

Displacement as challenge and opportunity

Urban profile:
Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community

Sulaymaniyah Governorate and Garmian Administration,
Kurdistan Region of Iraq

August 2016

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Profiling coordinator: Shadman Mahmoud (UNHCR).

Research facilitation: Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi (JIPS), Per Schoening (JIPS/NRC), Jozef Merckx, France Lau, Karam Hindi (UNHCR Erbil), Mohammed Hassan Mahmood, Omed Bakir Ahmed, Sirwan Hama Fatah, Aras Jalal Mohammed, Soran Khafur Salim (Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office), Ari Habeeb Ahmed and Sulaymaniyah Protection and Field Team (UNHCR Sulaymaniyah).

Report preparation: Roger Guiu.

Cartography: Bahar Hassan (Sulaymaniya Statistics Office and Abdulkhalq Saeed (UNHCR Erbil).

Cover image: Hemn Goran (AKO).

Profiling Steering Committee members for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Erbil Refugee Council (ERC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

The profiling exercise was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Printed by UNHCR, October 2016

Report preparation, August 2016

Data collection, June 2016

DISPLACEMENT AS CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

Urban profile of refugees, internally displaced persons,
and host community

*Sulaymaniyah Governorate and Garmian Administration,
Kurdistan Region of Iraq*

ئاواره‌یی گرت و دهرفهت

پروفایلی شار و شارۆچکه‌کان: ئاواره‌کان، په‌نابه‌رانی ناوڤۆ و
هه‌روه‌ها کۆمه‌لگای خانه‌خوێ

پاریزگای سلیمانی و کارگێری گه‌رمیان- هه‌ریمی کوردستانی عێراق

النزوح السكاني: تحدي و فرصة

تحديد مواصفات (بروفایل) المناطق الحضرية

اللاجئين والنازحين و المجتمع المضيف

محافظة سلیمانية و إدارة گرمیان ، إقليم كردستان العراق

August 2016

FOREWORD

Over the last 4 years, since the onset of the displacement crisis affecting the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, there has been ample information and analysis on the situation of IDPs and refugees sheltered in camps. With this strong focus on camp-based interventions, the situation of out-of-camp populations and the host community has long been overlooked. In the Kurdistan Region, the majority of refugees (60% out of 250,000) and IDPs (80% out of more than 1 million arrived to KR-I after January 2014) live in urban areas, co-existing with host communities, sharing the often scarce resources.

To address out-of-camp displacement and its effect on the host community, adequate and specific information is required about all populations of concern, in order to promote more resilient communities. This is the objective of the present urban profiling exercise. Today, the Sulaymaniyah Governorate and the whole of the Kurdistan Region is facing a multi-faceted crisis, consisting of ongoing conflict, protracted displacement, a financial crisis, and significant development challenges. There is a need to shift the focus of planning from emergency to medium-term interventions.

In order to achieve this goal, it is also necessary to see the whole picture of the displacement situation, produced with an area-based approach and including IDPs, refugees, and host communities.

It pleases me to note the collaborative effort taken to carry out this assessment, which complemented the comprehensive registration of displaced people (CRDP) that was conducted by MOP-KRSO in 2016, the data of which was used as a framework for this survey. The urban profiling exercise has been conducted by our specialised government institutions, the Kurdistan Region Statistics office (KRSO), the Sulaymaniyah Statistics directorate, the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) supported by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other UN agencies, and the Geneva-based Joint IDP Profiling Services (JIPS).

On behalf of the Ministry of Planning, whose mandate is to deal with the current displacement challenges, I would like to express my appreciation for the efforts of all those who diligently worked to produce this relevant and interesting document. We look forward to further collaboration in implementing the jointly developed recommendations.



Dr. Ali Sindi
Minister of Planning
Kurdistan Regional Government


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This profiling assessment has been conducted in June 2016 in order to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation of refugees, internally displaced persons, and host communities in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. We hope that this profiling assessment will contribute to establishing an evidence base and will help the Kurdistan Regional Government and the humanitarian and development partners to develop comprehensive, long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns and to improve the living standards of all population groups living in the urban areas of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

Beginning from its initiation, this assessment received the support of his Excellency, Dr. Ali Sindi, the Minister of Planning of the Kurdistan Regional Government. We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to him.

The work undertaken is a result of a partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office (DSO), and the Joint Crisis and Coordination Centre (JCCC). The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) offered technical support throughout the exercise.

Finally, we would also like thank all the participants involved in the research process, from its inception to the fieldwork and its implementation. Gratitude is also owed to the workshop participants: the Sulaymaniyah's Governorate DG of Education, the DG of Labour and Social Affairs (DOLSA), MISSING, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Council, the Halabja Administration, the Garmian Administration, Rapareen Municipality, JCC, as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), ACTED, the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), Mercy Corps, REACH, BDM, the Civil Development Organization (CDO), the Youth Activity Organization (YAO), Dahat NGO and Arche-Nova.



H.E. Omar Ahmed Ameen
Deputy Governor of Sulaymaniyah Governorate

Anne Dolan
UNHCR Sulaymaniyah

Mahmood Othman Maroof
Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office (SSO)

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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

WHY A PROFILING STUDY?

A crisis context

The Sulaymaniyah Governorate, with a total host population of 2.08 million people as well as 260,000 displaced people (IDPs and refugees aggregated), lies at the eastern side of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, bordering with Iran. The southern part of the governorate comprises the Garmian Administration (the districts of Kalar and Kifri).

Since 2012, Sulaymaniyah has gradually received Syrian refugees that were moving from their displacement in the Duhok and Erbil Governorates. Since 2003, families displaced from the neighbouring central governorates of Kirkuk, Salahaddin, and Diyala have also sought shelter in Sulaymaniyah's districts.

While the host community and the local authorities have endured the impact of displacement in the first years, the deterioration of security in the rest of Iraq and the pervasive financial crisis affecting the public and private sectors of the economy are placing the governorate under enormous strain. Budget disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraq's Federal Government led to the KRG receiving irregular and intermittent funds from Baghdad for the last 3 years.

In addition, due to a lack of an adequate taxation system in the Kurdistan Region to fund the public budget, the Kurdistan Regional Government has been almost completely dependent on its own oil exports to cover costs.

These revenues, however, have diminished drastically after international oil prices dropped by around 70%, starting mid-2014, which has limited and paralysed any further development of public service provision, mainly education and health care.

Taken together, conflict, displacement, and a weak economy are negatively impacting government functions, household resilience, private sector survival, and public service provision in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate and in the whole Kurdistan Region of Iraq in general.

Solutions to redress the situation must stem from a holistic analysis. This profiling exercise takes place within a complex environment, affected by many layers of external and internal shocks.

It is therefore crucial to complement the significant amount of information available on the families sheltered in camps for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) with a new and comparable analysis of those residing out of camps, in urban areas. It is also relevant to include a review of the needs of the host community living alongside these populations, so that the strategies to mitigate the effects of displacement can benefit all.

For these reasons, the profiling exercise has been conducted; it aims to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation for both displaced and host populations in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

Similar studies have been completed for the Kurdistan Region's Erbil Governorate (June 2016) and Duhok Governorate (August 2016).

Conflict, displacement, and a weak economy are negatively impacting government functions, household resilience, private sector survival, and public service provision in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate and in the whole Kurdistan Region of Iraq in general.

Why an urban approach?

As mentioned by the Minister of Planning, Dr. Ali Sindi, in his foreword to this report, the shift of focus from an emergency response to a longer-term one has to include urban areas in its core. In the case of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, there are two reasons for this.

First, about 86% of the IDPs and refugees in the governorate live in cities and towns, especially in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, the main urban centre. **Second**, the geographical extension of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate covers nearly half of the Kurdistan Region, with dispersed urban centres across the territory, which poses extraordinary operational challenges for the actors present there who are implementing programmes to the out-of-camp population in need; up to three hours by road separate the Sulaymaniyah District Centre from the southern district of Kalar.

Urban areas, ultimately, offer newly displaced populations a very dynamic environment in which to develop their own livelihood strategies. Therefore, households prefer to settle in urban areas in spite of the challenges they may face there in terms of living costs, employment, and social cohesion.

Objectives of the profiling

The overarching aim of the assessment is therefore to establish an evidence base for policy and practice recommendations for the governorate authorities and humanitarian and development actors in developing comprehensive, medium- and long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns.

The specific profiling objectives are:

- To provide demographic profiles disaggregated by sex, age, displacement status (i.e., refugees, IDPs, and host community) and diversity in the targeted areas;
- To provide profiles of the different urban areas with a high concentration of out-of-camp displaced populations;
 - To analyse the capacities, vulnerabilities, and coping mechanisms of the populations residing in the targeted areas;
 - To analyse the resilience of urban areas in relation to the availability and limitations of services and livelihoods;
- To provide a dataset available to the KRG and the humanitarian / development community.

Urban areas, ultimately, offer newly displaced populations a very dynamic environment in which to develop their own livelihood strategies

Preliminary findings were shared and validated with Governorate stakeholders, UN agencies, and NGOs in a workshop held in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre in July 2016.

The recommendations for the report were subsequently jointly discussed by all parties. This report is, in effect, a joint effort between all the stakeholders playing a significant role in the humanitarian response to the displacement crisis in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

2. METHODOLOGY

Introduction and methodological consideration

The profiling exercise takes an area-based approach in order to provide an analysis of the living situation in the different urban areas hosting displaced populations. It looks at all population groups impacted by displacement living in these locations (i.e., Syrian refugees, IDPs, and host community).

The aim is to analyse not only the differences between the target populations, but also the diversity within the urban areas of the governorate; each territorial part of the governorate present different dynamics and different socio-economic realities. A mixed-methods approach is used, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection methods: desk review, household survey, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).

Coverage of the area-based approach

The profiling covers urban and peri-urban areas across the governorate with a large concentration of refugees and IDPs¹.

For the area-based analysis, these areas are grouped into three different geographical strata that are analysed comparatively (a description of each area's characteristics is provided in the following section):

- **The Sulaymaniyah District Centre, being the district hosting the largest number of IDPs and refugees;**
- **Periphery district centres, which encompass all the district centres surrounding the Sulaymaniyah centre with a relevant population of IDPs or refugees;**
- **Kalar and Kifri district centres, which are areas that hold special relevance for the humanitarian partners given its high priority status for humanitarian interventions.**

1. The coverage areas include areas of responsibility for UNHCR's operations that do not necessarily correspond to the official administrative boundaries.

Household survey: quantitative data

A sample of 1,201 households was selected for the survey (399 from the host community, 401 IDPs, and 401 refugees), stratified by population group and geographic stratum (Figure 1).


The survey was conducted in May 2016 by the Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office and it covered the following topics:

- **Household composition (age, gender, family relations)**
- **Education (school attendance, education achievements, literacy)**
- **Employment (work status, occupation, industry, income, employment methods)**
- **Housing (dwelling, sharing, evictions, rent costs)**
- **Livelihoods strategies (income sources, expenditure, debts, coping strategies, assets)**
- **Mobility (migration history, future intentions, return)**

The sample drawn from each of the targeted subdistricts was proportionate to the size of each population group in that subdistrict (Table 1). Population figures for the host community and IDPs were facilitated by the Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office based on an internal census carried out in 2015, which included IDPs pre- and post-2014; figures for refugees were facilitated by UNHCR. Population weights were subsequently applied during the analysis in order to obtain results applicable to all urban areas at the governorate level.

The sample size used allows for an extrapolation of statistically significant results with a 5% margin of error for each geographical stratum, except for the Kalar and Kifri segment (results are significant with a 10% margin of error due to a smaller sample size available). The results are also representative for each population group with a 5% margin of error.

Figure 1. Distribution of the households interviewed in the coverage area by geographical stratum



Data Source: Administrative Boundaries provided by the Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office (SSO)

Table 1. Sampling of households interviewed per population group and stratum

Stratum	Host community	IDPs	Refugees	Total sample	Total population
Sulaymaniyah district centre	188	203	281	672	963,390
Kalar and Kifri	48	84	24	156	272,280
Periphery district centres	163	114	96	373	823,141
Total sample	399	401	401	1,201	2,058,811

Focus group discussions (FGDs): qualitative data

The FGDs aimed at providing in-depth and contextualising information on some of the topics addressed by the household survey.

Based on preliminary findings from the survey, the additional information gathered in FGDs explored intercommunity relations and perceptions in order to better understand the degree of social cohesion between (and within) the communities, as well as future intentions on migration.

Insights from groups of IDPs and refugees were obtained from previous UNHCR's regular FGDs with women, men, adults, and youth, carried out during 2015.

In addition, in order to obtain insights from the host community for this assessment, 8 FGDs with the local population were conducted with groups of women, men, and students. These FGDs were conducted by UNHCR in May and June 2016.

Limitations

Results at the district level are not statistically significant due to insufficient sample sizes in a majority of districts, thus providing results with a margin of error larger than the minimum standard of 10%.

Therefore, results are not displayed disaggregated by district in the data analysis, but grouped in the three strata described above (the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, Periphery district centres, and Kalar and Kifri).

In some cases, however, some figures divide the periphery district centres into two categories: on the one hand, the periphery districts with a large influx of displaced people and, on the other hand, the periphery districts with a smaller influx of displaced people (see Table 2 in the next section).

This facilitates a more practical and deeper analysis, but it must be taken into account that the margin of error for these two sub-groups is still slightly higher than the minimum standard of 10%.

A mixed-methods approach is used, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection methods: desk review, household survey, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).



Sulaymaniyah City Overview, freelance photographer, Halo Lano, 2015.

3. WHO AND WHERE ARE THE DISPLACED?

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

As 86% of the refugees and IDPs displaced in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate are living within the host community, the displacement phenomenon in this governorate has a distinctly face. Only 25% of the 31,000 refugees and 12% of the 229,000 IDPs are sheltered in camps, most of them in the southern districts close to the areas where the displacement originated.

With a host community of around 2.08 million people, this implies that the total population has increased about 11% in the last 4 years (13% if also including the displaced people hosted in camps). The urban areas covered in this assessment encompass about 2.06 million people (87% being host community members, 12% IDPs, and 1% refugees). **For the purposes of this assessment, these areas have been divided into three geographical strata: the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, Kalar and Kifri, and the periphery district centres.**

The Sulaymaniyah District Centre is the largest urban area, in which nearly half of the total population of the governorate is concentrated. The vast majority of refugees and around half of the IDPs live in this district. As a consequence, the increase of inhabitants has been close to 20%, mainly concentrated in the peri-urban neighbourhoods and outskirts, such as Qirga, Bakrajo, Raparin, and Tasluja.

