personnel	24	2%
Total Percentage			8%

Rank	Priority Needs	Total	Percentage
14	Women or girls are insecure in area	23	2%
15	Lack of/insufficient land for garden or crops	18	1%
16	Absence or loss of identity/education certificates/official documents	16	1%
17	Conflict or tension with local community/tribe	15	1%
18	Difficult access to school	13	1%
19	Lack of freedom of movement in area	11	1%
20	Other, specify	7	0%
21	Criminal violence in area	5	0%
22	Widespread presence of guns/weapons	4	0%
23	Presence of landmines or UXO's	3	0%
24	Behavior of local law enforcement officers	3	0%
25	Other	1	0%
26	Risk of forced recruitment to armed forces	0	0%
27	Difficult access to mosque	0	0%
Total Percentage			8%
Grand total		1417	100%

9.5 Needs and problems of IDPs in their respective governorate of residence

Differentiated by governorate we find some variations looking at the six most important needs, but the high level problem of food insufficiency confirmed. This problem dominates in all governorates except with Sa'ada IDPs, who feel stronger about the inadequate housing/shelter.

As for the second most important problem 'housing and shelter', we can observe a more pronounced difference between governorates. The problem ranks second highest in Al Jawf , Hajja while in Amran food and shelter rank equal; but in Sana'a people are more concerned about the armed conflict.

Jobs are the number 3 problem in Sa'ada, Hajja and Amran , but rank low in Al Jawf, who have more problems with livestock.

The number 4 problem of armed conflict is not mentioned at all by Al Jawf IDPs.

Water for livestock and drinking water are problems felt by Hajja IDPs more intensely than on average.

Table 9.7

Priority needs- IDPs per governorate

Rank No	Priority Needs	Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-jawf	Total	Percentage of Total
1	Insufficient food supply % of gov. total	101 20%	92 18%	37 22%	39 27%	24 29%	293	21%
2	Inadequate or overcrowded housing/shelter % of gov. total	133 26%	76 15%	37 22%	16 11%	18 22%	280	20%
3	Lack of job/self-employment opportunities % of gov. total	79 15%	57 11%	34 21%	11 8%	2 2%	183	13%
4	Armed conflict here or nearby	27 5%	34 7%	12 7%	20 14%	0	93	7%
5	Lack of/Insufficient food/water/pasturage % of gov. total	22 4%	47 9%	9 5%	5 3%	9 11%	92	6%
6	Inadequate drinking water supply % of gov. total	23 5%	47 9%	9 5%	4 3%	4 5%	87	6%
7	Lack of privacy for family members	13	30	4	9	1	57	4%
8	Discrimination by local community/tribe	24	10	3	12	3	52	4%
9	Immediate family members are missing	14	16	4	5	6	45	3%
10	Difficult access to humanitarian assistance	14	23	2	3	0	42	3%
11	Lack of clothes/shoes	16	7	2	1	0	26	2%
12	Difficult access to health service	5	12	3	4	0	24	2%
13	Behavior of humanitarian assistance personnel	10	4	1	0	9	24	2%
14	Women or girls are insecure in area	7	7	1	8	0	23	2%
15	Lack of/insufficient land for garden or crops	2	11	4	1	0	18	1%
16	Absence or loss of identity/education certificates/official documents	3	11	0	2	0	16	1%
17	Conflict or tension with local community/tribe	5	7	1	2	0	15	1%
18	Difficult access to school	3	6	1	2	1	13	1%
19	Lack of freedom of movement in area	8	3	0	0	0	11	1%
20	Other, specify	2	0	1	2	2	7	0%
21	Criminal violence in area	0	1	1	0	3	5	0%
22	Widespread presence of guns/weapons	2	1	0	0	1	4	0%
23	Presence of landmines or UXO's	1	2	0	0	0	3	0%
24	Behavior of local law enforcement officers	1	2	0	0	0	3	0%
25	UNKNOWN CODE 29	0	1	0	0	0	1	0%
26	Risk of forced recruitment to armed forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
27	Difficult access to mosque	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
	Total	515	507	166	146	83	1417	100%

9.6 Problems and needs of IDPs according to type of residence

Rented houses is the most frequent residence type for IDPs followed by spontaneous settlements and camps. A small proportion of about 10% is hosted and some IDPs declare living in own houses which could be a family house, a second house of rich Sa'ada residents, even purchase by the IDP family cannot be excluded, since a number of displaced have decided not to return.

Food is mentioned first by residents in all types of dwellings except by the hosted families who suffer more from overcrowded housing.

Housing which in general is the 2. problem is ranked 3. by camp residents below the problem of jobs.

Jobs are less the concern of people in settlements, but problematic for camp residents and IDPs in own houses.

Livestock supply is a need in settlements and with hosted IDPs, i.e. those in Al Jawf.

Drinking water is ranked in camps a problem below the average of all residential categories.

Among the lower categories of problems we find a relative higher rate of **discrimination** for the hosted and renting IDPs; the others probably get less in contact with their environment.

Loss of documentation is more frequent among hosted IDPs and those in settlements.

Hosted IDPs express also more difficulties to **access health services**.

Access to assistance in general is ranked about equal between the residential categories. FGD conducted in all residential types suggest however that there are discrepancies in the level of assistance between camps and non- camps. For example in spontaneous settlements people strongly complain about infrequent presence of mobile clinics, while camp residents can count on ambulances in addition to health posts. Primary education is another critical service that is rather available in camps, while children in some settlements cannot reach schools due to the distance and danger of the road. The scattering of IDPs outside camps needs to be better factored into the distribution management. With more distribution points and/or more precise information on the distribution day unnecessary and costly trips, anecdotally reported, could be avoided.

Table 9.8

Priority needs by Residential status

Rank No.	Highest priority need	Residential status					Total	Cumulative Percentage
		Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlements		
1	Insufficient food supply % of gov total	22 17%	118 21%	56 20%	17 25%	80 21%	293	21%
2	Inadequate or overcrowded housing/shelter % of gov total	33 25%	116 21%	46 17%	13 19%	72 19%	280	20%
3	Lack of job/self-employment opportunities % of gov total	13 10%	77 14%	54 19%	12 17%	27 7%	183	13%
Percentage total								53%

Rank No.	Highest priority need	Residential status					Total	Cumulative Percentage
		Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlements		
4	Armed conflict here or nearby % of gov total	3 2%	42 8%	22 8%	4 6%	22 6%	93	7%
5	Lack of/Insufficient food/water/pasturage % of gov total	9 7%	27 5%	18 7%	4 6%	34 9%	92	6%
6	Inadequate drinking water supply % of gov total	9 7%	30 5%	7 3%	6 9%	35 9%	87	6%
Percentage total								19%

Rank No.	Highest priority need	Residential status					Total	Cumulative Percentage
		Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlements		
7	Lack of privacy for family members	5	20	16	3	13	57	4%
8	Discrimination by local community/tribe	9	30	4	3	6	52	4%
9	Immediate family members are missing	7	19	9	1	9	45	3%
Percentage total								11%

Rank No.	Highest priority need	Residential status					Total	Cumulative Percentage
		Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlement		
10	Difficult access to humanitarian assistance	4	14	11	2	11	42	3%
11	Lack of clothes/shoes	1	12	9	0	4	26	2%
12	Difficult access to health service	4	6	5	0	9	24	2%
13	Behavior of humanitarian assistance personnel	1	8	5	0	10	24	2%
Percentage total								8%