The stratum comprised of the district centres of Kalar and Kifri hosts the second largest cluster of IDPs (nearly no refugees). Both urban centres are subject to tense situations due to their proximity to zones in which conflict continues to take place and which are not stabilised. Finally, the periphery district centres include those urban areas across the governorate that have also received an influx of IDPs.

The population increase in some of these periphery districts has been over 10%, especially in the eastern and southern districts (the touristic areas of Dukan and Darbandikhan, and the district of Chamchamal, bordering the Kirkuk and Salahaddin Governorates, where many IDPs come from).

In the inner districts, the population increase has not exceeded 5% in most cases. The district centres not covered in the assessment did not have a relevant presence of IDPs or refugees.

For the purposes of this assessment, these areas have been divided into three geographical strata: the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, Kalar and Kifri, and the periphery district centres.

The three population groups (host community, IDPs and refugees) present some differences in key demographic characteristics. IDP households tend to be the largest, with 7.7 members on average, while the average size of refugee and host community households is 5.5. Furthermore, the IDP and refugee populations are relatively much younger than the host community.

A total of 54% of IDPs and refugees are under 19 years of age, while this is the case for 43% of the host community. An important consideration for the effects of displacement is that 18% of the total refugee population and 7% of the total IDP population have been born in displacement.

1. DISPLACED POPULATION IN CAMPS AND OUT OF CAMPS: REFUGEES AND IDPs

Based on data from UNHCR (31st May 2016), the Sulaymaniyah Governorate hosts a total of 30,724 refugees, about 12% of the total number of refugees in Iraq – a number that has remained stable since early 2014. In addition, according to the KRSO's Comprehensive Registration of Displaced People done in June 2015, the governorate hosts 229,286 IDPs, including individuals displaced prior to 2014.

Therefore, the population distribution in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate after the latest waves of displacement has significantly changed (Figure 2).

A total of 89% of the population is formed by the host community, 10% by IDPs, and 1% by refugees. For IDPs and refugees, these figures comprise the total population both in-camp and out-of-camp.

Although there is a refugee camp and 8 IDP camps in the area, %75 of refugees and %88 of IDPs live in either urban or rural areas

However, the majority of both IDPs and refugees are not actually hosted in camps, but within the host community (Figure 3). Although there is a refugee camp and 8 IDP camps in the area, 75% of refugees and 88% of IDPs live in either urban or rural areas.

This highlights the importance of carrying out an analysis focused on the out-of-camp living situation vis-à-vis the host community.

Figure 2. Distribution of the total population in the IDPs, and refugees




Table 2. Population distribution in the profiling coverage areas (urban areas in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate) by district

District	Host community	IDPs	Refugees	Total population	% population increase due to displacement
Sulaymaniyah	811,175	132,779	19,436	963,390	19%
Kalar	185,631	31,334	121	217,086	17%
Ranya	203,063	2,035	1,892	206,990	2%
Chamchamal	148,109	24,935	644	173,688	17%
Pishder	95,734	8,609	43	104,386	9%
Halabja	92,039	3,004	332	95,375	4%
Sharazur	60,540	7,606	71	68,217	13%
Said Sadiq	61,520	3,305	247	65,072	6%
Kifri	36,876	18,318	-	55,194	50%
Dukan	44,404	14,868	-	59,090	33%
Darbandikhan	45,829	6,964	-	52,793	15%
		253,757	22,786		
TOTAL	1,784,920	276,543		2,061,281	15%

2. POPULATION FLOWS IN URBAN AREAS

Distribution of the displaced urban population

Focusing only on the urban areas covered in this assessment (Table 2) and based on the planning figures used for this assessment², the number of the displaced population in the urban areas in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is 253,700 IDPs (or 46,000 households) and 22,800 refugees (or 4,900 households). This is added to an urban host community of 1,784,900 inhabitants. The total population is now 2,061,300 individuals, corresponding to 1% refugees, 12% IDPs, and 87% host community.

In some urban areas, the population has increased significantly in a very short time (3 to 4 years) due to the arrival of displaced households. In addition to the area of Kifri, with a population increase

of 50%, other heavily-impacted centres include Dukan, Darbandikhan, and Sulaymaniyah. In other urban areas, the influx has been milder, with slight population increases, below 5%.

On average, the increase of population in the urban areas of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is estimated to be 15%. This percentage is the lowest among the three governorates in the Kurdistan Region, as the population in the Duhok and Erbil Governorates increased 26% and 25%, respectively, due to the arrival of refugee and IDP households.

In addition to this population increase in the urban areas, it should be noted that there is an extensive rural area that also hosts IDPs and refugees, although in smaller numbers. The Sulaymaniyah Governorate also hosts a small refugee population formed by Iranian Kurds displaced several decades ago (referred as old caseloads). These IDPs and refugees living in rural areas and camps frequently interact with their closer urban centres in order to access livelihoods, public services, or simply interaction with their closest community. Therefore, although not part of this assessment, these rural areas should also be kept in mind for a broader perspective.

2. Differences between these IDP/refugee figures and the ones in the previous section are explained due to the different sources used. While Section 1 relied on the overall figures provided by UNHCR and the Ministry of Planning, the figures in this section (and hence the ones used for the household survey design and for the rest of the report) are the planning figures used by the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, based on their own census of the displaced population, which, for IDPs, includes displaced persons prior to 2014.

Clusters of displaced population across the strata

As described in the methodology section, the geographical area in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is divided into three distinctive strata. **The Sulaymaniyah District Centre** hosts more than half of the IDP population and nearly all the refugees in urban areas. This geographical area corresponds to the capital city of the governorate, which is the largest urban centre in terms of size in the governorate (nearly 4 times larger than the other large urban centres).


The stratum comprised of the southern centres of **Kalar and Kifri** (the Garmian Administration) hosts the second largest cluster of IDPs, with close to 60,000 individuals (22% of the total), although it does not host virtually any refugees. Both urban centres are subject to tense situations due to their proximity to zones in which conflict continues to take place and which are not stabilised. In addition, out of the 8 IDP camps in the governorate, 5 are in this area.

Finally, the remaining **periphery district centres** within the governorate have two different dynamics in terms of their population increase (Table 2). Some districts have had a heavy influx of displaced populations, leading to quick population increases of nearly 20%.

Most of the IDPs and refugees not living in either the Sulaymaniyah District Centre or Kalar/Kifri are, in fact, concentrated in the eastern and southern districts (either the touristic areas of Dukan and Darbandikhan, or the district of Chamchamal, bordering the Kirkuk and Salahaddin Governorates, where many IDPs come from).

On the contrary, most inner areas received a much lighter influx, such as Halabja or Ranya. District centres with heavy and light influxes of displaced households will be differentiated recurrently in the assessment in order to carry out a more detailed analysis and mapping of variables.

Figure 3. Distribution of refugees and IDPs between in-camp and out-of-camp population



Source: UNHCR (May 2016) for refugees; KRSO (June 2015) for out-camp IDPs (including pre-2014 IDPs); IOM DTM (June 2015) for in-camp IDPs.

Influx of displaced households from Syria and central/south Iraq

About 15% of the Syrian refugees currently hosted in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate were initially displaced in 2012. Most of the displacement, however, took place in 2013 (with 42% of households being displaced by then) and 2014 (30%).

The remaining 13% were displaced between 2015 and in the early months of 2016 (Figure 4).


Regarding the IDP population, a large majority of the households currently hosted in the urban areas of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate have been displaced during the present conflict in Iraq, either in 2013 (8% of the total number of households displaced), 2014 (63%), or 2015 (22%).

A minority (7%) were displaced prior to 2013, mostly in 2006, 2007, and 2012.

In addition, the three main governorates of origin of the IDP households displaced after 2013 are Anbar (53%), Diyala (22%), and the neighbouring Salahaddin (11%).

The three main governorates of origin of the IDP households displaced after 2013 are Anbar (%53), Diyala (%22), and the neighbouring Salahaddin (%11).

Figure 4. Number of families displaced in the areas covered by the assessment of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, by year of displacement



3. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

Age, gender, and heads of household

By gender categories, the total urban population comprises 50% men and 50% women. There are no significant differences between refugees, IDPs, and the host community, or by geographical strata. The population of IDPs and refugees is relatively much younger than the host community (Figure 5). While about 54% of the displaced population is under 19 years of age, this is the case for only 43% of the host community³. The largest population group for IDPs and refugees, therefore, consists of those aged 0 to 9 years old.


In terms of potential vulnerability, it is important to note that about 74% and 71% of the refugee and IDP population group, respectively, consists of women and children below the age of 15.

While about %54 of the displaced population is under 19 years of age, this is the case for only %43 of the host community . The largest population group for IDPs and refugees, therefore, consists of those aged 0 to 9 years old.

Household size

The largest households in terms of size are those in the IDP group: the average size is 7.1 members (ranging from 6.6 in the periphery districts up to 7.8 in Kalar and Kifri). Both refugee and host community households comprise on average 5.5 members.

Figure 5. Distribution of population groups by age



3. In most of the districts excluding the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, the percentage of IDP and refugee population under 19 years of age can be well above 60%.

4. URBAN SPACES AND COHESION

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY

FINDINGS. The main aim that IDPs and refugees had when moving to the area or neighbourhood where they currently live was to find security. Other factors were also relevant, such as a better affordability of living (especially for those IDPs that have been displaced before 2013), but most IDPs have arrived directly from the areas of conflict with an only primary objective of seeking safety.

The most recent IDPs and refugees arrived in an urban host setting deeply affected by a financial crisis. As became evident from the FGDs with host community members, the sudden and unexpected loss of employment, the closure of offices, workshops, and small factories either in their neighbourhood or around the cities and towns strongly shaped the environment in which IDPs and refugees were received.

As a consequence, the most recurrent feeling stated by host community members in qualitative terms was a sense of alienation in their own neighbourhood. The additional burden that displaced households imposed on the deteriorated public services and private sector, as well as the perceived unfairness of the ones assuming the burden of the crisis and fears of a demographic shift, have led the host community to lean towards drastic solutions, involving, most often, restrictions imposed on the movement and rights of the displaced population.

As a consequence, creating the conditions for a peaceful sharing of the urban space has become a challenge as well as an opportunity. The main analysis on this issue covers three structures: the housing structure, the social structure, and the public services structure.

Housing constitutes a large part of the analysis. The overall housing situation in urban areas is relatively optimal, in the sense that up to 99% of the households live in either individual houses or apartments. However, 12% of IDP households in Kifri were hosted in the town's school at the time of the assessment. Furthermore, while 9 out of 10 host community households own their dwelling (the other 10% either rent or are hosted), virtually all IDP and refugee households are tenants.

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This draws particular attention to the rental market in urban areas, as the influx of displaced households drastically changed its configuration. Out of the total number of families that rent, only 46% belong to the host community, while 49% are IDPs and 5% refugees, on average, in all strata. In areas of heavy displacement, such as Kifri and Kalar, up to three quarters of rented houses are inhabited by IDPs and the rest by host community members.

Housing emerges as one of the key challenges of protracted displacement, as this situation is conducive to negative effects, especially in the form of overcrowding and evictions.

Indeed, evictions have become alarmingly recurrent in two areas: the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, and Kalar and Kifri, where the majority of eviction cases took place in the last year – a significant portion due to an inability to continue paying rent. IDPs are most affected by evictions, with 22% of the households having been evicted.

Regarding the social structure, testimonies from the FGDs pointed to a very negative state of interaction between IDPs and the host community, at least on the surface.

However, the FGDs also presented many positive cases where the general distrust held by host community members vanished when they referred to closer personal interactions with IDP families, usually their neighbours, or the families of their children's friends, or poorer families living close-by, to whom they were providing assistance, or even IDPs that had become relatives through inter-marriage. This shows that there are still opportunities for more positive interaction and trust between the population groups to emerge.

Finally, a note on the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin. The data indicate the extent to which this is a protracted displacement situation. A total of 21% of IDP households and 15% of refugee households stated that they are unwilling to return back under any circumstance, at this moment.

In addition, 31% of both IDPs and refugees imposed the reconstruction of the area as the main condition for return, once the area is pacified and accessible.

In sum, this implies that about half of the total displaced population is likely to remain in their current location in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate for the next 5 to 10 years. Even for those households willing to return, the feasibility of returning is seriously limited by external factors such as reconstruction needs, the financial cost, and legal land and property disputes.

1. CHANGING DYNAMICS IN URBAN AREAS

Changes perceived by the host community

Based on the discussions held in the focus groups with host community members, the influx of refugees and, more importantly, of IDPs in their neighbourhood was received with negative feelings. The host community related displacement with a deterioration of public services and an undesirable competition for housing within their neighbourhood.

Furthermore, many participants feared the effect of displacement in terms of a demographic change in the local population. In addition, although many participants reported on a positive side to displacement, that is, more economic activity for the local shops, these benefits have been offset by the impact of the financial crisis.

Many FGD participants mentioned the loss of employment, the closure of offices, workshops, and small factories either in their neighbourhood or around the cities and towns. They also discussed how these closures had had a strong impact on them. Employment in retail and construction had become scarcer, and participants reported being unable to compete with the lower salaries that refugees and IDPs accept.

Taken together – the arrival of IDPs and the financial crisis – the most recurrent feeling stated by host community members in qualitative terms was a sense of alienation in their own neighbourhood, because of the decreasing quality and capacity of public services, and because of many families having to rely on coping strategies to face the decrease in available revenue.

Displaced families, many said, receive more attention from both government and humanitarian actors, and this creates popular perceptions that the situation of IDPs and refugees is better than that of the host community, in spite of all population groups facing equally dire circumstances.

As the dynamics in urban areas change, the increasing reaction of the host community is to demand drastic solutions which involve, most often, restrictions on the movement and rights of the displaced population. The following section, therefore, attempts to focus on the dynamics and origins of these perceptions across most of Sulaymaniyah’s neighbourhoods.

Figure 6. Reason for IDP and refugee households for choosing their current neighbourhood, by original displacement period

Reason	Time of displacement			
	Before 2013	2013	2014	2015 & 2016
Better affordability	39%	35%	23%	27%
Safer location	17%	31%	35%	42%
Relatives, friends are also here	9%	14%	12%	10%
Better employment	13%	5%	5%	3%
Other	22%	15%	25%	18%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Reasons given by IDPs and refugees to move and live in their current neighbourhood

IDP and refugee households that have been displaced for a longer period (i.e., who left their place of origin before 2012 and therefore have had time to find certain stability in the host area) tend to live in their current neighbourhood mainly due to a better affordability of rent and living expenses (39% of the households).