Rank No.	Highest priority need	Residential status					Total	Cumulative Percentage
		Host family	Rented dwelling	IDP camp	Own House	Settlement		
14	Women or girls are insecure in area	2	8	7	0	6	23	2%
15	Lack of/insufficient land for garden or crops	0	6	3	2	7	18	1%
16	Absence or loss of identity/education certificates/official documents	3	3	2	0	8	16	1%
17	Conflict or tension with local community/tribe	3	7	1	0	4	15	1%
18	Difficult access to school	1	3	3	1	5	13	1%
19	Lack of freedom of movement in area	0	7	0	0	4	11	1%
20	Other	1	4	0	1	2	8	1%
21	Criminal violence in area	2	1	0	0	2	5	0%
22	Widespread presence of guns/weapons	0	1	0	0	3	4	0%
23	Presence of landmines or UXO's	0	1	0	0	2	3	0%
24	Behavior of local law enforcement officers	1	1	1	0	0	3	0%
26	Risk of forced recruitment to armed forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
27	Difficult access to mosque	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Percentage total								8%
Grand total		133	561	279	69	375	1417	100%

Conclusion:

- **Agriculture and livestock were the main sources of income before displacement.**
- **A considerable number of IDPs has a source of income now, but only very few can make a living of it.**
- **Most IDPs spend money on food; nearly half of IDP HH spend money on their accommodation.**
- **They cope by borrowing money and rely on humanitarian assistance.**
- **In displacement food insufficiency and inadequate shelter are the dominant problems across all governorates and residential types.**
- **Lack of jobs ranks third on the list of needs. The absence of cash income and of the immaterial advantage related to an occupation are both undermining the wellbeing of the families in displacement.**
- **Some deviation from the average can be found between governorates – i.e. in Sa'ada the housing problem seems to be more urgent than in other displacement areas.**
- **Likewise there are differences between the residential categories, i.e. the lack of job opportunities is less a concern for the IDPs in settlements than for the camp residents.**
- **There is evidence from FGD that basic services outside camps like health care, water supply, NFI distribution are less frequent and reliable than services in camps; also education, attention to vulnerable and activities involving women are not existing or at lower level in non camp situations.**

Chapter 10

Gender and vulnerability aspects of IDP profiling

The base unit of the profiling study is the household, usually led by a male member of the family. This person is also the addressee of the questionnaire and offers his opinion and perspective on most of the issues inquired by the survey, which no doubt creates a gender imbalance of the results – except for the livelihoods module that is answered by the woman of the household while a female enumerator takes notes.

Through that section of the questionnaire essential information on expenditures, resources and coping strategies is provided by the IDP women. Most importantly, the needs and problems while living in displacement are expressed by the woman on behalf of the whole family. This way we have captured the female perspective to some extent.

We have another possibility to complement the male dominated responses with a female angle. The questionnaire allows identifying the number of female headed households, to analyze their situation as displaced families and to compare with the other households. This adds more than a female aspect, it adds the dimension of diversity and vulnerability that often characterizes the female headed household.

Results from female headed households' analysis

In our IDP sample we find 9 % households led by females. Most of these are in active adult age, some beyond 60 years and a few girls are among a number of child headed households.

10.1 Residential categories – relevant under gender /vulnerability aspects

Nearly half of the female headed households live in rented dwellings. While this is the preferred residential category among IDPs and even in the combined IDP – returnee sample (see table 5.4 with 37 %) the preference is less marked than for the female group. We know that living in host situation is the least preferred option with 9% of IDPs only. For the female group it is also least preferred, but with 14%, thus getting close to living in camps, which is the case for 16% of the female group. (see details and governorate breakdown in annex 8 : Female headed HH by governorate).

The high rate of rental accommodation and the relatively increased number of female headed families hosted is remarkable and will further motivate humanitarian actors to shift attention towards these non-camp situations.

10.2 Intention of return and alternative solutions - no remarkable gender difference

The proportion of positive and negative answers to the question of return is the same as among the IDP in general.

Table 10.1:

Intention to return female headed HH

Female headed Household		Would you like to return to the place of usual residence before displacement?				Total
		Yes	%	No	%	
Governorate	Sa'ada	35	78%	10	22%	45
	Hajjah	9	69%	4	31%	13
	Amran	9	90%	1	10%	10
	Sana'a	15	63%	9	37%	24
	Al-Jawf	13	65%	7	35%	20
Total		81	72%	31	28%	112

Those in Amran express a strong desire to return while those in Al Jawf and Sana'a seem to be more reluctant. The Sana'a result differs from the general IDP pattern. We do unfortunately have no FGD indication to the reasons from women in position of head of family, but from adolescent girls in Sana'a FGD we know that they want to stay and integrate rather than going back. They expect to have better education, skills building and they hope for job opportunities. Maybe mothers join their children in the expectation for better chances in the city?

The female headed households are even more uncertain about when their wish to return will become reality ; about 94% are not sure/do not know when this may happen, only a few plan to go home in the course of the next 12 months.

Those female headed households who say not wishing to return are in similar position as the general IDP caseload when it comes to alternative solutions. Mostly they expect to stay where they are in displacement. Only very few have ideas or plans to do something else but staying on. Male and female family heads are equally affected by lack of information about rights and potential assistance and apparently also by the lack of own resources at their disposition, that would enable them to envisage a new start away from home.

10.3 Obstacles to return - some significant difference

Table 10.2

Obstacles to return by all IDP HH and by Female headed HH

No	Obstacles to return	All	F h HH
1	Ongoing fighting	35%	35%
2	Chance of renewed fighting	34%	34%
3	Damage to house	13%	13%
4	Fear from harassment in return area	7%	2%
5	Non existence of State institutions	6%	11%
6	Inability to travel	1%	2%
7	Lost Land	1%	1%
8	Fear from loosing humanitarian assistance	1%	2%
9	Mines and UXO\'s	1%	1%
10	Other	1%	0%
11	Food insecurity / lack of livelihood	0%	0%
12	Lack of health services in home area	0%	0%
13	Lack of employment in home area	0%	0%
14	Lack of education in home area	0%	0%
15	Lack of other services in home area	0%	0%
Total		100%	100%

Women responsible for a family have the same concerns about the stability of peace in the return area as men have. They also consider the damage to their homes as a major hindrance for return. But when it comes to the third set of obstacles that we can label 'individual safety concerns' as opposed to 'general safety concerns' for obstacle one and two, we observe a difference between the groups. Women responsible for a family fear less any possible harassment upon return. Yet they fear the consequences of non existence of state institutions.

This difference may reflect gender specifics regarding the type of risk, respectively vulnerability: men fear revenge – the term 'revenge killing' is frequently used in men's FGD when obstacles to return are debated. Some men inform that they receive threat messages; others talk about black lists believed with their names and mention the dreaded Houthi jails, all threats directly against them as individuals.

Participants in female FGD instead recall their traumatizing experience of eviction, of the air attacks, destruction of property, the hardship of flight, - all this associated now with their home area making return a sad prospect, but less an individual risk.

Women are concerned about the absence of state institutions in return area. This is understandable as they may feel more dependent on the protective capacity of local institutions like a police station in their town. But we should note that in FGD men also emphasize very strongly the restoration of state institutions as a precondition for return.

10.4 Economic situation of female headed HH

In displacement less than half of female headed HH have an income with those in Saada being somewhat advantaged, while those in Hajja being relatively disadvantaged with 77% having no source of income.

Table 10.3

Does the HH have a current income source ?