On the other hand, recently displaced families tend to prioritise safer locations above other criteria, as 35% of

was a sense of alienation in their own neighbourhood, because of the decreasing quality and capacity of public services, and because of many families having to rely on coping strategies to face the decrease in available revenue.

the households displaced in 2014 and 42% of those displaced in 2015/2016/ selected security as the main reason for choosing their current neighbourhood. Other factors such as better employment opportunities or the presence of other family members are, in general, not often highlighted. This may be indicative of these households not yet having found a more permanent destination within the Kurdistan Region.

2. HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS

Housing situation

The aggregate housing situation is relatively optimal as the percentage of households living in individual houses or apartments is about 99% in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre and the periphery district centres, and 97% on average in Kalar and Kifri (Figure 7)⁴.


There are no major issues in terms of families living in unfinished buildings or informal/collective centres as seen in other governorates. However, 12% of the IDPs in Kifri are still hosted in the district centre's schools. Similarly, a significant part of the refugees in Kalar are hosted in informal settlements, although the total number is relatively small.

Virtually all refugee and IDP households that live in houses/apartments are tenants – the only exception to is Kalar and Kifri where a number of families are hosted by others. On the contrary, only 1 out of 10 host community households are tenants, while the rest principally own their house or apartment (Figure 8).

Regarding the possession of a written rental agreement, only in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre a significant proportion of households hold a contract (62%). There are large differences across population groups; about 80% of refugees and IDPs who rent have a contract, while the same holds true to 38% of the host community.

The situation is, however, drastically different in the periphery districts: only about 20% of the households that rent (either refugees, IDPs, or host community members) have a written agreement. The rest presumably rely on verbal agreements. Therefore, while contractual agreements for rents are not a common practice outside of the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, they are most sought after in these areas by displaced households given that written agreements serve as an effective mechanism for providing legal security to both landlords and tenants alike.

Figure 7. Housing situation in urban areas per stratum and population group



4. It must be noted, though, that the quality of the dwelling was not assessed. FGDs with refugees and IDPs provided more nuanced insights, in that these population groups were more likely to rent housing in a poor state and with landlords not willing to carry out maintenance work.

Note: due to limitations in sample sizes, the margin of error in this figure is above the conventional %10 interval.

Families sharing the dwelling

The ratio of households sharing a house or flat with other families in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is much lower than in the other two governorates of the Kurdistan Region, which indicates a comparably smaller problem of house overcrowding.


On average, 23% of refugee households and 32% of IDP households live in shared houses or apartments. This is especially predominant in Kalar/Kifri and districts like Chamchamal, these areas having received a heavier influx of IDP households.

The aggregate housing situation is relatively optimal as the percentage of households living in individual houses or apartments is about %99 in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre and the periphery district centres, and %97 on average in Kalar and Kifri

The housing units that host multiple families tend to be larger than houses inhabited by a single family. This is a positive sign, as it implies that shared houses are frequently large enough to host all household members.

Nearly 59% of the houses shared between families have 4 or more rooms, while this is the case for only 45% of the houses inhabited by a single family.

Figure 8. Status situation of housing in urban areas per stratum and population group



Rent and cost of housing

Displacement created a strong pressure on the rental market. Out of all households that rent a house or apartment in the urban areas, 49% are IDPs, 46% are host community households, and only 5% are refugees. In districts with a heavier influx of displaced people, well above 60% of rented houses are inhabited by IDPs.

The highest rent costs are found in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, with an average rent of 304,000 IQD/month (\$243/month)⁵.


For the other locations, the average rent is significantly lower, but the lower rents are also correlated with the impact of displacement. For instance, the average rate in Kalar/Kifri is about 190,000 IQD/month (\$150/month), followed by the periphery districts with a heavier influx of IDPs (average rent of 172,000 IQD/month, or \$138/month) and those with a lighter influx of IDPs (average rent of 137,000 IQD/month, or \$110/month). Overall, the difference is more than two-fold between the most expensive and the least expensive rent.

The ratio of rent over total household expenses (only for those who pay rent) is 24% for all urban areas taken together. There are, however, great differences between strata (Figure 9). The major issues are found in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, where the average ratio stands at 31% of rent over total expenses. The ratio is lower in the other areas: 23% for Kalar/Kifri and 13% for the other periphery districts.

Regarding population groups, refugees tend to have the highest ratio of rent over total expenses (34% of expenses dedicated to rent if living in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, 28% on average in the periphery districts, including Kalar/Kifri), followed by IDPs (31% and 22%, respectively) and host community (31% and 11%, respectively).

In sum, all households renting in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, independently of the population group, face very high financial costs compared to those renting in other districts, for whom renting imposes a much smaller burden.

Figure 9. Ratio of rent over total household expenses by stratum



5. Based on an exchange rate of \$1 = 1,250 IQD.

3. CAPACITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

General public services provision

Employment data from the survey were used to estimate the number of persons employed in key public services (provision of health care, education, and utilities such as water, electricity, and waste collection).


In the urban areas, 4.8% of the total population were found to be employed in these public services – in other words, nearly 5 employees are servicing every 100 residents (including host community, IDPs, and refugees). This ratio stands between 3.9% for the urban areas in the Duhok Governorate and 5.3% for the urban areas in the Erbil Governorate – the differences, however, are not great.

Large disparities do emerge if disaggregated by strata, with many of the periphery district centres critically below the governorate average, and the Sulaymaniyah District Centre having the highest percentage of public employees in health care, education, and utilities.

The locations with a relatively heavier influx of displaced people tend to show a lower ratio than other areas, which is, indeed, linked to the arrival of displaced households and the lower capacity to provide services for the entire population.

The expansion of service provision and capacity, in quantitative and qualitative terms, came to a halt during 2014 due to the financial crisis. It left many new educational and health care facilities unfinished, and the increase of the public service staff had to be discontinued.

Figure 10. Percentage of people employed in the public health care, public education and utilities sectors



Education services in urban areas

The provision of education services in urban areas is measured here by the percentage of children that reported not attending school due to 'no easily accessible facility'; therefore, this refers to constraints in the access to education (note that other reasons not linked to service provision are explored in the final section of this report).

The percentage of children between the age of 6 and 14 that do not attend school due to access constraints is relatively low across the urban areas: in Kalar and Kifri the percentage is 2% and close to 0% in the rest of the districts, including the Sulaymaniyah District Centre. The situation is similar for children aged 15 to 18, with 2% of the children in Kalar and Kifri having access issues and close to 0% in other areas.

However, it is important to separate school access issues also between the population groups. In this sense, 4% of the IDPs and 3% of the refugees between ages 6 and 14 reported problems with school access. For the particular case of IDPs, these problems are more frequently found in Kalar and Kifri, as well as in those districts with a light influx of displaced population (Dukan, Halabja, and Darbandikhan). These districts have adopted fewer measures with which to adapt education to the displaced groups. In the age group of 15 to 18 years, 6% of IDPs and 5% of refugees reported no access to schools in general, with issues concentrated in the same geographical areas as before. For the case of the host community, no child in any of age group reported not being able to attend school due to a lack of access.

The only group that reported serious issues in access to education in the FGDs were refugees, although IDPs mentioned that class overcrowding and the fact that there were not enough teachers to cover all topics created a negative environment for learning.

Refugee FGD participants reported that there was a lack of Arabic schools for all refugees and they were, in addition, unable to access Kurdish schools due to a lack of availability. In addition, they indicated that many local schools were not operating fully due to the financial crisis (although no details on which grades are most affected were available). These issues were a direct cause for many children engaging in child labour, migration, or early marriage, participants said.

Refugee FGD participants reported that there was a lack of Arabic schools for all refugees and they were, in addition, unable to access Kurdish schools due to a lack of availability.

As mentioned above, this section referred only to issues in the provision of education services. Other issues not linked to access, such as a lack of willingness to study, dissatisfaction with the service, barriers such as language, etc., are referred to in the final section of this report.

Health services in urban areas

There is a general satisfaction regarding access to health services in urban areas, with 57% of the respondents qualifying access in positive terms (12% as very good and 45% as good). In areas such as Chamchamal, Darbandikhan, Said Sadiq, and Halabja, satisfaction is higher than the average level across all population groups.

However, pockets of dissatisfaction exist in some areas. While in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, 20% of the households rated access levels as insufficient, in Kalar and Kifri the rating is close to 50%. The main reason for the low ratings in these areas is primarily linked to a decrease in the quality of the service provided, which is linked to the financial crisis. This implies a diminished capacity and hence poorer access. A lack of affordability in other, private health care services also has a negative effect on access to health care, as pointed out by a number of households in the FGDs.

4. SOCIAL COHESION AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

Interaction between the groups

The testimonies gathered in the FGDs point to a very negative state of interaction between IDPs and the host community, at least on the surface. Discussions in all the host community FGDs included general statements regarding an extended lack of trust to the overall population of IDPs; as was mentioned above, the reasons are linked to an increased competition in the access to public services and employment, as well as to fears of demographic change. Participants referred to their interactions with IDPs being mainly transactional, only taking place in work environments, hospitals, or mosques. Language differences were mentioned as a major issue limiting interactions.

(Discussions in all the host community FGDs included general statements regarding an extended lack of trust to the overall population of IDPs; this general distrust vanished when participants referred to closer interactions with specific IDP families)

However, this general distrust vanished when participants referred to closer interactions with specific IDP families – usually their neighbours, or the families of their children's friends, or poorer families that are living close-by, to whom they were providing assistance, or even IDPs that had become relatives through inter-marriage. The general negative statements on IDPs turned into more positive statements on co-existence and altruism for these less distant families.

FGDs with IDPs did not point to major issues in terms of co-existence with the host community, and many pointed to inter-marriages as a positive sign.

Their main concern, only in some of the groups, was related to the restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement for security reasons; many pointed to the arbitrariness with which they were being treated when dealing with security forces and bureaucracy, such as when requesting the necessary documentation to be permitted to travel between governorates and to cross checkpoints.

Sense of safety in daily life

Based on the survey data, virtually all respondents reported feeling safe or very safe in their location.⁶ A similar response was given with regards to street harassment, as no survey respondent mentioned a case of street harassment, with the exception of Kalar, where 4 households of the 120 interviewed pointed to a harassment experience (the 4 of them being IDPs).

These data were corroborated in the FGDs in all population groups. IDPs reported feeling safe in the governorate in spite of the sometimes restricted freedom of movement.

The only issue mentioned in the groups was related to street fights between children being caused by their origin. For the host community, safety in their neighbourhood persisted in spite of the arrival of new families, although some participants reported being more vigilant. Many persons pointed to their local *mukhtars* as key players in solving general issues, disputes, or misunderstandings without the intervention of security forces.

6. Topics such as safety, violence, and co-existence between population groups are difficult to assess based solely on household survey findings due to the limitations of exploring such perceptions through a questionnaire. Respondents may not always be willing to share such feelings or experiences. Therefore, limitations to the representativeness of the responses on these topics should be kept in mind.

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IDP students using a school of host community, Ashti Street, Sulaymaniyah. Fareeq Halabjaji, Freelance Photographer, 2016

5. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PUSH FACTORS: EVICTION, MIGRATION AND RETURNS

A negative push: evicted families

About 6% of the households in the coverage area, on average, reported having been evicted in the last 12 months. The areas with most recurrent evictions were Kalar and Kifri, although the majority of cases (in absolute numbers) have taken place in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre. There is also a significant difference in percentages between the districts with a heavier influx of IDPs or refugees and the less impacted districts (Figure 11). This holds some relation to the different rates of eviction by population group, since IDPs in particular have an extremely high rate, with 22% of the families having been evicted⁷.


The reason for most of the eviction cases is related to an inability to continue paying rent, as stated by around 35% of the evicted respondents. The second most cited reason for eviction is the property owner's decision to stop renting to the household. However, around 40% of the respondents stated 'other' reasons, not specified in the survey.

An ambiguous push: migration abroad

In almost 6% of the families, on average for all groups, there is at least one member who stated having plans to leave the household unit. Of these, the vast majority have intentions to move elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region or in Iraq, while a very low number of families reported a willingness to migrate to Europe. In total, the families willing to migrate to Europe are less than 1% of the population assessed.

Indeed, compared to the FGDs held in other governorates, the participants of all population groups in the FGDs for the Sulaymaniyah Governorate indicated that few families have left or are willing to leave mainly because the travel is both expensive and very dangerous. Willingness to migrate, in any case, was seen to be higher for refugees and the host community. In this latter case, many participants expressed that the success of some of their relatives or friends in Europe were encouraging them to try for themselves.

Figure 11. Proportion and total number of families evicted per location and per population group in the last 12 months



7. The figure for the host community (3.5%) encompasses all households, irrelevant of whether they rent or own the house they live in. If only those families that rent are taken into account, the eviction rate for the host community is as high as 11.7%.

Note: number of eviction cases extrapolated from survey responses.

A positive push: willingness and feasibility to return to place of origin

A significant majority of the displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable in the medium term; on average, about 85% of Syrian refugees and 79% of IDPs stated their willingness to return. However, in some cases, a substantial percentage of displaced families do not have any wish to return at this moment (Figure 12).

In particular, this is the case for IDPs coming from conflict-affected governorates such as Diyala and Baghdad, where 38% and 42%, respectively, of the families displaced from there wish to stay in the Kurdistan Region or migrate elsewhere.

As a condition for the return to take place, virtually all households (excluding those not willing to return) stated that the **primary** condition for return is the 'liberation' of their place of origin. **The second** condition, however, is more nuanced and relates to reconstruction, restoration, or reclamation of property in the place of origin.

In particular, 36% of the IDPs indicate reconstruction of their houses as a condition, 25% prioritise reclamation of their former properties, and 15% expect financial assistance.

This situation is relatively similar for households originating from Anbar, Baghdad, and Salahaddin, while those from Diyala place major emphasis (38%) on financial assistance above other conditions.

Regarding refugees in particular, there is a similar distribution: 36% of Syrian households place the reconstruction of the house as condition, while 20% expect financial assistance, and 14% aim to reclaim their properties.

As property reclamation or reconstruction is one of the main conditions for the households willing to return, it is worth deepening the analysis on the situation of IDPs' and refugees' properties.


An average of 65% of them own either a house or land in their place of origin and, of these, 87% can prove legal ownership of the asset – the absence of such proof would be a remarkable challenge in reclaiming the property in case of return.

However, the lowest percentage is found for IDPs originating from Diyala (79%); in other words, 2 out of 10 households coming from Diyala are not able to prove ownership of their land.

An average of 65% of them own either a house or land in their place of origin and, of these, 87% can prove legal ownership of the asset.