		Does your household presently have any source of income?				Total
		Yes	%	No	%	
Governorate	Sa'ada	22	51%	21	49%	43 100%
	Hajjah	3	23%	10	77%	13 100%
	Amran	3	33%	6	67%	9 100%
	Sana'a	10	44%	13	56%	23 100%
	Al-Jawf	9	45%	11	55%	20 100%
Total		47		61		108
Percentage		44%		56%		100%

Trying to explore further we face the already known problem that less than 50% are willing to answer if they can make a living from this source of income. Out of these only 6% can make a living, 57% say to barely make a living and 37% say not be able at all to live on the current source of income. These results suggest that female headed HH are economically worse off than the IDPs in general.

How do these families cope in displacement ? Mainly by borrowing money and in the second place through humanitarian assistance like the other IDP families. It is not clear why families in Amran would have relatively less need for or access to borrowed money.

We need however to caution against overinterpretation when coming to such low absolute numbers in the governorate breakdown.

Table 10.4

Female headed HH indebted

F HH Debit			Did you make any debts since you were displaced?		Total
			Yes	No	
Governorate	Sa'ada	Count	33	11	44
		%	75%	25%	
	Hajjah	Count	9	4	13
		%	69%	31%	
	Amran	Count	5	5	10
		%	50%	50%	
	Sana'a	Count	20	2	22
		%	91%	9%	
	Al-Jawf	Count	15	4	19
		%	79%	21%	
Total		Count	82	26	108
		%	76%	24%	100%

10.5 Needs in displacement - difference in ranking of needs

Below we compare the priority needs and problems in displacement as expressed by the female member of all IDP HH , with those given by the women without a male head of HH.

For the female headed HH the shelter/housing is an even bigger problem than it is already for 'normal ' HH. The deficient food supply is of similar gravity in both groups, while the missing family members are understandably a bigger problem among the group where at least one person is missing in each family. Female h HH complain more about behavior of humanitarian staff than the average, but the access to assistance seems not to be a specific difficulty of this group of beneficiaries.

Table: 10.4

Priority needs in displacement –All IDP HH and Female h HH

Rank	Priority needs	Female h HH	All IDP HH
1	Inadequate or overcrowded shelter	30%	20%
2	Insufficient food supply	19%	21%
3	Family members missing	9%	3%
4	Lack of job/self-empl. opportunities	7%	13%
5	Armed conflict here or nearby	6%	7%
6	Inadequate drinking water supply	6%	6%
7	Lack of privacy for family members	5%	4%
8	Behavior of hum. assistance pers.	5%	2%
9	Discrimination by local community/tribe	4%	4%
10	Lack of food/water/pasturage. f.livestock	4%	6%
11	Difficult access to health service	2%	2%
12	Lack of land for garden or crops	1%	1%
13	Lack of cloths/shoes	1%	2%
14	Difficult access to hum. assistance	1%	3%
15	Other	0%	6%
Total		100%	100%

In FGD we did not become aware of female headed families and their specific problems or complaints. Regarding particular groups with special needs participants emphasized instead the lack of care for chronically ill family members or the disabled persons in the community in need of better support. The older women taking part in FGD expressed concern about their health and the problem of accessing care, in particular as treatment is costly, but sometimes also the distance to medical facilities was indicated as a problem.

Conclusion

- **Female headed HH are 9 % of the sample IDP HH**
- **Nearly 50% have rented an accommodation in displacement, drawing attention to non-camp situations**
- **Their choice to return or not has the same strong bias towards return as it has all over, yet their plans to materialize return are even less concrete.**

- **Those who do not want to return do not have particular ideas of alternatives to staying on in displacement except for families where adolescent children express their desire to integrate in the capital city for a better future.**
- **Impediments to return are the same for male and female, except that females fear less the revenge of their home environment, but they feel more in need of protective state institutions.**
- **Economically female headed families are relatively disadvantaged compared to others in displacement.**

Chapter 11

Conclusions and Recommendations

11.1 Conclusions

A . Sa'ada governorate access problem

The conflict governorate Sa'ada was not accessible to profiling except for the government held Sa'ada city district and the security belt around reaching into parts of AlSafra and Saher district. Inaccessibility of the conflict affected Western part of Sa'ada with the majority of districts and population persists to date. The data obtained in Sa'ada city with security belt do not allow extrapolation to the entire governorate. In consequence we do not know the real extent of the IDP crisis created by the 6th war. We ignore numbers and living conditions of IDPs in the Western districts, we ignore also numbers and living conditions of returnees and the situation of the affected population that has not moved. The humanitarian needs of these population segments could not be assessed nor addressed by the international humanitarian community. To what extent local NGOs and the de facto responsible entities in the area respond to the humanitarian crisis remains unclear. An unknown number of war affected people is deprived of international assistance since the outbreak of hostilities and 10 months after the truce agreement. This situation persists despite all efforts of international actors to gain access.

B. Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

The accessible population still remaining in displacement after the truce agreement upholds in their large majority their desire to return. They see however a number of impediments for this wish to come true. Sustainable peace in the area of return, the most important condition, has not been reached between the conflicting parties. No progress of reconstruction and repair of public facilities and private property in the war damaged area is tangible yet, which is awaited by IDPs and would also create a pull factor for return. IDPs feel that their personal safety and security in their home location is not guaranteed as there is a lack of protective government institutions. So far nothing indicates that GoY regains power over the Western districts of Sa'ada now under AI – Houthi control. These factors are strong deterrents to return and their persistence suggests a probability of prolonged displacement of a large number of persons awaiting improved conditions for return.

Therefore the response to the crisis needs to move from a state of immediate life saving action to the level of providing living conditions acceptable for a longer than just short term displacement. This includes improved service delivery compliant with international minimum standards in all sectors and for all IDPs irrespective of their residential category.

The prospect of longer term displacement further suggests the development of projects that engage the displaced in activities beneficial also for recovery of livelihoods upon return.

C. Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

More than a quarter of the IDPs interviewed declare having no intention to return. A minimal number of them have a productive alternative envisaged – either to go elsewhere in the country, settle and integrate there or to integrate locally in the area of their current displacement. Lack of own resources, lack of political decisions about alternatives to return and lack of information about rights and potential support to alternative solutions keep IDPs stagnant in their current displacement situation, while their decision not to return could be the starting point of a process that leads them to a new life away from home, be it integrated in the local community where they are or settled elsewhere in the country.

The reality of people unable or unwilling to return must be acknowledged and their free choice supported. Among this group the following categories of people are

overrepresented: former livestock owners, people with professions related to the GoY, people who lived mainly of cross border trade with Saudi Arabia, marginalized or formerly jobless persons. Funds should be mobilized to support integration programs in other than return areas. The concerned IDPs should be informed and engaged in a dialogue about their future. In a joint planning process on governorate/district level their wishes and capacities should be reviewed and matched with the possibilities the respective governorate and receiving community can offer to absorb and integrate new citizens. If this joint effort is forcefully pursued it may end displacement for this group earlier than for those who wait for return.

11.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations for concrete actions respect roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders who can together provide solutions to the above summarized main problems of the IDP crisis in Yemen.