The primary condition for return is the 'liberation' of their place of origin. The second condition, however, is more nuanced and relates to reconstruction, restoration, or reclamation of property in the place of origin

Figure 12. Distribution of households by willingness to return and area of origin¹



1. Apart from Syria, only the Iraqi governorates of Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salahaddin are highlighted in the figure because 93% of the IDPs in the assessment's coverage area come from these four governorates.

5. EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS.

One of the most pressing concerns in a displacement and financial crisis context is the effect on the labour market caused by the arrival of a very large number of people into the workforce. In the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, employment opportunities have largely withstood the shock, and the situation has not reached critical levels for the time being.

The host community population has maintained similar employment rates to those prior to the crisis, although unemployment rates are persistently high, especially in a stalled private sector that has been deeply affected by the financial crisis. Even in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, which hosted half of the IDPs and a majority of the refugees, employment rates have remained at the same level. The employment of Syrian refugees, in fact, is extraordinarily high, with rates for the adult male population at about 78%.

IDP households, on the contrary, have significantly low employment rates (57% for men and 8% for women), with many adults being inactive (unemployed and not searching for work). This situation is, however, compensated partially by IDPs' access to public transfers by the Federal Government of Iraq for their previous employment in their place of origin (although only if working for the public sector).

The dynamism of the private sector is a key aspect in this protracted displacement situation, as refugees and IDPs cannot usually work for the government (although some exceptions exist for teachers and health care personnel). Nevertheless, in Sulaymaniyah most employment is generated by the public sector, with 55% of the employed host community working for the government or public companies. Slightly less than half of the IDPs and refugees employed work in construction, the second most common job being in retail.

In a geographical sense, the districts that host the majority of IDPs and refugees (the Sulaymaniyah District Centre and the periphery districts with a heavier influx of displaced persons) also tend to have more private sector jobs available.

As was mentioned above, the percentage of the unemployed population is significantly high across the governorate, which poses certain challenges to the facilitation of employment opportunities to those currently seeking for work. Although the host community has the lowest unemployment rate of all three population groups (9% for host community members, 14% for refugees, and 20% for IDPs), in absolute terms, 77% of all unemployed individuals belong to the host community.

Most livelihood interventions, in this sense, have frequently not targeted the host community. Furthermore, an important aspect for livelihood programming is the fact that half of the unemployed individuals are between 15 and 24 years of age, and the integration of youth into the labour market is one of the most crucial challenges facing Sulaymaniyah.

The most challenging aspect is, perhaps, the differences in the education levels of the unemployed population: half of them have not completed any formal education, while the other half have a higher education diploma. It may be challenging to combine employment programmes targeting both population groups in an environment of deep financial crisis.

As regards the employment of women, the proportion of women working is extremely low and few opportunities exist outside of public sector jobs. This derives in large part from traditional cultural norms and beliefs across communities regarding the role of women. Most women currently at working age, displaced or not, are illiterate, which virtually excludes them from the labour market. Young women are gradually accessing higher education levels and will be seeking to enter the labour market.

Their entrance will be critical to the growth of the economy in the area, but it will pose a challenge for the labour market if it is not modernised and if jobs are not diversified to allow access for young women.

1. WORK STATUS OF THE POPULATION

Explanation of concepts

The work status of the population is analysed through three different indicators. **First**, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have been employed at some point during the month preceding the survey, either as self-employed or paid employees, full-time or sporadically ('employed').

Second, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have not been working but have been actively searching for a job, either for the first time or after losing their previous job ('searching for a job').

Third, through the remaining percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who are outside of the labour force, which means that they are full-time students, disabled persons unable to work, housewives, early retired persons, or simply persons unwilling to work. These individuals are 'economically inactive' and do not count as part of the unemployed population ('out of the labour force'). All three categories sum up to 100%.

The traditional concepts of employment and unemployment rate do not fully apply to the context of the Kurdistan Region and to a complex displacement setting as the present one. The definition of employment is an example of this: informal employment or underemployment is common within this context, which means that individuals may not have worked for the full month, but rather sporadically in different places, for some days. In the survey approach for this report, such an individual is counted as employed, even if s/he has only worked for one week during the month and spent the remainder of the time searching for a job. Underemployment is thus not visible in the data.

In addition, self-employment is also a fluid category that in many cases hides precarious employment situations. Therefore, the boundaries of unemployment are difficult to define, especially because there are no safety nets for someone officially declared unemployed or jobless, as is seen in other countries.

Finally, some additional limitations apply to the data on work status of the IDP population related to the lack of clarity regarding current employment in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, as many IDPs have retained their public posts in their places of origin and are being paid their salary⁸.

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cases have taken place in the
Sulaymaniyah District
Centre.**

For all of the above reasons, the analysis of the population's work status is divided into the following three indicators: 'employed', 'searching for a job' and 'out of the labour force'.

Gender plays an important role in this analysis, as the percentage of women outside of the labour force is extremely high as compared to men. Therefore, work status here is always disaggregated by gender, and information on women's participation in the labour force is provided later in this section.

8. An IDP survey respondent, when asked about his/her employment situation, might have answered that he/she is employed, but at their place of origin, not in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. His/her employment status is maintained, especially in the case of public employees. For instance, a teacher from Anbar would declare he/she is employed and still receiving salary, although not actually working anymore due to displacement. Technically, this person does not work in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. However, other IDPs may be working in fact as employees within the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. This distinction cannot be made with the survey data available.

Data on work status

This part analyses employment in urban areas by comparing the work status of the population by group, stratum, age, and gender. The general situation in the areas included in the assessment is that 40% of the adult population is employed, taking together men and women, and independently of the population group. This is disaggregated into 69% for men and 13% for women.

In comparison with the rest of the governorates in the Kurdistan Region (only urban areas), the average rate, for men and women aggregated, stands between 39% in Duhok and 41% in Erbil.

By population group (Figure 13), there is a very high percentage of employment among male Syrian refugees (78%), with only a very small number of them outside of the labour force (i.e., much fewer full-time students, disabled, or inactive people than in other groups).

The host community and IDPs, on the other hand, have a similar labour force participation, but the IDP group has a higher number of individuals seeking employment. In comparable terms, lack of employment affects the displaced population more than the host community. Overall, these figures are very similar to the ones seen in other governorates in the Kurdistan Region, with no remarkable difference in numbers.

By geographical stratum, the areas of Kalar and Kifri differ from the other districts by having a significantly lower percentage of employed people.

This is not explained by a lack of available employment (the rates of people searching for work are quite similar), but by the fact that there are more people inactive, or outside of the labour force, probably due to a more volatile context in the two areas. Regarding women's employment status, the rate is relatively higher in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre than in the periphery districts.


A significant majority of the displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable in the medium term; on average, about %85 of Syrian refugees and %79 of IDPs stated their willingness to return.

By age group, the lowest employment levels are found among youth (28% for men, 1% for women), most of them still being full-time students. For this young age group, the rate of people searching for work is not higher than the other age groups, which indicates that the governorate is not experiencing a great youth unemployment problem. Employment rates for individuals older than 25 years are extremely high, at 90% for men and 19% for women.

Regarding the type of employment for those individuals with a job, on average nearly 3 out of 4 workers are paid employees in the urban areas. Most of the remaining are self-employed (20%), and a minority are employers or business owners (5%). Self-employment is particularly high in the areas of Kalar and Kifri, and much lower in the rest of the governorate.

The data also shows that the vast majority of paid employees (in the private sector) are working within the informal economy, without a written labour contract. The rate of workers with a contract is only 8% in Kalar and Kifri, 14% in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, and 32% in the periphery districts. These rates are very low, especially for refugees and IDPs (only 9% of the workers from these groups have a contract), whereas the rate for the host community is 23%.

Figure 13. Work status of the individuals between the age of 15 and 64 by gender, population group, stratum, and age group



2. GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS ON EMPLOYMENT

Jobs in the public and private sectors


Slightly more than half of the employment available in all the geographical strata of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is primarily in the public sector (55% of the employed population work for the government or public companies, which is exactly the same percentage in the other two governorates of the region).

An analysis of the jobs created by the private sector in each stratum shows that the periphery districts with a heavy influx of displaced population and the Sulaymaniyah District Centre have higher rates of private sector development compared to the other urban areas (Figure 14).

Regarding private sector employment, each geographical area presents a different economic composition (Table 3). In general, it can be noted that the economy in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate is much more diverse than in the other governorates that are excessively focused on the construction sector that is currently in crisis.

However, most of the work generated by the private sector is concentrated in services (retail, accommodation, reparation, etc.), followed by construction and agriculture. Manufacturing and mining continue to be minor sectors.

Figure 14. Ratio of employment in the private sector



Note: Based on approximate geographical locations on a map. Districts with heavy influx are Chamchamal, Darbandikhan and Dukan. Districts with light influx are Halabja, Pishder, Ranya, Said Sadiq, and Sharazur.

Table 3. Main economic sectors

Stratum	Economic sector	Percentage of the total population employed in the private sector
Sulaymaniyah District Centre	Wholesale and retail	42%
	Construction	20%
	Food and accommodation	6%
Kalar and Kifri	Home / electronic repairs	26%
	Wholesale and retail	25%
	Construction	24%
Periphery district centres	Agriculture	11%
	Wholesale and retail	27%
	Agriculture	20%
	Construction	20%
	Manufacturing	8%

Lack of jobs

Regarding the specific economic sectors in which IDPs and refugees are employed, it must be taken into account that these population groups can only access jobs in the private sector. Construction is the most relevant sector, employing about 45% of the working IDPs and refugees.


Wholesale and retail represent the second most common occupation for the displaced population, employing 20%, followed by accommodation and food as the third main sector, employing 8%. Agriculture, on the other hand, is only relevant in the periphery districts, employing almost no refugees or IDPs in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre nor in Kalar and Kifri.

The data below show the actual unemployment rates for the different geographical areas, calculated as the proportion of people seeking employment over the total number of the labour force. Unemployment (aggregating host community, refugees, and IDPs) is relatively similar in all geographical strata (Figure 15).

Those periphery districts with a heavier influx of displaced population seem to have higher unemployment rates, but they do not stand significantly above the others

As expected, those periphery districts with a heavier influx of displaced population seem to have higher unemployment rates, but they do not stand significantly above the others. It must be noted, for instance, that other periphery districts in the Kurdistan Region, such as Shaqlawa or Sheikhan, have nearly double rates of unemployment compared to the average rate in the urban areas of the Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

Figure 15. Unemployment rates by stratum



Sulaymaniyah Grand Mosque, Central Bazaar used daily by refugees, IDPs and Host Community. Fareeq Halabjawi, Freelance Photographer, 2014.

3. INTEGRATING THE POPULATION INTO THE LABOUR MARKET

Who are the unemployed?

The segment of population that is unemployed and looking for a job is here disaggregated into different demographic and socio-economic categories, such as population group, age, education and experience, and gender (Figure 16). This is useful in order to understand which population segments need more attention in increasing their employment.

Although the level of unemployment is relatively higher for IDPs and refugees than for the host community, in absolute terms, about 77% of the total number individuals currently unemployed are host community members, forming the bulk of unemployed.


Furthermore, it is very important to highlight that 36% of the individuals looking for jobs are women, which poses a special challenge in terms of access to the labour market – female

Half of the unemployed have very low human capital levels (have not completed any formal education degree), and another half have a higher education diploma, but both groups are unable to find employment.

employment rates in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have historically been very low, especially outside of the main cities, and there are longstanding cultural norms which continue to pose barriers to job access. Most of the women seeking employment are located in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre.

Regarding the demographic data, about half of the unemployed individuals are between the ages of 25 and 44. The second largest group comprises youth below the age of 25 years (37%), with the remaining 8% representing the eldest segment of the population. Therefore, a significant percentage is constituted by young people, indicating a serious challenge to integrating youth into the labour market, especially if also considering the fact that up to 50% of the unemployed population has never worked before and has no professional experience.

Figure 16. Characteristics of the group of population currently searching for job in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate’s urban areas



Challenges of human capital (education, skills, and occupation)

A final challenge for the integration of the unemployed population refers to their knowledge and skills. The unemployed population is highly polarised and divided: half of the unemployed have very low human capital levels (have not completed any formal education degree), and another half have a higher education diploma, but both groups are unable to find employment.

Facilitating the employment of these groups is a significant development challenge for which a combination of two different policies or programmes are required (a difficult task in a context of financial crisis).

Fortunately, illiteracy rates are relatively low, but special attention must be paid to this segment of the population that is prone to be excluded from jobs.

The labour force (host community, IDPs, and refugees aggregated) is mostly characterised by low levels of human capital. In particular, 59% of the individuals either working or searching for work have not completed all grades of basic education (up to Grade 9), 11% hold a basic education level, 8% a high school education level, and as many as 22% have completed university studies.

In terms of population groups, Syrian refugees have much lower human capital levels than IDPs and host community members. Up to 80% of the refugees either working or looking for work have not completed basic education (moreover, 32% of them are illiterate).

Table 4. Type of occupation held by the employed population by population group and education level

Population group	Education level	Low-skilled	Semi-skilled	High-skilled	Total
Host community	None or up to Grade 9 (basic education)	35%	58%	7%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	19%	57%	25%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	2%	21%	77%	100%
IDPs	None or up to Grade 9 (basic education)	52%	46%	2%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	50%	39%	11%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	10%	20%	70%	100%
Refugees	None or up to Grade 9 (basic education)	54%	41%	4%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	38%	42%	20%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	9%	40%	51%	100%

Note on the definition of each occupation segment: high-skilled occupations include managers, professionals, and technicians; semi-skilled occupations include clerical workers, service and sales, skilled agricultural workers, and craft workers; low-skilled occupations include machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations. People in armed forces are excluded.

Women's participation in the labour force

In terms of occupation, the data suggest that there is an appropriate correlation between education levels and type of occupation; that is, individuals with lower education levels are frequently more likely to work in low-skilled positions (as operators and in elementary occupations) or semi-skilled positions (as administrative, service, or craft workers); higher education levels facilitate access to high-skilled and better-quality jobs (as managers, professionals, and technicians).

This pattern is seen across all population groups, which is to be expected in the labour market (Table 4). A small caveat is the fact that only 51% of the refugees with higher education work in high-skilled positions, while this rate is around 70 to 77% for IDPs and host community members. This may indicate certain barriers for refugees to access these occupations.

**%52 of
the host
community
women older than 35
years cannot read or write,
while the rate is %64 for the
refugees and %25 for
the IDPs**

The vast majority of employed women work in the public sector (8 out of 10 women), most of them in education (58%) and health care (13%). For those working in the private sector, employment opportunities are scarcer. Agriculture is the main employer (24% of the women employed in the private sector), followed by other service activities and technical work.

Regarding women's literacy rates, the data shows very low levels for all population groups: 52% of the host community women older than 35 years cannot read or write, while the rate is 64% for the refugees and 25% for the IDPs. Nearly two-thirds of the women that are currently employed have higher education levels (either university or technical studies), and this poses an obstacle for those that are not as highly educated, which is the majority of the female workforce.

In addition, host community participants in FGDs reported that the situation for women's employment has become worse due to the closure of several factories in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, such as cigarette and sugar factories, that used to employ a significant number of women.

6. FINANCIAL SITUATION AND HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Vulnerability has been increasing at the household level in all urban areas in the governorate, manifesting in different ways, from a growing dependency on non-sustainable sources of income to employment insecurity and indebtedness for emergency purposes.

Salaries in the public sector (both for the host community working for the government and for IDPs still receiving payment from the Federal Government) were not fully paid in the preceding year due to budget restrictions and other irregularities and delays, and wage earners are in a precarious situation due to an increased competition for jobs.

The nature of displacement has also left many families without assets to rely on for coping purposes. All these factors are gradually leading households to the brink of poverty, if they are not already poor in the strictly financial sense.

This section aims to analyse all these dynamics behind household vulnerability and map them across the urban strata, putting into context the role that the financial and displacement crises have played in generating this situation which requires the regular monitoring by both local authorities and humanitarian actors.

The average household expenditure per capita (one of the most frequently used indicators for financial vulnerability) stands at \$154/month for host community households.

This is about a 20% higher than the \$126/month for IDPs and \$133/month for refugees. However, this figure covers concerning dynamics as mentioned above, affecting all population groups equally, that place also the host community into a very vulnerable position.

Indebtedness emerged as one of the key aspects indicating a concerning financial situation of households. While the average percentage of households indebted stands at around 35% across the urban areas (all groups having a similar percentage), in the periphery districts with a heavy influx of displaced people, this portion of indebted households is 64%, nearly double.

Host community households are largely indebted due to previous long-term loans linked to asset purchase (houses, cars, etc.), but it is noteworthy that about 45% of the households indebted also have loans for the purpose of helping them sustain domestic consumption (which can range from the need to pay health care costs to other more critical purposes such as to afford basic daily items).

Of those IDPs and refugees who also have outstanding debts, more than 70% are also indebted for the purpose of financing domestic needs and about 45% for supporting the payment of rent. The need to cover emergency purposes with debt is therefore higher for IDPs and refugees than for the host community, but the overall levels are critical for the entire population.

This section develops a household vulnerability analysis, using consumption poverty as the measure of vulnerability. The model identifies factors contributing to household vulnerability, and it provides an overall area-based assessment of the most vulnerable locations

Another key aspect illustrating the extent of vulnerability across all groups are income sources. On average, nearly 26% of the income that households received or generated in the month preceding the survey came from relying on coping strategies (e.g., selling assets).

Other non-sustainable sources of income, such as borrowing and family support, comprise on average about 19% of total income sources. Salaries, wages, business earnings, and pensions, therefore, only account for slightly more than half of the total income of an average family.

This aspect is not captured by simply analysing household expenditure per capita, but such a situation, as a consequence of the financial crisis, puts many 'middle-income-level' households across all groups at risk of entering poverty if they must continue sustaining their consumption through debts, asset sale, assistance, or income from insecure employment.

Finally, this section develops a household vulnerability analysis, using consumption poverty as the measure of vulnerability. The model identifies factors contributing to household vulnerability, and it provides an overall area-based assessment of the most vulnerable locations.

The narrative emerging from the assessment indicates certain districts (Kalar, Kifri, and the periphery districts with a heavy influx of displaced populations, such as Darbandikhan, Chamchamal, and Dukan) being particularly vulnerable compared to the rest of the urban strata in Sulaymaniyah, not only due to a lower expenditure per capita, but also due to a higher influx of displaced households, a higher rate of unemployment, lower provision of public services, and higher levels of indebtedness. In certain locations such as Kalar and Kifri, there are additional, important concerns for shelter actors, as overcrowding and evictions are particularly alarming.

Finally, the Sulaymaniyah District Centre also presents some concerning figures, specifically with regards to the relatively very high average rents that impose a heavy burden on the domestic budget for many families, especially for IDPs and refugees.

1. HOUSEHOLD BUDGET

Economic situation at stratum level

A proxy used here for measuring relative wellbeing is the household’s average expenditure per capita. The area that shows the highest expenditure per capita in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate corresponds to the periphery districts (Figure 17), specifically, those that received a light influx of IDPs and refugees.

There, the average expenditure is 234,000 IQD/month (\$187/month). The area with the lowest expenditure per capita is Kalar and Kifri, with 145,000 IQD/month on average (\$116/month), about 40% lower than the highest rate.

However, a caveat applies to the data for the periphery districts with light influx. This geographical area, in fact, groups together some of the poorest districts in the governorate (Said Sadiq and Halabja) with some of the richest (Pishder). Thus, the result is a weighted average of both and hides a great inequality.

Economic situation across population groups

IDP and refugee households have a very similar expenditure per capita: 157,000 IQD/month (\$126/month) for IDPs and 166,000 IQD/month (\$133/month) for refugees. In contrast, host community households on average have an expenditure per capita of 192,000 IQD/month (\$154/month), about 20% higher (Figure 18).

Consequently, there are significant differences between hosts, IDPs, and refugees regarding the distribution of households between expenditure quintiles (Figure 19). The host community is evenly distributed across the quintiles, with the same percentage of households in the richer and poorer quintiles (a methodological note on the analysis of quintiles is provided in Box 1).

IDP and refugee households, however, tend to be concentrated in the 3rd and 4th quintile, which indicates a middle-income position for the average household. Displaced families, however, are underrepresented in the richest quintiles, which are mainly dominated by host community households.

Figure 17. Average household expenditure per capita in urban areas per stratum (data in IQD/month)




Figure 18. Comparison of household expenses per capita and total household expenses by population group (IQD/month)






Figure 19. Distribution of households across expenditure quintiles, by population group



Box 1. How to analyse quintiles



The use of quintiles is a common and explicative way to statistically compare the characteristics of households according to their wealth levels, that is, between the poorer and the richer households. Here, “expenditure quintiles” are used. To calculate them, all households have been ordered from the richest to the poorest according to their household expenditure per capita. Then, the households are divided into 5 groups of the same size, each of them representing 20% of the total.

The first group, or quintile, contains the richest 20% of households; the second quintile contains the next richest 20% of households, and so on.

With this grouping, it is possible to analyse whether the households in the richer quintiles have any differentiating characteristic when compared to the poorer quintiles (e.g., the majority of households in the richest quintile are male-headed households, while the majority of households in the poorest quintile are female-

headed households). A number of characteristics are evaluated in the following sections.

Below is a comparison of the different expense items that form the family budget for the different population groups, on average (Table 5). The main expense item that absorbs between 35% and 49% of total household expenses is food purchase. The next item in importance is rent. It must be noted, however, that the value is comparatively very low for the host community because fewer households tend to rent. On the contrary, house ownership is very common in the host community (9 out of 10 families) as seen in previous sections. For IDP and refugee families, both food and rent make up around 70% of the households’ total expenditure.

Other relevant expenditures correspond to health care (between 8% and 13%) and fuel / transportation (6% and 9%). However, it must be taken into account that the absolute numbers (in IQD/month) vary for each population group: for instance, while refugees spend 54,000 IQD/month/household (\$43) on health care, host community families spend 109,000 IQD/month/household (\$87) – a double amount, although the percentage over total household expenditure is relatively similar (8% and 13%, respectively).

Table 5. Total monthly household expenses distributed by item, in IQD/month and in percentage over total

		Food	Rent	Health	Energy & water	Fuel & Transport	Education	House repairs	Debt pay-back	Other	Total
Host community	Total HH expense	413	25	109	42	76	51	17	34	76	842
	Percentage over total	49%	3%	13%	5%	9%	6%	2%	4%	9%	100%
IDPs	Total HH expense	308	272	97	35	53	44	9	9	53	879
	Percentage over total	35%	31%	11%	4%	6%	5%	1%	1%	6%	100%
Refugees	Total HH expense	250	236	54	27	41	14	27	7	20	675
	Percentage over total	37%	35%	8%	4%	6%	2%	4%	1%	3%	100%

2. INDEBTEDNESS

The current percentage of households in the host community with outstanding debt is 40%. This level stands between the 34% of IDP households and the 48% of refugee households. Geographically, there are similar levels of indebtedness across the urban areas in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, with the exception of the periphery districts with a high influx of displaced households, where the percentage of indebted households is twice the governorate average (Figure 20).

Focusing on the host community situation, around a third of the indebted households have more than one outstanding debt. The most common purpose of borrowing money are long-term asset purchases, such as buying a house (22% of total debt purposes), consumer durables such as vehicles (14%), or a business establishment (10%).


Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, beyond long-term assets, about 45% of the households borrowed money in order to help them sustain domestic consumption. This is a relatively high

percentage compared to the other governorates, where only a minority of host community households relied on emergency indebtedness as a coping strategy. In addition, 6% of host community households also contracted debts in order to support the payment of rent.⁹

Regarding indebted IDP and refugee households, about two-thirds have taken multiple loans from different sources for different purposes. Indebtedness is less of an issue for these population groups in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre (only 25% of IDPs or refugees indebted) as compared to the periphery districts (50% of the households indebted).

Regarding the purposes of the money, it is clear that the most important use is for emergency and coping purposes (71% of households have debt for sustaining domestic consumption, and 45% have debt for helping in paying rent – IDPs and refugees aggregated). None of the other purposes (purchase of large assets) represent more than 5% of the cases.

Figure 20. Levels of indebtedness per strata



9. Percentages regarding the purpose of the loan may not add up to 100% because survey respondents were given the option to give the purpose of both the first and second loans (therefore, the sum of the different purposes may be higher than 100%).

3. FINANCIAL WELFARE AND VULNERABILITY ACROSS THE URBAN AREAS

Methodology and household/area factors determining welfare

This part develops a statistical model and a subsequent analysis on the factors that are expected to influence household vulnerability. The model is described in Annex D and it shows in greater detail the regression coefficients, which indicate whether there is an effect between a given factor and a household's vulnerability.

The sections below do not enter into a statistical discussion of these effects for each factor, but they provide information on the differences between the richer and the poorer households, and they map where the locations of the vulnerability are. Consistent with the area-based approach used in this assessment, vulnerability exists across all population groups, and hence emphasis is given to geographical comparison.

Household vulnerability is evaluated with the following factors¹⁰:

- **Dependency ratio;**
- **House overcrowding;**
- **Rent paid over total household budget;**
- **Non-sustainable household income sources;**
- **Illiteracy rates of the head of household;**

The indicator used in this model to categorise households according to their expected vulnerability is household expenditure per capita (as shown in Figure 17). This indicator is frequently used in similar vulnerability

assessments¹¹. However, it presents some limitations for fully understanding vulnerability and the dynamics related to this concept. Household per capita is used to explain poverty or, more specifically, consumption poverty. Another type of vulnerability is more closely linked to household resilience, or the ability to withstand shocks.

From this perspective, a household might be vulnerable but not necessarily poor; however, it might be at risk of falling into poverty in the event of an external shock. In the context of the Kurdistan Region, this is equally alarming. For instance, host community households have a relatively high expenditure per capita, but the fact that many households underwent salary cuts implies that they employ negative coping strategies in order to sustain their expenditure levels.

A prolonged period in this situation may place the household at risk of heavy indebtedness, inability to pay rent, and potential eviction and relocation to less well-off districts. Similar situations are experienced by refugee and IDP households.

Presumably, this latter type of vulnerability is not fully measured by household expenditure per capita, for the reasons stated above. However, some discussion is provided in the sections below on specific factors more closely linked to resilience, such as non-sustainable income sources.

Highly vulnerable households can be characterised as having, at least 2 dependent members for each non-dependent member. Geographically, households with this characteristic are more frequently found in the periphery districts that have received the largest influx of IDPs and refugees

10. Two additional factors (gender of the household head, and indebtedness for emergency purposes) were also tested. However, they were not found to be statistically significant in the model. This indicates that no explanatory relation was found between these factors and the likelihood of a household to be relatively poor. Therefore, they are not discussed in the sections below.

11. Jordan's Vulnerability Assessment Framework, an initiative of UNHCR's response to the refugee crisis in that country, considers (predicted) household expenses as the proxy to identify those families that require assistance. UNHCR's models used in Egypt and Lebanon follow a similar framework.

Dependent members and vulnerability

The household's dependency ratio causes a negative effect on a household's financial welfare. This ratio considers the number of dependent members (i.e. individuals either below the age of 15 or above the age of 64) in the household for each non-dependent member.

A ratio higher than 1 means that there are more dependent members than non-dependents, which is theoretically indicative of more vulnerable families.

The data indicates that poorer households are characterised by having more dependent members than relatively richer households. The dependency ratio is close to 0.6 in households located in the richest quintile, which means that there are almost 2 non-dependent working-age members on average for every dependent member (Figure 21).

This is a positive situation as these households are more likely to have at least one member at

working age and employed than households in which the majority of the non-dependent members have to take care of dependent members.

In the middle quintile (3rd), there are, on average, an equivalent number of dependent and non-dependent members in the family, while in the poorest quintile, households have more dependent than non-dependent members.

Highly vulnerable households can be characterised as having, for instance, at least 2 dependent members for each non-dependent member.

Geographically, households with this characteristic are more frequently found in the periphery districts that have received the largest influx of IDPs and refugees (Figure 22). There, around 18% of the households have twice as many dependent as non-dependent members.

A ratio higher than 1 means that there are more dependent members than non-dependents, which is theoretically indicative of more vulnerable families.

Figure 21. Households' dependency ratio by expenditure quintile





Figure 22. Mapping of the households with a critical dependency ratio by stratum



House overcrowding and vulnerability

A proxy to measure room overcrowding is the ratio of rooms in the house per each household member. This ratio is found to correlate with the financial situation of the household, in the sense that a high number of people per room (excluding bathrooms) is indicative of the household being relatively poorer than others.

For instance, the average ratio for households in the richest segment of the population is exactly 1 person per room, while for those in the poorest segment it is 1.5 per room (Figure 23).

Comparatively with other governorates, as highlighted in an earlier section, overcrowding in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate's urban areas is not as common as in the Duhok or Erbil Governorates, where the ratio for the poorest quintile is nearly the double.