GOVERNMENT – CENTRAL LEVEL

<p>GoY should prioritize the adoption of the</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National IDP policy and strategy - National framework for durable solutions for displacement in Yemen. <p>These documents provide a solid common basis and necessary guidance for all actors working together on a comprehensive and effective response to the IDP crisis.</p>
<p>A - Sa'ada governorate access problem</p> <p>Accept and support negotiations for access between Al Houthi and international humanitarian actors</p> <p>Reach an agreement with Al-Houthi to accept assistance implemented in accordance with standard practice of humanitarian aid delivery</p> <p>Create pilot areas/districts for access that can serve to build trust between all parties and that can later be expanded to a broader area.</p> <p>B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return</p> <p>With the aim to remove the principle obstacle for IDP return: the lack of trust in lasting peace/ the fear of renewed outbreak of war, GoY should</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - pursue bilateral and multilateral peace talks with Al Houthi to dissipate mistrust between the two sides - achieve progress on the agreed implementation of the truce arrangement (22 points) including accelerated demining operations to instill trust in peace - accelerate reconstruction and compensation in all affected districts. <p>With the aim to alleviate life, prevent discrimination and ascertain rights of displaced populations short and midterm, GoY should</p>

- step up aid to IDPs out of camps
- immediately replace lost ID and educational documentation, facilitate inclusion of IDP children in schools in host locations
- adapt the health system so as to facilitate improved access to health services for IDPs, in particular to ensure uninterrupted care for chronically ill persons
- include the most destitute IDPs in the national social security network.

C - Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Accept and support the free choice of no return

Adapt national development plans to accommodating alternative solutions to return

Empower governorates with legal, administrative and financial measures to plan and implement with the concerned IDPs programs of integration away from home

Advocate with donors for funding support.

GOVERNMENT - GOVERNORATE LEVEL

The governorates hosting IDPs should operationalise and implement the IDP strategy and the framework for durable solutions on governorate level according to the prevailing conditions, i.e. availability of arable land, absorption capacity of infrastructure, demands of the labor market, reserves of natural resources such as water etc.

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

Sa'ada governorate :

- open access for all international humanitarian staff to safety belt at minimum
- negotiate with Al Houthi pilot areas for urgent humanitarian assistance beyond safety belt
- facilitate reconstruction in pilot Al Houthi stronghold areas.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Sa'ada governorate: accelerate reconstruction in safety belt

All governorates:

Facilitate peaceful living together of host communities and IDPs for a transition period in displacement through

- sensitizing host communities /councils for the problem of discrimination and through
- ensuring that host communities benefit from the presence of IDPs, i.e. access to improved communal services
- preventing at least disadvantages i.e. depletion of scarce resources.

C - Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Create a **planning unit for ' integration of IDPs in the governorate'** that should gather all relevant stakeholders:

- Governorate planning and development department, important sector departments; representatives of the concerned IDPs; the Early Recovery cluster/ humanitarian NGOs/development organizations
- Plan scope and nature of an integration program matching a potential integration offer with the capacities and intentions of IDPs selected according to established criteria
- Advocate with international donors and central government for funding support of an integration program.

GOVERNMENT – EXECUTIVE UNIT

The Executive Unit should develop further the internal capacity to fulfill the role as principle actor in the national IDP response for both assistance in displacement and support to durable solutions.

A - Sa’ada governorate access problem

Advocate with GoY for improved access to all IDPs and other war affected persons/areas

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return and

C - Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Establish with support of UNHCR information centers for IDPs in each affected governorate with the aim

- . to disseminate the rights and obligations of IDPs, including limitations in the current situation in Yemen

- . to guide IDPs missing out on assistance (vulnerable, marginalized) towards service providers

- . to inform IDPs about available options for durable solutions and the practical modalities of receiving support for the chosen solution

Request and authorize a competent, experienced NGO for the operation of the center under the supervision and guidance of ExU and UNHCR

Advocate for financial and technical assistance in achieving durable solutions with international donors and government on district, governorate and central level.

GOVERNMENT – District council – host and home community

The local/district council is the administrative interface between the resident and the displaced population who has returned or has found refuge on their territory within or at the edge of towns and villages. The attitude of the local administration towards the returned or still displaced is as important for their wellbeing as is the material assistance provided on large scale by other actors.

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

District councils in home communities can contribute to improved access by advocating and negotiating with relevant non-state actors for acceptance of humanitarian activities in their communities.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Sensitize community and administration for the problem of discrimination against IDPs namely in school, medical facilities and in community at large

Instruct administrative / communal staff to treat IDPs as citizens with equal rights as all, but with different needs

Remove administrative hurdles where possible that stigmatize or exclude displaced persons from participation in community life

Encourage personal contacts between displaced and resident population.

C - Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Advocate on superior level for material support to improved communal infrastructure and services needed to accommodate new residents

Ensure equal access for integrating IDPs to communal services

Ensure also access for local citizens to communal services that are implemented and / or improved due to IDP presence such as school renovation and capacity building opportunities – vocational training workshops.

CIVIL SOCIETY – Host and home community

The role of civil society in host and home communities – religious leaders, highly respected personalities, charities, women's groups, teachers' association, local branch of disabled association, etc. - is to bridge the gap between authorities and citizens and between resident and displaced or returned population and help to understand each other, prevent conflicts and ease frictions.

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

Civil society actors in home communities should make use – to the degree possible in the current situation – of their influence on non-state and state power holders in order to obtain assistance for the recovery of livelihoods of all affected citizens in their communities.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Sensitize other community members for the problem of discrimination against IDPs namely in school and in community

Make direct contact with 'peers' among the IDPs , i.e. visit the religious leaders, visit the womens' centers in camps, the emergency schools and teachers in settlements, the camp or bloc leaders who know the disabled in their sector, in order to discuss and advance group specific problems

Help locate, raise awareness and facilitate assistance to 'invisible' vulnerable IDPs in rental , host or squatter situation

Facilitate peaceful conflict resolution between resident and displaced citizens where needed.

C - Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Orient new members to the community about specific characteristics of the local environment to enable smooth integration

Advocate for just sharing of resources and equal access to communal services

Facilitate peaceful conflict resolution between resident and new citizens where needed.

DONORS

Donors should

remind representatives of GoY of their primary responsibility towards the IDPs. Support technically and financially the government in the attempt to resolve the IDP crisis, namely through pursuing all three options IDPs have as a durable solution.

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

Grant reconstruction funds under the condition of equal access to all areas of Sa'ada governorate.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Support voluntary return with sufficient funding when safety and dignity is ensured
Ensure with sufficient funding a dignified standard of living in displacement.

C- Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Clearly inform government that potential funding is not limited to return, but can also be made available for situations where IDPs choose local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country as their preferred option.

The scope of funding should take into account that an envisaged integration could be further accelerated by offering also for example to local professionals access to new IDP oriented capacity building facilities. Creating a 'win-win' situation for local and IDP population is the best basis for smooth integration.

UN AGENCIES – IO

UN and IO should

ensure that the IDP crisis receives the necessary international attention and related funding for its response;

promote forcefully with the GoY and with relevant non - state actors compliance with international humanitarian principles

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

Keep access on top of advocacy agenda with GoY and donors

Broaden humanitarian space gradually by creating opportunities to bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Al Houthi and GoY.

Create information network to gain transparency on the humanitarian situation in Sa'ada – task a point person with management of this information.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Cluster Leads

Build capacity among local humanitarian service providers about Sphere standards, code of conduct and humanitarian accountability towards beneficiaries, and promote adherence to these.

Ensure equal access to assistance for all IDPs irrespective of residential category.

Under the prospect of prolonged displacement primary education for IDP children needs to be more forcefully promoted and enabled.

Create communal networks of protection and support these materially to improve prevention of and response to protection threats.

Ensure that special needs of vulnerable, indicated by community members are addressed appropriately.

C- Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Early Recovery and other developmental actors must adapt interventions to the fact established through profiling in July/August 2010 that an estimated 25% of the families in displacement do not want to return. There is no evidence of change of mind at the

time of publishing the findings. Early Recovery actors must help restore livelihoods of IDPs in areas away from home.