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Overcrowding could be determined by having 3 or more people per room. The percentage of households in this situation is actually very low across strata, and none of them surpass the 5% of total households facing an overcrowding situation (Figure 24).

Figure 23. Households' ratio of people per house rooms by expenditure quintile





Figure 24. Mapping of the households in a situation of overcrowding by stratum



Renting and vulnerability

The financial vulnerability of a household is also explained with the amount of rent paid as a proportion of total household expenses. Its importance to understanding vulnerability (as opposed to other factors such as food expenses) lies in the fact that rent can be a heavy financial burden that may lead to negative outcomes such as excessive indebtedness, and even eviction and further displacement, driving families deeper into poverty in most cases.

There is a significant difference between households in the richest expenditure quintile and those in the other quintiles, with the latter allocating significantly more than 30% of their total expenditure to rent. The ratio for the richest segment stands at 24% (Figure 25).

Slightly more than 4% of households allocate more than half of their total expenditure to rent, which represents a very heavy financial burden that is linked to an increased likelihood to be a vulnerable household.

The Sulaymaniyah District Centre and the periphery districts with a large influx of displaced households have the highest percentage of households allocating a critical amount of their available resources to paying rent.

There, slightly more than 4% of households allocate more than half of their total expenditure to rent, which represents a very heavy financial burden that is linked to an increased likelihood to be a vulnerable household. Again, however, these percentages are significantly low if compared to the other governorates where the rent burden is one of the main challenges.

Figure 25. Households' ratio of rent costs over total expenses by expenditure quintile




Figure 26. Mapping of the households in a situation of rent vulnerability by stratum





Figure 27. Break-down of households' average income sources by population group



Non-sustainable income

The main income source for most of the households in urban areas is comprised of wages and salaries, or the earnings from business ownership. However, as a consequence of the financial crisis, only half of the total income available by host community households is actually obtained from wages, salaries, or business earnings (around 70% for IDPs and refugees).

The financial situation of many host community households is significantly challenging, as can be concluded from the fact that a substantial portion of the total income available is generated through negative coping strategies such as borrowing money and obtaining financial support from family (17%) and selling off assets (the remaining 26%). All three population groups, in particular, rely heavily on loans to complement their available income. Financial assistance is also an important income source for refugees, as it represents 10% of a household's total income.

In order to fit this factor within the vulnerability assessment, a ratio is created that denotes the dependence of the household on income sources that are not sustainable, and therefore may imply a significant degree of vulnerability.

Such income sources are remittances, support from family members, assistance from the government or NGOs, charity, or begging (but excludes savings, sale of assets, and money borrowed, because these are potentially one-off revenues and may distort the analysis). The ratio, therefore, divides non-sustainable income by the total household income.

The statistical analysis indicates that the higher the percentage of non-sustainable income over total income, the lower the household's expenditure. In simple terms, poorer households rely more frequently on non-sustainable income sources. In general, households in the lower expenditure quintiles tend to have a higher ratio of non-sustainable sources of income. This is especially common in the middle-income segments of the population, who are presumably most affected by the current financial crisis (Figure 28).

In terms of location, it is more frequent to find households with high levels of non-sustainable income in the periphery district centres with a light influx of displaced population (Figure 29).

Figure 28. Households' ratio of non-sustainable income sources over total income by expenditure quintile





Figure 29. Mapping of the households with critical non-sustainable income sources by stratum



Illiteracy rates

The literacy of the household head is also a significant variable in explaining a household's financial situation. The effect is indirect, in the sense that illiterate heads of household frequently face a limited range of occupations they can likely access in the labour market, which also limits their income prospects (it should be noted that a family's breadwinner and the only person working is usually the head).

As would be expected, the highest percentage of illiterate heads of household is in the poorest segments of the population (Figure 30). In addition, geographically, illiteracy rates are lowest in the Sulaymaniyah district centre, with about 19% of the household heads unable to read or write. The further from the Sulaymaniyah centre the household is located, the higher the illiteracy rates, reaching 36% in the area of Kalar and Kifri.

Summary and trends of the vulnerability model
Some areas appear more frequently in the analysis of vulnerability than others, pointing to specific characteristics that make them especially vulnerable in this context of displacement.

In particular, although half of IDPs and a majority of refugees have sought shelter in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, most of the other half have arrived in districts that were already relatively poorer than the rest of the governorate, such as Kalar, Kifri, Darbandikhan, or Chamchamal. These districts have been analysed throughout this assessment as areas with a heavy influx of displaced households, which, on a whole, have an expenditure per capita significantly below the average.

The relative vulnerability of these districts can also be explained with their higher unemployment rates as well as with a more restricted provision of public services, compared to the rest of the governorate. Household indebtedness was also identified as an increasingly concerning issue. Particularly in the area of Kalar and Kifri, important concerns emerge for shelter actors, as the analysis highlights the overcrowding of families in existing dwellings and, especially, evictions as relatively critical.

Kalar, Kifri, Darbandikhan, or Chamchamal areas are with a heavy influx of displaced households, which, on a whole, have an expenditure per capita significantly below the average and have unemployment rates as well as with a more restricted provision of public services,

Vulnerability concerns in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre mainly refer to the relatively significant impact generated by displacement on the housing sector.

Many households may be considered vulnerable in this context, taking into account that being able to afford a dwelling is a key aspect in finding stability in displacement. The financial burden that renting a house impose for many families in this area may lead many of them to facing eviction or force them to move again.

Kalar, Kifri, Darbandikhan, or Chamchamal areas are with a heavy influx of displaced households, which, on a whole, have an expenditure per capita significantly below the average and have unemployment rates as well as with a more restricted provision of public services

A final note on vulnerability refers to the concerning high proportion of households that currently depend on non-sustainable sources of income in order to cover their normal living costs (debt from the wider family network and negative coping strategies).

This applies to the districts with a smaller influx of displaced households, as well as for the Sulaymaniyah District Centre (hence, mainly concerning the host community).

This situation is a direct consequence of the financial crisis all over the Kurdistan Region, and it may drive many families to the brink of poverty if these non-sustainable sources of income are depleted at some point.

Figure 30. Percentage of household heads that are illiterate by expenditure quintile





Figure 31. Mapping of household heads' illiteracy levels by stratum





Sulaymaniyah, Mawlawi St. Bazar used daily by Host Community, Refugees and IDPs. Fareeq Halabjawi, Freelance Photographer, 2014.

7. THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Here, education data is analysed by using gross school enrolment rates, which show the percentage of students enrolled in each grade regardless of whether they are in the official age group corresponding to their current level of education. This is done because students in this context do not follow a direct path from basic to intermediate education to university, but rather intersperse their schooling with periods of being out of school.

Drop-out rates between basic education and high school are high, but most students re-enter higher school in later stages in life. For instance, 55% of the students in grades 10 to 12 are actually 3 to 5 years older than the official age group at this level (15 to 17 years old).

Enrolment rates in basic education is relatively high and appropriate across the strata in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, which is generally indicative of an absence of significant gaps in the education provision in these grades.

Even in Kalar and Kifri, enrolment in basic education is at similar levels than in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, implying that the challenges of displacement and a location close to a conflict zone has not undermined the area's capacity to provide and adapt education services.

However, it is also in Kalar and Kifri where enrolment rates into high school drop significantly, especially for boys. In the rest of the governorate, high school enrolment rates are extremely high (much above 100% in the capital city and around 90% in the periphery districts).

A further important characteristic is the fact that the enrolment of girls is on a par with that of boys in all levels of education.

However, it is well known that, despite the very high enrolment rates in all grades, the education system is significantly affected by financial constraints, in terms of a lack of sufficient funds to pay salaries to teachers and, where needed, to expand the education infrastructure (for instance, by establishing new school buildings or classes in order to absorb the newly arrived school-age IDPs and refugees).

These constraints lead to a greater class overcrowding and affect the area's ability to maintain the quality of the education provided. Furthermore, there has even been cases in the last school year of many schools being temporarily closed due to strikes. However, such constraints have not emerged either in the survey or in FGDs as having strongly disrupted children's education.

Refugee children, however, constitute the greatest challenge for authorities and humanitarian partners in the field of education. In displacement, Syrian children do not attend school, with enrolment rates at 54% and 2% for basic education and high school, respectively, for the male population, and 61% and 11% for basic education and high school for the female population.

On aggregate, the situation is alarming in the sense that 57% of the children aged 6 to 17 are outside of the formal education system, posing serious concerns to their future human development. The main questions that remain are why this group does not attend school as opposed to similar cohorts within the host and IDP communities, and how to bring these students back to school.

ENROLMENT RATES

Enrolment rates by stratum

School attendance is analysed with gross enrolment rates into basic education and high school¹². In this context, is it preferable to rely on gross rates due to the fact that students in both basic and intermediate levels are frequently older than the age cohort that technically corresponds to that grade.

Drop-out rates are high, but many students re-enter education in later stages of their lives (a *regret* effect). It is then expected, and desirable, to see enrolment rates above 100% in basic education, for instance. For this reason, an examination of net rates only would largely underestimate school attendance.¹³

Enrolment rates in basic education (grades 1 to 9) seem to stand at relatively appropriate levels. There are very few differences across strata, which is generally indicative of an absence of significant gaps in the overall education provision (Figure 32).

Basic education enrolment in Sulaymaniyah stands at similar levels across the whole of the Kurdistan Region, slightly above a gross rate of 100%.

High school enrolment, on the other hand, is extremely high (much above 100% in the capital city and around 90% in the periphery districts). It must be noted that more than half of the students in high school are older than their corresponding age cohort (i.e., older than 17 years).


This indicates that the governorate authorities have been effective in providing intermediate education levels during the last years, attracting a significant number of youth back to school who had presumably entered into the labour force or helped in domestic work.

Comparatively, gross enrolment rates in the other two governorates in the Kurdistan Region do not exceed 80%. The improvement, however, is less noticeable in the areas of Kalar and Kifri, which can be linked either to a lower capacity to provide intermediate education compared to the other districts, or to a higher impact of the influx of IDPs.

12. Gross enrolment is obtained by dividing the number of students, independently of their age, in each grade (in basic education or high school) by the total number of children of the age group corresponding to each grade. In contrast, net enrolment divides the total number of only those students whose age corresponds to the grade they should be attending, by the total number of children of that age group. Gross enrolment, in practice, includes children that attend a specific grade 'out of their corresponding cohort'. For instance, a 19-year-old child attending high school would be included in gross enrolment but not in net enrolment rates.

13. Technical age cohorts for primary education (grades 1 to 9) would correspond to children between 6 to 14 years old. For high school (grades 10 to 12), age cohorts would correspond to children between 15 and 17 years old.

Figure 32. Gross enrolment rate in basic education and high school per stratum and gender




Enrolment rates by population group

While enrolment rates for the host community seem to be appropriate in this context (especially outstanding in the high school levels, as indicated above), the situation for IDPs and refugees lags behind optimal levels (Figure 33). Especially in the case of refugees, for which the data shows a clear divide. The drop in basic education enrolment is noticeable compared to the other groups, but the data for high school enrolment show that enrolment in these grades is almost non-existent. This indicates that there is a very high proportion of children out of school at an

early age – in actual numbers, 50% of the Syrian children between ages 6 and 14 and 88% between ages 15 and 17 do not attend any kind of formal school.

The drop in enrolment levels for IDPs is less substantial. For basic education, the data suggests that school attendance for girls (88%) is lower than it should be expected, compared to boys. For high school education, the drop is more extreme, which is indicative of schools' lower capacity to absorb all the IDP population willing to attend this level of education.

Figure 33. Gross enrolment rate in basic education and high school per population group and gender¹



1. Basic education for the case of IDPs integrates primary education (grades 1 to 6) and intermediate education (grades 7 to 9).



Sulaymaniyah Market used by Refugees, IDPs and Host Communitie, Freelance Photographer, Halo Lano 2015

8. CONCLUSIONS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. HOUSING SITUATION

- **Humanitarian actors and local authorities should coordinate policies and programmes in order to ease the burden that renting costs impose on most families, especially in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre.**

This district has some of the highest average rents in the entire Kurdistan Region, and the local authorities have already aimed at tackling this issue by ordering an automatic reduction of rents charged by landowners.

Many families, whether IDPs, refugees, or host community members, are in a dangerous struggle to pay rent. This leads to indebtedness or constant relocation, in search for cheaper housing. In order to prevent this through support, shorter-term instruments could be employed, such as targeted cash-for-rent programmes¹⁴, and medium-scale rehabilitation or refurbishment of buildings in exchange for rent-free housing (with the involvement of governorate authorities in reinforcing the trust of property owners).

In the long term, however, reducing the pressure on the housing sector of the Sulaymaniyah District Centre will involve measures such as developing new and affordable housing units or better equipping the city's outskirts with public services and infrastructure to incentivise relocation there.

- **Shelter actors should scale up legal assistance for families to report eviction situations, and local authorities should regulate written rental agreements. The data indicated extremely high rates of eviction for IDP families in the last 12 months.**

For this population group, access to legal support is relatively more difficult, and this is a clear area in which protection actors can focus their efforts.

Evicted households would benefit from legal assistance to report unfair evictions, to find a negotiated solution with landlords, as well as to find new accommodation. Most of the eviction cases in absolute numbers took place in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, but Kalar and Kifri have a relatively higher ratio of evictions per population, signalling that these areas have specific issues in need of attention.

Regarding actions by the local authorities, there is a need to increase advocacy to enforcing written agreements that would better protect both tenants and property owners. Currently, written agreements are only predominant in the Sulaymaniyah District Centre and nearly non-existent in most of the periphery districts.

- **Shelter actors and local authorities have to collaborate in solving the inadequate housing situation of a significant proportion of IDPs in Kifri. In this town, many IDP families remain hosted in the local school facilities.**

14. Such cash programmes must ensure that they do not generate inflationary effects on the rental market or trigger a surge of potential renters into already overcrowded areas. This is important especially for the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, which already hosts 90% of the refugee population in the governorate and half of the IDPs. It is also the district with the highest average rent in the entire Kurdistan Region of Iraq. See for instance, ALNAP (2015) "Technical guidelines: Conditional cash for rent".

2. SOCIAL COHESION IN URBAN AREAS

- **Local authorities are encouraged to facilitate spaces and events for interaction between host and displaced communities, in order to strengthen the relations between neighbours, mitigate social tensions, and enable peaceful co-existence.**

FGDs with host community members and IDPs revealed a significant lack of trust between these communities in urban areas.

The role played by communal spaces and joint events (such as community halls, sport activities, or youth/women groups) as points of connection between residents of all groups was emphasized and can be further developed.