Both agro-related and non-agro developmental interventions will be needed to integrate this segment of IDPs in a new environment and achieve solutions of their choice.

Conduct a market study to determine the need for marketable skills, so as to avoid training activities that do not match the labor market.

NGOs

National and international NGOs

Should be aware and live up to their crucial role in response to displacement, i.e

- **staff behavior must be in accordance with the code of conduct for assistance personnel in order to uphold dignity of the displaced beneficiaries**
- **NGOs should strive for internationally agreed minimum standards in assistance to ensure best possible living conditions for displaced persons**
- **make use of their insight in problems and capacities of beneficiaries to advocate on their behalf with decision makers.**

A - Sa'ada governorate access problem

Collect and channel to a point person all possible Sa'ada information i.e. from returnees who come back to IDP distribution points; from activities conducted locally in Sa'ada districts.

B - Situation in displacement and perspectives to return

Increase quality of assistance by improved own performance and/or evidence based strong advocacy to donors to remedy deficits in the following sectors:

Food aid

Distribution points too far from settlements, unknown distribution day – both resulting in costly access to rations

Problem of inadequate rations for large families in part but not yet in all places resolved

Firewood

Conflicts with host communities emerging – no alternative prepared; women prefer cooking gas

Health

General concern of IDPs how to cover cost for treatment and drugs

General concern about care for chronically ill (cost and availability of care/drugs)

Particular unmet needs in settlements (HARAD) as presence of mobile clinic for few hours and only 1x per week is insufficient

Shelter

Inventory of rental situation in order to establish need and criteria for assistance

Replacement of one year old shelters too be speeded up

Desire for a prayer/ assembly place should be accommodated (men in Harad settlement offer workforce)

Wash

Too small number of latrines in settlement (Harad) – long standing complaint
Existing latrines unusable as they lack since many months urgent replacement of protective plastic sheeting

Hygiene items including those for female to be distributed more than once only!

EducationNo school facility in many settlements – distance to local schools to long

Vulnerable – destitute

Inclusion of extremely vulnerable in national social welfare fund needs promotion

Follow up action by NGOs is missing on mobilizing communities for identification of vulnerable members and their specific needs.

Cash for work

No projects yet, but needed after 1 year of depleting own assets and in areas without job opportunities

Project ideas could include incentives for

- . construction of communal facilities in IDP area (mosque/school/women center)
- . construction / improvement of shelter for vulnerable (old, widowed, female HH, disabled etc) in settlement, host and rental situations
- . other cfw opportunities come up during implementation of durable solution programs.

In general increase quality of NGO assistance by :

Application of international humanitarian **minimal standards** for assistance to all IDPs that can be accessed.

Establishment by NGOs of **complaint mechanisms** that accommodate both written and oral complaints and offer anonymity if the complainant prefers. Emphasis is to be placed on follow up actions which must be reported. Resolution rate must be made public.

Increased attention to the problems and needs expressed **by women** i.e. clothing and shoes for children and women, regular and reliable supply of female hygiene items including undergarments; **adolescent girls** and young women want to be considered for educational and employment opportunities.

Productive use of time in prolonged displacement

Anecdotal evidence from the field confirms the predicted very small trickle of spontaneous return under the prevailing conditions. As these are not likely to change in the near future preparations must be made for ongoing displacement of the majority of IDPs, while remaining ready for immediate return as soon as conditions in particular of safety are right.

Beyond improved basic assistance NGOs should think of engaging IDPs in activities that have a double use: **contribute to improved living conditions now and to some extent help restore livelihoods quicker and better upon return.**

Categories of such activities are

Cash disbursement / Cash for work – example: pilot programs for rental support or for NFI fairs or incentives for shelter improvement should be implemented and – as far as new to the Yemeni context - systematically monitored for their beneficial effect and potential undesired side effects.

Skills building – example: women’s centers in Sana’a offer computer and English courses, from which IDP women and adolescents living mostly in rented facilities or with host families could benefit if financially supported.

Skills for low cost house construction are needed in displacement as well as upon return.

Skills for running small business are also of double use.

Income generating activities - examples: vegetable gardening in suitable areas can contribute to improve own diet and produce income; food transformation can provide small income to women’ groups; sheep and goats for milk and meat can be held in spontaneous settlements that IDPs preferred over camps and houses in the hope to continue their pastoral activities in displacement. It proved however possible only under the condition of initial financial support for fodder and water and most likely some guidance on the management given the difficulties of the rather hostile natural habitat available for IDP provisional settlement.

C- Choice of no return and alternative durable solutions

Identify the IDPs with no interest in return yet with interest in integration within the governorate of displacement and those with interest in settlement in other governorates. **Engage also women and older children** of the families in this discussion. FGD have revealed that the final decision may be made by the male head of HH, yet this is the end of a dynamic process within the family which should be captured to obtain a complete picture of interests, wishes, expectations and capacities of the entire family and should be considered in the planning of a new future.

Coordinate with the other NGOs operative in the response to ensure full mapping of the IDPs across each governorate.

Document IDP capacity/ professional background distinguishing between crop farmers, livestock breeders, and the diverse professions exercised before displacement.

Feed these findings to the ‘**integration planning unit**’ at the governorate level.

IDPs with no perspective of return could most likely leave displacement earlier and recover livelihoods quicker when they enter the labor market with appropriate skills.

NGOs can **assess the demand for skilled labor –eventually with guidance from ILO** - and plan accordingly for upgrading the professional skills of those IDPs whose livelihoods are not dependant on land, such as mechanics, electricians, carpenters and masons or offer computer and English courses, skills that are in demand and would also be suitable to include women in the capacity building opportunities.

ANNEX 1: Truce agreement ending 6. war

Truce agreement between Al Houthi and GoY brokered by Qatar ending the 6. war on the 11th of February 2010, an agreement that includes 6 points:

- 1- All parties are to abide by the declared ceasefire.
- 2- Opening of roads, removal of mines, and ending of military stationing in positions and on side roads are to take place.
- 3- Withdrawal of Houthis from occupied districts.
- 4- Non interference of Houthis in the affairs of the Local Authorities.
- 5- Release of prisoners, civilians and military, Yemenites and Saudis.
- 6- Houthis to abide by the Yemeni Constitution, Law and Order, and not to assault any neighboring country.

A new more detailed agreement was also signed as a supplement consisting of 22 points to carry out the previous peace agreement and includes the following:

1. Implementing what remains of the six points that Abdul-Malik Al Houthi has previously announced to accept them.
2. Al-Houthi should compel his members to return to their districts and governorates safely with no one from the security forces obstructing their way.
3. All road passages should be secure for all citizens without exception, as well as mosques, schools and government premises.
4. Non-interference of Al-Houthis in the affairs of the Local Authority.
5. Stopping of arrests conducted by Al-Houthis members against citizens, students, or military personnel who have been granted leaves to visit their families.
6. Stopping of arrests whether by citizens who cooperate with the State or by the executive authorities.
7. Immediate release of all abducted persons by Al-Houthis from the date of declaration of the end of the war and up to date without any exception, including those who were arrested by the State Apparatus or its collaborators.
8. Halt the building of new barricades, roads construction, & trenches digging, as such actions that do not serve the peace process.
9. Swiftly end armed manifestations in the roads, mountains and hills, and the withdrawal from all public and private buildings including citizens' houses.
10. Establishment of a *field committee* to be formed by the National Committee, the mediator and the Houthis so as to follow up on the implementation of this agreement and to submit a report thereon.
11. The Houthis must submit a signed list of their claim of what the State took from them, and accordingly what would be proved will be submitted.

Annex 2: Sa'ada counting report

The counting in Sa'ada has targeted 1200 households in Sa'ada City and 2 other districts outside Sa'ada.

- 1- Sa'ada City (Old Sa'ada and New Sa'ada)
- 2- Sahar
- 3 - Al-Safra

Our team in Sa'ada conducted the counting in 2 days using 30 Enumerators covering 1200 Households in safe areas i.e. Sa'ada City, Sahar and Al-safra.

In Sa'ada city the counting is done according to the methodology but somewhat different due to the facts on the ground.

In consultation with humanitarian actors and local authorities Sa'ada city is virtually divided into 3 different areas as below:

- 1-Area with High Density of IDPs and Returnees (400 households)**
- 2-Area with Middle Density of IDPs and Returnees (400 households)**
- 3-Area with Low Density of IDPS and Returnees (400 households)**

Sub Division

- **The high density area of IDP and returnees are further divided into 10 clusters where every cluster is divided into 40 small areas, every small area contains 10 houses and randomly one house out of the 10 houses has been counted. This means that 400 houses have been targeted in the high density area (10 clusters x 40 houses in each cluster).**
- **The same division has been applied to the middle density area.**
- **In the low density IDP/Returnee area, due to the reality on the ground (the area was not large enough to be divided) our team divided this area into 5 clusters where every cluster is further divided into 80 small areas so that they achieved 400 houses counted (5 clusters x 80=400).**

For the other 2 districts Sahar and Alsafrā our team visited 10 villages within these two districts and counted IDPs and Returnees in each village.

For the camps: they were allowed by camp management (RC) to have access to 7 camps.

Number of Interviews

Total of 700 interviews should be conducted in Sa'ada Governorate and divided as below:

From Sa'ada City: 535 Households

From the Camps: 130 Households divided into 7 accessible camps

Annex 3 - Extrapolation

0- Summary

At the time of the exercise the number of the IDPs in the 4 governorates and within Saada city, Safra and Saher, the estimated number of the IDPs is as follows:

	IDP HH	IDP individuals	IDP HH range		IDP Indiv range	
Amran	6739	55937	6402	7076	53140	58734
Sanaa	3279	24589	3115	3442	23359	25818
Al Jawf	2202	14316	2092	2313	13600	15032
Hajjah	15203	112504	14443	15963	106879	118129
Saada	15854	82439	15061	16646	78317	86561
Total	43277	302076	41113	45441	286972	317179

At the time of the exercise the estimated number of IDPs that left the district where they were registered or returned is estimated as follows:

	IDP/returnee HH	IDP/returnee individuals	IDP/returnee HH range		IDP/ returnee Indiv range	
Amran	2965	24612	2817	3114	23382	25843
Sanaa	33	246	31	34	234	258
Al Jawf	264	1718	251	278	1632	1804
Hajjah	8362	61877	7944	8780	58783	64971
Total	11624	88453	11043	12205	84031	92876

At the time of the exercise, the number of returnees in Saada city and Safra and Saher is estimated as follows:

	Returnee HH	Returnee Ind	Returnee HH range		Returnee Indiv range	
Saada city	3743	19464	3556	3930	18491	20437
Saada 2 districts	3288	17100	3124	3453	16245	17955
Total	7032	36564	6680	7383	34736	38392

Governorate * Have you become registered as IDP by the government after arrival in this place? Crosstabulation

Have you been registered by the government before arriving to this place E20

Estimated Total of IDPs is the "Total registered number at the beginning" + "estimated number of non registered"\
- "estimated number of double registered"

1- Weights and adjustments

	Reg. IDPs	Reg %	Double Reg %	Estimated Total of IDPs	% of IDPs	Target Sample Size	% of Target Sample	1st Sample variation adjustment	Pre Sampling Fraction
Amran	8051	0.95	0.11	6739	0.16	250	0.13	0.84	0.04
Sanaa	4461	0.79	0.06	3279	0.08	150	0.08	1.04	0.05
Al Jawf	2751	0.82	0.02	2202	0.05	100	0.05	1.03	0.05
Hajjah	21962	0.94	0.25	15203	0.35	700	0.37	1.05	0.05
Saada			0.05	15854	0.37	700	0.37	1.01	0.04
Total	37225.00	3.50	0.49	43277	1.00	1900.00	1.00	1.00	0.04

2- Estimation of Returnees

Governorate	Number of IDPs at the first sample interviews HH	Average family size	Number of IDPs in first sample interview	%IDPs absent at the first interview	#of likely returnees	#of likely returnees Households
Amran	6739	8.3	55937	0.44	24612	2965
Sanaa	3279	7.5	24589	0.01	246	33
Al Jawf	2202	6.5	14316	0.12	1718	264
Hajjah	15203	7.4	112504	0.55	61877	8362
Saada		5.2	0		0	0
Total	27424	7	207346	0.28	88453	11624

3- Estimation of Numbers in Saada

	IDPs	Returnees
Camps	18668	
Saada City	39988	19464
Safra and Sahar Districts	23784	17100
Total	82439	36564

3.1 Camps

No	Camp Name	IDPs	HH
1	Sam Camp	1423	216
2	Al-Esha Camp	387	58
3	Mandhaba Camp	12140	1828
4	Al-Jabanah Camp A	930	131
5	Al-Jabanah Camp B	500	67
6	Al-Jabanah Camp C	319	35
7	Al-Jabanah Camp D	500	64
8	Bugalat Camp	469	59
9	Al-Salam Camp	2000	285
Total Population of IDPs		18668	2743

3.2 Saada City

Tot Pop		66869
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	Percentage	Nbr
IDP	60%	39988
Returnee	29%	19464

3.3 Saada Villages - Al Safra and Sahar districts

District Name	Village Name	Population	HH IDPs	Returned HHs	% of IDPs	% of Returnees
Al-safra	ال ناييل	500	70	58	0.14	0.12
Al-safra	الخانق	2000	120	110	0.06	0.06
Al-safra	زور وادعة	800	150	115	0.19	0.14
Al-safra	المسلحقات	500	66	33	0.13	0.07
Al-safra	الزاوية	400	70	58	0.18	0.15
Total		4200	476	374	0.11	0.09
Sahar	البيقلات	1400	400	340	0.29	0.24
Sahar	غرار	3735	215	182	0.06	0.05
Sahar	العبددين	3518	345	235	0.10	0.07
Sahar	الصحن	2930	392	245	0.13	0.08
Sahar	الخنق	1200	100	5	0.08	0.00
Total		12783	1452	1007	0.11	0.08

District Name	Total Population	%IDPs	%Returnees	Estimated IDPs nbr	Estimated Returnees nbr
Sehar	151590	0.11	0.08	17219	11942
Alsafra'a	57926	0.11	0.09	6565	5158
Total	209516	0.23	0.17	23784	17100

Annex 4: IDPs by five age groups

Location		AGEGROUP					Total
		0-4	5-11	12-17	18-59	60+	
Sa'ada	Male	250	458	330	786	80	1904
	Female	250	417	297	860	66	1890
	Subtotal	500	875	627	1646	146	3794
Hajjah	Male	298	603	399	760	65	2125
	Female	270	529	325	769	44	1937
	Subtotal	568	1132	724	1529	109	4062
Amran	Male	99	191	113	273	32	708
	Female	97	155	114	305	25	696
	Subtotal	196	346	227	578	57	1404
Sana'a	Male	88	157	96	193	15	549
	Female	70	128	103	243	18	562
	Subtotal	158	285	199	436	33	1111
Al-Jawf	Male	28	81	43	117	5	274
	Female	41	73	53	125	1	293
	Subtotal	69	154	96	242	6	567
TOTAL	Male	763	1490	981	2129	197	5560
	Female	728	1302	892	2302	154	5378
	GRAND TOTAL	1491	2792	1873	4431	351	10938
Percentage		14%	26%	17%	41%	3%	100%