Humanitarian actors can also contribute to this effect through the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which are mainly infrastructure projects that benefit the whole community.

- **Local authorities, with the support of civil society organisations, should promote programmes offering Kurdish language classes to IDPs.**

A frequent comment in the FGDs with host community members and IDPs referred to language barriers as a reason for the lack of interactions between the communities. Offering and incentivising Kurdish-language learning would ease the adaptation of IDPs into the new environment and enhance interactions and co-existence.

- **Humanitarian actors should position social cohesion considerations as a cross-cutting theme along all operational clusters, at the same time as the public authorities should publicly endorse and promote peaceful co-existence.**

Currently, social cohesion is part of a specific operational cluster (emergency livelihoods and social cohesion) within the humanitarian framework. Given the delicate social cohesion situation and the feelings of unfairness among all population groups, it is important to mainstream social cohesion considerations across the rest of the clusters and evaluate ways to enhance co-existence.

This must be matched with strong communication efforts promoting peaceful co-existence and pointing that, contrary to widespread perceptions, there are no winners or privileged parties in this displacement crisis, but all population groups have been affected.

3. DURABLE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

- **Livelihood actors should extend vocational training programmes in the periphery areas of the governorate.**

Given that a significant part of the population currently unable to find employment has very low education levels and do not have labour experience, their re-enter into the labour market can be aided by providing training on vocations, craftsmanship, and manual skills (and funding for basic equipment if necessary).

FGDs with refugees highlighted, however, that there are very few training opportunities in such skills outside of the Sulaymaniyah District Centre.

- **UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and the local chamber of commerce can cooperate in order to support refugees in developing joint ventures with host community members. Given their refugee status, Syrian individuals cannot set up businesses in non-camp settings.**

An alternative system for entrepreneurial refugees is to create joint ventures with local entrepreneurs. This requires a platform that supports refugees in identifying, linking, and partnering with locals, ensuring at the same time the legal protection of the refugee partner.

- **A stronger presence of micro-finance actors in the governorate is necessary for longer-term livelihood activities. Although the absence of micro-finance actors is an extended problem in the whole of Iraq, livelihood interventions in the area of business development would strongly benefit from this type of funding.**

- **Livelihood actors implementing cash-for-work should consider focusing the programmes outside of the Sulaymaniyah District Centre and including vulnerable host community households.**

While cash-for-work remains as one of the main livelihood programmes across the Kurdistan Region, a re-thinking of the scope of this programme may more strongly benefit the entire governorate, not only the Sulaymaniyah District Centre, where it has been more strongly focused. Kalar or Kifri, for instance, are areas of interest for cash-for-work given their higher unemployment rates.

Furthermore, while the focus has been in providing work for the community of IDPs and refugees, expanding the programme to include vulnerable host community households would contribute to wider benefits and reduce the problems that occur when some groups are excluded from the programme in a particular location.

4. CASH ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS

- **Humanitarian and development actors together with local authorities have to work on the coordination of different cash mechanisms and on ensuring their sustainability in the longer term, while avoiding double social protection systems. Cash assistance is quickly becoming one of the most important response mechanisms to the displacement crisis in the Kurdistan Region.**

In the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, many programmes implemented by different partners co-exist: cash for rent, cash for education, cash for food, cash for work, and unconditional cash payments. This funding is provided in addition to the payments that the local authorities give to the vulnerable families in the host community as part of the public safety net.

As the amount of money disbursed and the number of families targeted increase, it is important to strengthen the coordination between partners and to gradually converge to a common understanding of the beneficiaries. Feedback from participants in the workshop held in Sulaymaniyah indicated that there is a strong need to coordinate actions with public authorities in order to prevent parallel structures and to guarantee the sustainability and continuity of these forms of financial support in the future years when humanitarian actors may not be present anymore.

Therefore, discussions should be initiated between humanitarian and development actors and the governorate's Department of Labour and Social Affairs (DOLSA) in order to better link and converge the different cash mechanisms with the existing governmental social protection systems.

- **Humanitarian actors working in cash assistance should consider taking a holistic area-based programme and target vulnerable families, independently of their being IDPs, refugees, or members of the host community.**

The data on the living conditions of the host community has been increasing recently, and it has revealed that a significant percentage of the population is in a relatively vulnerable situation. This facilitates the targeting of host community households in addition to IDPs and refugees through an area-based approach.

The previous sections on vulnerability assessment provided a combined picture of vulnerability across the population groups. Innovative strategies can be applied that focus on well-targeted pockets of poverty or fragility across the Sulaymaniyah Governorate, where all population groups face similar situations. Coordination with planning authorities such as the statistics office can be sought for this purpose, in addition to involving the local authorities in the project design in order to fit the project with the recommendations highlighted above.

- **The Sulaymaniyah Governorate's DOLSA is encouraged to methodologically enrich their current welfare system and criteria in order to adequately target the vulnerable population and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its programming.**

Previous reviews¹⁵ highlighted the need of DOLSA to upgrade the functioning of their safety net by easing, clarifying, and simplifying the procedure by which a household is entitled to assistance. Collaboration with humanitarian partners delivering cash assistance in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate can generate useful lessons for DOLSA.

15. See for instance World Bank (2015), Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian crisis and ISIS on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

5. EDUCATION CHALLENGE

- **Local authorities should collaborate with education partners in order to implement flexible educational programmes for children out of school that aim to help them re-access education (either formal or informal courses).**

Many children have lost one or two years of education due to displacement, or have abandoned their studies for other reasons such as employment. Re-access to formal courses may be a challenge, even when the child was willing to continue studying after dropping out of school.

This applies especially to refugees, among whom drop-out rates for both boys and girls are dramatically high in basic education and high school. Alternative solutions may be needed (e.g., intensive courses offered over shorter durations, remedial courses that allow students to make up learning they have missed, holding classes in the evening after work, etc.).

Efforts in this direction would significantly contribute to the achievement of the goals of the initiative ‘**No Lost Generation**’, which was launched by a number of international actors with respect to the Syrian crisis, but which can be extended to cover also Iraq’s displacement crisis.

- **Humanitarian actors should evaluate how to scale up programmes providing financial incentives to families in order to prevent students from missing school.**

While some reasons for school drop-out are linked to obstacles in access, such as an insufficient capacity or availability of education facilities, other reasons refer to an inability to afford costs linked to education (mainly transportation costs) as well as a preference to work instead of studying.

Work is on-going through some programmes in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate that provide households with cash in exchange of taking the children to school, as well as other programmes offering households assistance in terms of school materials and transportation.

- **Local authorities should aim to increase the pool of teachers available for the specific schools established in order to provide education for refugees and IDPs.**

The low number of teachers available to teach in these schools has been highlighted in many FGDs as a severe constraint affecting education provision for refugees and IDPs.

Participants pointed out this fact as one of the main reasons for school drop-outs, in addition to the ones highlighted above. The current problems in sustaining the payment of public teachers’ salaries, however, stand as the major obstacle.

6. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING FOR A LONG-TERM RESPONSE

- **Development actors are encouraged to support their counter-parts in governmental departments in terms of infrastructure, hardware, or technological support, as an alternative to other financially non-sustainable assistance.**

There is a strong demand by the public entities for international actors to offer financial assistance in providing public services to the whole of the population in a time of financial crisis.

While the best solution may not be to simply fund public activities (this would be a short-term, non-sustainable approach), longer-term support to Sulaymaniyah's institutional capacity can come in the form of infrastructure (rehabilitation of facilities or quick development of new ones) or action capacity (e.g., for health care, it may involve mobile medical clinics, ambulances, and equipment, while for education it can involve transportation funding offered to teachers).

In this case, the districts of Kalar and Kifri, above others, require an urgent upgrade in their capacity to provide health care and education services.

- **International actors are also encouraged to collaborate with their government counter-parts in providing upgrades to their technical capacity and expertise.**

Apart from supporting public authorities in upgrading their physical capacity, it is important to contribute to the building of capacity by placing technical experts and qualified staff within government agencies.

Human resources are an important component of service delivery and, therefore, this recommendation aims to achieve an institutional change from within the system by the transfer of skills, methods, and procedures.

- **International actors are encouraged to work more closely through local NGOs and local civil society organizations when implementing programmes.**

A longer-term approach to responding to the crisis would also benefit from a gradual reorientation of activities away from direct implementation by international actors, to a more enabling role that allows local non-governmental actors to upgrade and develop their capacities¹⁶. Even though it means ceding some 'power' on the ground, local actors are the ones that will continue the action in the coming years.

16. See for instance ODI (2016) Time to let go, a three-point proposal to change the humanitarian system.

7. STAKEHOLDER COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION FOR LONG TERM PROGRAMMING

- **UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities should enhance their communication efforts with beneficiaries and communities in general in order to increase awareness, legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability to aid recipients.**

Keeping a sense of fairness in the assistance distribution, improving participation by the communities and carefully explaining the work implemented can also be key aspects in shifting programmes into a long-term approach¹⁷. The perceptions of both the host community and the displaced population on humanitarian intervention can sometimes be negative due to a lack of communication.

The displaced population in urban settings reported that there is sometimes a lack of clarity on how assistance is delivered, usually distorted by rumours. It was suggested by some groups that temples, mosques, or public spaces such as hospitals should be used as centres for information dissemination. Most importantly, in the case of the host community, FGDs showed that they generally felt neglected, and this creates mistrust.

It was strongly suggested that both local authorities and NGOs keep regular FGDs with host communities in addition to their regular communication with direct beneficiaries. Additional efforts are needed in order to develop strong 'Communication with Communities' strategies.

- **UN agencies and international NGOs should communicate and advocate with donors for a longer-term commitment and a shift in funding priorities.**

Funds allotted to programming are frequently contingent on emergency purposes, which in some cases hinder the shift into longer-term interventions. Therefore, it is important to

17. To this effect, initiatives such as the partnership with Asiaccell to facilitate the spread of information and creating a hotline for displaced populations to request information is a good step, the impact of which needs to be evaluated.

communicate the needs and benefits that more development-oriented programmes can bring to ease the crisis in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate and in Iraq, in general. Options such as requesting a minimum of the programme funding to be allocated to the expansion of public services have been suggested.

- **Humanitarian actors should integrate the local authorities (and related agencies) as often as possible in their programme design and implementation in order to avoid parallel structures.**


Shared plans between public authorities and international actors bring benefits in terms of producing more financially sustainable programmes that can later be better integrated into the work of public authorities, in addition to ensuring a greater buy-in of the local population. This is crucial since, for instance, DOLSA also implements programmes on livelihoods and on medical and psychosocial support to the displaced.

- **All stakeholders should gradually move towards a greater unification of data needs and a coordination of the data available. Data dispersion, conversely, negatively affects programme planning.**

For instance, generating and sharing data in order to track the movement of refugees and IDPs and updating lists of beneficiaries can be helpful to eliminate duplicate cash assistance.

Stakeholders would benefit from collaboration between different information management offices and actors such as the Sulaymaniyah Statistical Office (which has a longer-term focus in data gathering) and the REACH Initiative (which is relatively more focused on emergency and needs assessment).

It is also important to enhance coordination with actors in Central and South Iraq, as most of the solutions allowing, for instance, returns will involve a coordinated action across the country.



Sulaymaniyah City Overview, Mohamad A. Ali, freelance photographer, 2016.

ANNEXES

Household survey questionnaire

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Cover	Location	A1	Filled by enumerator prior to interview: A1_1 Governorate A1_2 District A1_3 Subdistrict A1_4 Neighbourhood A1_5 Block number A1_6 Type of household A1_7 Cluster number A1_8 Household number	A1_1: Sulaymaniah A1_2: Pick from list A1_3: Pick from list A1_4: Pick from list A1_5: Block number A1_6 1.Refugee, 2. IDP, 3. Local A1_7 Cluster number: A1_8 Household number	N/A
		A2	Number of enumerator		N/A
	Meta data	A3	Interview logistics: Would you allow us to do an interview with you?	1. Yes 2. No	N/A
		A4	Filled by enumerator: Who is the respondent? [in relation to the household head]	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. Brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
Household Roster	Household composition (ROSTER)	B1	What is the first name - starting with the head of the household		All
		B2	What is [Name's] relationship to the head of household?	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. Son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
		B3	Is [Name] male or female?	1. Male 2. Female	All
		B4	How old is [Name]?		All
		B5	What is [Name's] marital status?	1. Never married 2. Married 3. Widowed 4. Separated 5. Divorced	All Age 12+
		B6	During the past 12 months, how many months did [Name] live in this household?		All
		B7	What is [Name's] nationality? [multiple response]	1. Iraqi 2. Syrian 3. Other	All
		B8	What is [Name's] main ethnic or cultural background?	1. Kurd 2. Arab 3. Turkman 4. Chaldean 5. Syriac 6. Assyrian 7. Armenian 8. Other 9. Prefer not to answer	All
	Education - 6+	C1	Can [Name] read and write?	1. can read and write 2. can read only 3. cannot read nor write	All Age 6+
		C2	Is [Name] currently attending school?	1. yes, 4 days a week or more 2. yes, less than 4 days a week 3. no	All Age 6+
C3		[if yes] what level?	1. Primary (1-6) 2. Secondary (7-9) 3. Highschool (10-12) 4. Institute 5. University 6. Postgraduate	All Age 6+ Attending	