YEMEN AGE RANGE GROUP CENSUS 2009

0-4		5-11		12-17		18-59		60+		Total
Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
8%	8%	10%	9%	8%	8%	23%	22%	2%	2%	99%
16%		19%		16%		45%		4%		99%

Annex 5 : IDP from Sa'ada DISTRICTS in their current governorate of displacement

Displacement Governorate	Origin in Sa'ada governorate															Total
	Baqem	Qatabir	Monabbih	Ghammar	Razeh	Shada'a	Al-Dhaher	Haydan	Saqyan	Majz	Sahar	Al-Safrah	Al-hawwa	KitafwalBoqea	Saada City	
Sa'ada	3	1	0	7	101	1	1	101	1	201	53	13	1	2	111	522
Hajjah	1	0	3	3	13	32	289	110	1	0	5	2	0	3	2	464
Amran	6	1	0	0	16	0	1	10	1	23	37	13	0	2	10	120
Sana'a	0	0	1	0	37	0	0	37	7	1	26	3	0	0	11	123
Al-Jawf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	0	0	8
** Total	10	2	4	10	167	33	291	258	115	45	122	37	2	7	134	1237
%	1%	0%	0%	1%	14%	3%	24%	21%	9%	4%	10%	3%	0%	1%	11%	100%

Displacement Governorate	Origin Districts in Sa'ada governorate															Total
	Baqem	Qatabir	Monabbih	Ghammar	Razeh	Shada'a	Dhaher	Haydan	Saqyan	Majz	Sahar	Safra	Al-hawwa	Kitaf	Saada	
Sa'ada	0%	0%	0%	1%	8%	0%	0%	8%	9%	2%	4%	1%	0%	0%	9%	42%
Hajjah	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	23%	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	38%
Amran	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%	3%	1%	0%	0%	1%	10%
Sana'a	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	3%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	10%
Al-Jawf	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
%	1%	0%	0%	1%	14%	3%	24%	21%	9%	4%	10%	3%	0%	1%	11%	100%

**** Not ALL respondents from Sa'ada gov. could be allocated to their districts**

**Annex 6:
UnregisteredIDPs**

Displacement Governorate	Month	Since when do you live here?[Year]								
		2001	2004	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total	
Sa'ada	Jan	0	0	0	0	2	3	2		
	Feb	1	0	0	0	0	0	2		
	Mar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	3		
	May	0	0	0	0	0	3	0		
	June	0	0	0	1	0	1	3		
	July	0	0	0	1	0	1	1		
	August	0	1	1	0	8	24	0		
	Sept	0	0	0	0	1	12	0		
	Oct	0	0	0	1	1	4	0		
	Nov	0	1	2	0	0	11	0		
	Dec	0	0	0	0	0	8	0		
	Total	1	2	3	3	12	67	11		99
	%	1%	1%	2%	2%	7%	37%	6%		55%
Hajjah	Jan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		
	Feb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Mar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	May	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	June	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	July	0	0	0	0	0	3	0		
	August	0	0	0	0	0	3	0		
	Sept	0	0	0	0	0	11	0		
	Oct	0	0	0	0	0	5	0		
	Nov	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		
	Dec	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	24	1		25
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	1%		14%
Amran	Jan	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		
	Feb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Mar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	May	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	June	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		

	July	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	August	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	Sept	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
	Oct	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	Nov	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
	Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total	0	1	1	0	0	7	0	9
	%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	4%	0%	5%
Sana'a	Jan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Feb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Mar	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	May	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
	June	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	
	July	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
	August	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	
	Sept	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	
	Oct	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	
	Nov	0	0	1	0	2	5	0	
	Dec	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	
	Total	0	0	1	2	3	22	3	31
	%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	12%	2%	17%
Al-Jawf	Jan	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	Feb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Mar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Apr	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	May	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	June	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	July	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	August	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
	Sept	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	Oct	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	
	Nov	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
	Dec	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	
	Total	0	0	0	1	0	13	1	15
	%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	7%	1%	8%
Grand Total	1	3	5	6	15	133	16	179	
Grand %	1%	2%	3%	3%	8%	74%	9%	100%	

Annex 7 a – Return to Razeh from Hajja – Testimonial

Case 1 – Return to Razeh from Hajja governorate

- **Displacement history**

Place of interview: Sa'ada city – interviewees travelled from Razeh to Sa'ada city upon request of FG team

Interviewees: S. 37 years and his cousin M. 20 years

Location of return: district **Razeh** /village or town: Burkan

Return date: **April 2010**

Location of Displacement: Governorate: **Hajja** /District :**Abs** /place: Al Mrnaf

Residential category: rented accommodation

Date of fleeing home: **December; four months in displacement**

Family members displaced: **wife and children of S.; just married wife of M.**

Why did you leave? Security reasons.

Former displacement? No, first time.

- **Motivation for return**

'Trigger' for return – Was there a special moment or event that made you think "now we can return"! ?

We returned because of the **weather situation which was unbearable; we even could not go to the camps because it was too hot , and the camps have bad reputation.**

Reasons/ motivation for return

- **It was too hot for us to live there**

- **The high amount of rent we used to pay**

- We heard that things back home are fine and the armed conflicts were stopped

- We returned back not to lose our properties - land , houses and beehives

- **While in displacement:**

Did you ever think **Not** to return, but to stay in the displacement area and start a new life in that place?

The conditions of life are beyond our affordability, the rent is a burden to us, we tried but we couldn't; some of us tried to sell qat, but because of the different area, we failed.

- **Situation upon return**

- **Situation in general**

Was it as you expected? **No, I thought that our area would be all ruined because of the jets attacks and the tanks, and bombs, but it was somehow livable.**

We could find schools; houses and farms are partially destroyed.

Did many people return? **Yes many of us were there before us, that surprised us the most; we thought that we were the only people who took the risk to return.**

Are many people still out and did not return? – What do you think why!? **Yes, some could**

not afford the money of transportation back home, some do not have relatives back home and in addition their houses and properties are totally destroyed.

Do you feel safe? **No and threatened by Houthies ; we obey their instructions , we have no other option .**

Do you think it was the right decision to return now? **I feel that we have made a mistake by coming back, there in the displacement area, there was at least security.**

- Situation of our own property

The houses, lands and cattle partially destroyed

There were bombs on own property, it even killed some of our children while playing.

No Huthies nor government forces occupied our land .

Who helped you to take possession of your property, to repair?

The government did nothing, neither did the Huthies , only the wider families and the neighbors helped .

- Situation of Public services (schools/clinics/mosques)

Not functioning except some mosques still there and are run by the Huthies in their sectarian way.

- Government presence (with police/administration)

Is absent - the 'government presence' in these districts are only Huthies .

Problems upon return	Own solutions for restart	Assistance received ... from...	Assistance needed ... from whom?
-Home damaged -The water pump and generator were stolen -The farms were destroyed partially	As for houses we managed to have some tents -As for electricity some of us have managed to buy lanterns and candles -As for water we managed to buy water ,others collect water from the valleys or the fountains	Nothing we received as external help	We need our houses to be rebuilt We need schools services Health services centers From whoever can help ,either from the government or the organizations
Bombs on the lands and houses	Some of us bury these bombs ,some left it like this .	No assistance received	clearance

We have no food, need to wait for harvest	we go for animals hunting especially the hares (rabbits)	We receive food supplies from organizations	We need more food supplies the food hardly is for ten days
School not functioning and health centers too far	Educated people from us teach the children ,but not regularly ,they give Islamic teachings only which they say is enough . We take our sick people to either Harad or Sa'ada hospitals .	Nothing we received regarding these issues.	We need schools to be reopened, we don't want our children to receive the Huthies teaching and beliefs. We need hospitals with qualified doctors in our districts.

Livelihoods - Source of income

- At home before displacement? **We used to smuggle qat to Saudi Arabia, some have their own shopping stores .**

- During displacement? **We used to have monthly food supplies and other supports like mattresses, we have sold our wives jewelry we tried to sell qat, but it wasn't our area therefore we lost.**

- Now after return home - what assistance do you need now to earn an income as good as before? **We need first of all security. We need our lands and farms to be repaired and without the water generators we won't be able to plant qat .The lakes we used to have the water from are ruined due to the jets attacks ,we need all this to be back again; only in these conditions we would earn our income as good as before .**

Annex 7 b – Return to Malahed – Testimonial

Case 2 – Return to Malahed, Al Daher district from Harad

- **Displacement history**

Place of interview: Sa'ada city – interviewees travelled from Malahed to Sa'ada city upon request of FG team

Interviewees: group of 4 men

Location of return: **Malahed in Al Daher district** /village or town: Al Hasam

Return date: **June 2010**

Location of Displacement: Governorate: **Hajja** /District :**Harad**/place: Al Gufl /Al Sharifa

Residential category: **spontaneous settlement**

Date of fleeing home: **January 2010; five months in displacement**

Family members displaced: **wife and children**

Why did you leave? Heavy attacks by air and by tanks, that killed many of us. I wanted my wife and children safe.

Former displacement? No, first time.

- **Motivation for return**

'Trigger' for return – Was there a special moment or event that made you think "now we can return"!?

The government declared it is safe, so did the organization that we used to receive our food supplies from, who said that the war is over and you get back to your homes safely.

Reasons/ motivation for return

1) Safety

- Now it is safe and we really have no problems with the Huthies ,so there was no need to stay any more longer.

2) Pull factors:

Social relations:

- I remembered the old days when I used to stay with my clan and tribe ,it made me take my decision and say that I have to return , among my people

Economic factors:

- We have farms, lands that we had to go back for.
- Income opportunities at home better than in displacement – Qat planting and trading across the border, but unfortunately we came back to see that all this was destroyed

3) Push factors:

- We suffered too much from discrimination, from isolation in displacement, they used to call us bad names and insult us in the displacement area.
- Living conditions in displacement were too bad: We had not enough food/health care/schooling- the road our children had to cross to get to the school - there was a 10 year old IDP girl who got killed in a car accident while crossing that road
- Water :ok - but no way to earn income

- Bad housing conditions: we had a tent which was in a bad condition.
- We felt it will not get any better in displacement so we better go home
- We had nothing to do there, so what are we to stay here for.

While in displacement:

Did you ever think **not** to return? **No**, we thought of returning home, there will be a day that we are going to return back home , war is not going to go for ever, there will be a day that things will go better.

- **Situation upon return**

- Situation in general

Was it as you expected? **No, it was worse than we expected.**

Are most people here back? **There were many people who returned before us**, we did not expect this.

Are many people still not returned? – What do you think why!?!? **Yes there are many people who did not return because they are still terrified ,they did not feel secured enough.** Their pregnant women while in their home during the jets attacks, they got scared to death to the extent they suffered abortion.

There are still some **bomb pieces** that threaten people, some of us even died when trying to investigate what these things are, especially the children.

Do you feel safe now? **Not really safe, again we are threaten by the Houthies**, we avoid them .

Do you think it was the right decision to return now? **No regret at all, east or west - home is the best!**

- Situation of our own property:

Cattle was missed, some others found some of them , and those who took them with them during the moving suffered loss due to the long distances they walked ,or the weather in the area of displacement. Some of us sold the cattle during the movement .

Landmines on own property

Our lands were not occupied by no party, simply because there are landmines, no one can approach them, no Houthies nor the government .

Who helped you to take possession of your property upon return?

No one, even started to rebuild house, but we still live in the ruins, we have to look for our living ,there are open mouths to feed, rebuilding the houses will come later .

- **Situation of Public services (schools/clinics/mosques)**

All not functioning, because the Houthis used these places as military sites .

- **Government presence (with police/administration)**

is absent - Who holds the power in your place ? Houthis

Problems upon return	Own solutions for restart	Assistance received ... from...	Assistance needed ... from whom?
Home damaged	Living in them whatever their conditions are. -some whose houses are fine are accommodating others.	no assistance received from nowhere	We want our houses to be rebuilt. -the rehabilitation committee must do something about this.
Landmines on a plot	No one dares to approach them	Nothing	We need the government to clear them to start work.
We don't have enough food ,and we don't wait for the harvest ,simply because we did not plant anything so far	We share the food that the organization supports us with. -some of us hunt birds that are fat and good to eat.	Organization helps - .appreciation to this organization.	
School not functioning	Nothing	Nothing	We need our schools back, we need health centers.

Livelihoods - Source of income

- **At home before displacement:** we used to **trade qat** to Saudi Arabia, we had cattle, we used to buy barley and corn from Saudi Arabia and sell it here.

- **During displacement:** we used to have **food supplies** from the organization, there was no work at all.

- **Now after return home:** daily wages work, such as **collecting wood** in bundles and sell them which doesn't give much in return.

What assistance do you need now to earn an income as good as before?

We need first of all security.

To get the income as good as before, our lands should be rehabilitated, because they are our main source of income.

Annex 8 : Characteristics of female headed HH in governorates

Table 1:

Female headed HH by residential categories in governorates

Female Headed HH		Residence type										Total	%
		Host family	%	Rented dwelling	%	IDP camp	%	Own House	%	Settlement	%		
Governorate	Sa'ada	4	27%	22	43%	12	71%	0	0%	5	23%	43	40%
	Hajjah	1	7%	0	0%	4	24%	1	50%	7	32%	13	12%
	Amran	2	13%	6	12%	1	6%	1	50%	0	0%	10	9%
	Sana'a	1	7%	21	41%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	22	21%
	Al-Jawf	7	47%	2	4%	0	0%	0	0%	10	45%	19	18%
Total		15	100%	51	100%	17	100%	2	100%	22	100%	107	100%
Total %		14%		48%		16%		2%		21%		100%	

Table 2:

Female headed HH by obstacles to return

Rank	Female Household Obstacles to return	Governorate					Total
		Sa'ada	Hajjah	Amran	Sana'a	Al-Jawf	
1	Chance of renewed fighting	19%	3%	6%	1%	6%	35%
2	Ongoing fighting	7%	8%	1%	14%	4%	34%
3	Damage to house	4%	0%	2%	4%	3%	13%
4	Non existence of State institutions	9%	0%	0%	0%	2%	11%
5	Fear from harassment in return area	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
6	Inability to travel	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%
7	Fear from losing humanitarian assistance	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
8	Lost Land	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
9	Food insecurity / lack of livelihood	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
10	Lack of health services in home area	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
11	Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Total Percentages		42%	11%	9%	21%	17%	100%