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population	
		#	Questions	Answer options		
Household Roster (cont.)	Education - 6+ (cont.)	C4	What is the main reason for not attending school regularly, or not attending at all?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No easily accessible school 2. Teaching is of poor quality/ teachers absent 3. School time is not flexible 4. Mistreatment by the instructor or other students 5. Has to work to support the family 6. Family disapproves/does not think the child needs to study 7. Early marriage 8. Sickness or disability, 9. Helping in house chores 10. Schools were full 11. Schools were not accepting the student 12. Schools are mixed gender 13. Does not understand the language 14. It costs too much 15. Missing documentation 16. Current situation is perceived as temporary 17. Schools are not functioning/closed 18. Did not meet the age requirement at the time of registration 19. Other reasons 	All Age 6 - 18 Irregularly attending	
		C5	What is the highest level of education ever completed by [Name]?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. None 2. Primary (1-6) 3. Secondary (7-9) 4. Highschool (10-12) 5. Institute 6. University 7. Postgraduate 	All Age 6+	
		C6	Number of years in school (including passed and failed years)			
		C7	Has [Name] ever attended any kind of vocational training? (e.g. sewing, carpentry, mobile phone repair)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 	All Age 15+	
	Employment - 15+		D1	What is [Name's] main work status in the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Employer 2. Self-employed (Kurdish: working owner) 3. Paid employee 4. Unpaid family worker 5. Student who also works 6. Full-time student 7. Home maker 8. Don't work, looking for work (has worked previously) 9. Don't work, looking for work (never worked before) 10. Not looking for a job because of lack of papers 11. Not looking for a job due to frustration/discouragement 12. Not interested in working 13. Retired / too old 14. Disability/illness 15. Under age 16. Other 	All Age 15+
			D2	What is [Name's] occupation in main job during the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Managers 2. Professionals 3. Technician and associate professionals 4. Clerical support workers 5. Service and sales workers 6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 7. Craft and related trade workers 8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 9. Elementary occupation 10. Armed forces occupation 	All Age 15+ Labour force active
			D3	D3_1 In what industry did [Name] work in his/her main job during the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2. Mining and quarrying 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 5. Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 6. Construction 7. Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles 8. Transportation and storage 9. Accommodation and food service activities 10. Information and communication 11. Financial and insurance activities 12. Real estate activities 13. Professional, scientific and technical activities 14. Administrative and support service activity 15. Public administration and defense, compulsory social security 16. Education 17. Human health and social activities 18. Arts, entertainment and recreation 19. Other service activities 20. Activities of households as employers, undifferentiated goods and services-producing activities of households for own use 21. Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 22. other 	All Age 15+ Labour force active
				D3_2 In which sector has [name] worked in the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public sector 2. Local private sector 3. International private sector 4. Mixed sector 5. Local non-governmental/non-profit organization 6. International non-governmental/non-profit organization 	
			D4	D4_1 What was [Name's] total cash income (actual or expected) from the work last month? (IQD)?	D4 Amount	All Age 15+ Labour force active

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Household Roster (cont.)	Employment - 15+ (cont.)	D4	D4_2 Has [name] experienced any of the following problems concerning payment of salaries/wages during the past 30 days?	1. Delay of payment/non payment 2. Reduction of payment 3. Delay and reduction 4. None	
		D5	Does [Name] have a written work contract or permanent employment for the main work the last 30 days?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know	All Age 15+ Labour force active
		D6	What is the main method [Name] used when searching or finding a job?	1. Contacted employment office 2. Placed/answered job advertisements 3. Asked friends, relatives or other personal connections 4. Contacted employer directly 5. Tried to find land, workplace, equipment, financial resources/credit to start own business, applied for relevant licenses, permits, et 6. Went door to door looking for employment 7. Other	All Age 15+ Labour force active Job seeking
		D7	What is the main reason for why [Name] finds it difficult to, or don't want to, find a job?	1. Too many people searching for jobs 2. Education/qualifications not matching available jobs 3. Legal issues 4. Available jobs are too far away 5. Discrimination 6. Lack of personal or political connections 7. Don't have enough time to look for work 8. Wages are too low 9. Disability or chronic illness 10. Language barriers 11. Other	All Age 15+ Labour force active Non job seeking
Shelter	Shelter type	E1	What is the main type of dwelling the household lives in?	1. Apartment/flat 2. House/villa 3. Informal settlement/ tent/ makeshift shelter 4. Caravan 5. Collective center 6. Unfinished/abandoned building 7. Hotel/motel 8. Religious building 9. School 10. Garage/ house annex 11. Other	All
		E2	Does your household share this dwelling with other households?	1. Yes 2. No	All
	Tenure conditions & security	E3	What is the main tenure status of this dwelling?	1. Owned 2. Rented 3. Housing provided as part of work 4. Hosted with rent 5. Hosted for free 6. Provided dwelling for free 7. Occupied/squated	All
		E4	[If owned, or rented] Does someone in the household have a written documentation for ownership/renting the dwelling?	1. Yes 2. No	All Renting or owning
		E5	[If dwelling is rented] how much rent in IQD do you pay each month to stay in this dwelling including both rent on the dwelling and the land underneath?	Amount	All Renting
		E6	How many rooms total does this dwelling have (excluding bathroom/toilet)?	Total number of rooms	All Except living in tent
		E7	How many rooms are used for sleeping?	Total number of rooms	All Except living in tent
		E8	Has your household experienced eviction from its dwelling during the past 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		E9	[If experienced eviction last 12 months] What was the main reason for eviction?	1. Haven't paid rent 2. Rent was increased 3. Owner no longer wanted to rent out 4. Demolition 5. Development projects 6. Neighbourhood pressure to leave 7. Other	All Evicted
		E10	[If experienced eviction last 12 months] From which neighborhood was your household evicted? Second line (neighbourhood/area and city/town)	free text in Kurdish/ install kurdish keyboard on the tablet	
Access to services	Access to health	F1	How do you rate your household members' access to private or public health centres/hospitals?	1. Very good 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Insufficient 5. Not accessible	All

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population	
		#	Questions	Answer options		
Access to services (cont.)	Access to health (cont.)	F2	What is the main reasons for rating low on access to health care?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very good 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Insufficient 5. Not accessible 6. Too far from household location 7. Can't afford 8. Too low capacity of clinic 9. Low quality of services provided 10. Services provided is not relevant 11. Language barrier 12. Discrimination 13. Health facility not functioning/closed 14. Other 	All Low rating of access	
		F3	Please indicate the number diseases and mental disorders which apply to your household	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. hepatitis 2. autism 3. cancer 4. blood pressure disease 5. diabetes 6. number of smokers 		
		F4	the number of smokers in the household			
	Access to energy	F5	What is the main source for energy of cooking for your household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Other sources 6. No cooking 	All	
		F6	F4_1 What is the primary source of energy for heating for this household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Kerosene stove 6. Other sources 7. No heating 	All	
			F4_2 If any, what is the secondary source of energy used for heating for this household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Kerosene stove 6. Other sources 7. No heating 		
		Livelihoods and coping mechanism	Household economy (income sources, expenditures, debts)	G1	Which of the following sources of money did your household have in the past 30 days, and how much money did you have from each source in the past 30 days? (IQD) <i>If the household did not have an indicated income source write 0/leave blank?, otherwise write the amount in IQD besides each source.</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Income from wages/salaries 2. Income from business earnings (incl very small and household enterprises) 3. Support from family members abroad (remittances) 4. Pensions 5. Assistance (in cash) from government/UN/NGO 6. Income from renting out 7. Selling off own assets 8. Using loans (formal and from family/friends) 9. Using savings 10. Charity (e.g. Zakat or support from neighbours etc..) 11. Begging 12. Other
	G2			Do any of the members in your households have outstanding loans/ borrowed money that he/she has to repay?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 	All
	G3			G3_1 What is the main purpose of the household loan(s)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Business related 2. Personal consumption needs (e.g. food and clothes) 3. Purchase and improvement of dwelling 4. Religious/wedding/burial 5. Consumer durables (e.g. car) 6. On-lending 7. Farm/agriculture purpose 8. For paying housing rent 9. Other 10. Don't know 	All Indebted
				G3_2 What is the secondary purpose of the household loan(s)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Business related 2. Personal consumption needs (e.g. food and clothes) 3. Purchase and improvement of dwelling 4. Religious/wedding/burial 5. Consumer durables (e.g. car) 6. On-lending 7. Farm/agriculture purpose 8. For paying housing rent 9. Other 10. Don't know 11. no secondary reason 	
G3_3	Apart from the loans, does your household currently have any settlements?			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. yes 2.no 		
G3_4	what is the purpose of those settlements?			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. housing 2.marriage 3. Longterm facilities: Furniture, car 4.small projects 5.other 		

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population					
		#	Questions	Answer options						
Livelihoods and coping mechanism (cont.)	Household economy (income sources, expenditures, debts) (cont.)	G4	G4_1 During the last 12 months did your household receive any assistance in cash or kind?	1. Yes 2. No	All All Received assistance					
			G4_2 [if yes] What is the main source of assistance that your household received?	1. UN aid programs 2. Government benefit 3. NGO 4. Charity 5. Friends or relatives 6. Other						
	Coping mechanisms	G5	Did your household experience any of the following economic crisis during the past 12 months? If more, select which of the following had the economically most severe impact for your household second line (read through the whole list to the respondent)	1. Unexpected loss of job or shutdown of business 2. Involuntary reduction in working hours 3. Non-payment or delay in payment of wages 4. Cut-off or decrease in support from friends/relatives (remittances) 5. Increase in cost of housing rent 6. Forced eviction or loss of assets 7. Loss of livestock, crops, or other agricultural assets 8. Death of a household member 9. Serious illness or injury to a household member (including yourself) 10. Involuntary breakup of family 11. Reduced or suspended assistance 12. Savings ran out 13. No severe crisis		All				
							G6	What was your household's main response to this crisis in order to cope?	1. Depended on cash or in-kind assistance from others 2. Relied on own savings 3. Reduced food purchases 4. Reduced expenditures on health/education 5. Employed HH members took on more work or, if not working, household member started working 6. Child taken out of school 7. HH members (inc. children) migrated 8. Loans 9. Sold assets (buildings, land, gold, etc.) 10. Begging 11. Nothing 12. Other	All With shock
	Expenditures	G8	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Food in the past 7 days (in IQD)			All				
							G9	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Healthcare (Includes medicines, treatment) past 30 days (in IQD)		All
							G11	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Fuel (for cooking; kerosene for heating) and Transportation (Taxis, bus, etc) in the past 30 days (in IQD)		All
							G13	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on House/shelter repairs in the past 30 days (in IQD)		All
							G15	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Other needs in the past 30 days (in IQD)		All
	Daily interactions	Relations between population groups	H1	H1_1: Are there issues are causing divisions between Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community in your area?	1. yes 2. no	All				
				H1_2: select up to two most important issues	1. Housing shortages/rent increase 2. Job shortages 3. Overstretched resources (water, food, electricity, etc.) 4. Overstretched public services (education and health) 5. Targeted aid and foreign assistance 6. Ethnic/religious differences 7. Cultural differences					
Perceptions of safety and trust		H2	Has any household member experienced being physically harassed within the past 6 months?	1. Yes 2. No		All				
							H3	How safe do you consider your neighbourhood?	1. Very safe 2. Safe 3. Unsafe 4. Very unsafe	All

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Migration history and future plans		11	Has your household ever been displaced from your place of origin?	1. Yes 2. No	all
		12	I2_1 [If yes] Where is your place of origin?	1. Iraq 2. Syria 3. Other	I2_1 all pop
			I2_2 Which governorate in Iraq is your place of origin?	18 Governorates of Iraq	
			I2_3_1 From which district in Diyala?	Districts dropdown	All displaced from Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah Alden
			I2_3_2 From which district in Kirkuk?	Districts dropdown	
			I2_3_3 From which district in Neneveh?	Districts dropdown	
			I2_3_4 From which district in Salah Adin?	Districts dropdown	
Migration history		13	I3_1 [if yes] When was your household displaced from your place of origin? (the date of the most recent displacement)	Year only	
			I3_2 [if Iraqi and displaced] was your household displaced from your place of origin after November 2013?	1. Yes 2. No	
		14	[if displaced] Did your household come directly to your current location?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		15	[if no] how many times have you in total moved?		
		16	[if displaced] Did all the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, arrive with you to Duhok Governorate?	1. yes 2. no	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		17	[if no] Which of the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, did not come with you? [Multiple answers allowed]	1. Spouse / cohabitant 2. Sons/daughters 3. Parents/Grandparents 4. Siblings 5. Other relatives 6. Others non-relatives	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Household split
		18	When did your household arrive to this location/neighbourhood?	1. 2016 2. 2015 3. 2014 4. 2013 5. 2012-2010 6. Before 2010	All
Migration history and future plans (cont.)	Mobility	19	What was the reason for your household to choose the current location for residence? [For displaced households]	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also here 7. Cost of living/rent in in this location is lower 8. Better safety location 9. Bigger/better home 10. Marriage 11. Other 12. Always lived here (does not apply)	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		110	Are there persons in your household who have left to live in another place within the last 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		111	[If yes] why did this person(s) move?	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also here 7. Marriage 8. Cost of living/ rent is lower 9. Location there is safer 10. Bigger/better home there 11. Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility 12. Has land and/or house there 13. Other	All With moved members within last 12 months
		112	Does anyone in your household have firm plans to move away from your current location within the next six months? (either within KRI or abroad)	1. Yes 2. No	All
	Future plans	113	[if yes] Where are you/other household members planning to go? [if more members are moving to different places, answer this question about the most economically active member]	1. within Sulaymaniyah 2. Within KRI 3. Elsewhere in Iraq 4. Neighboring countries 5. Return to place of origin 6. Europe 7. Other	All Plan to move

Household survey questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Migration history and future plans (cont.)	Future plans (cont.)	I14	What is the main reason for choosing to move there?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Better employment opportunities Availability/better quality of education opportunities Availability/better quality of health services Availability of humanitarian assistance To join other family members Relatives/friends are also there Marriage Lower rent there Location there is safer Expecting to be evicted by landlord Expecting to be evicted by municipality or local government Bigger/better home there Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility Has land and/or house there Other 	All Plan to move
		I15	[If displaced] Would you consider returning to your place of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> yes no don't know 	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		I16	I16_1 [If yes] What is the most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Liberation of area Reclaim of house/ land Reconstruction of house Financial/ in kind assistance Other 	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Consider return
			I16_2 What is the second most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Liberation of area Reclaim of house/ land Reconstruction of house Financial/ in kind assistance Other 	
Documentation	Documentation	J1	Does the head of household have any of the following documents? [multiple response]	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> nationality certificate (Iraqis) civil ID (Iraqis) passport (ALL) PDS card (Iraqis) residency permit (IDPs and Refugees) Household card of address (information card) (Iraqis) UNHCR certificate (Refugees) family record Ministry of Migration and Displacement registration card none (all) 	All
		J2	[For refugees and IDPs who do not have a residency permit] What is the main reason for not having a residency permit?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Unaware of the process Don't know how to apply Cost, distance or difficulty of reaching the Asaysh/issuing office See no benefit in having a permit Waiting for the permit Does not apply Other 	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 and Syrian Refugees
Housing, Land and Property	Housing, Land and Property	K1	K1_1 Did your household leave any assets in your place of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No 	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
			K1_2 Which of the following assets did your household leave in your place of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> housing non agricultural land agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment business assets jewelry/savings/cash car(s) other prefer not to answer None 	All
			K1_3 [if yes] Did you leave \$(asset) in the care of someone else?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No 	All
			K1_4 Do you have proof of ownership (and currently in safe hands)to reclaim or recover \$(asset)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No 	
		K2	K2 Do you currently own any of the following Assets in your current location?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> housing non agricultural land agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment business assets jewelry/savings/cash car(s) other prefer not to answer Don't own 	
			K3	K3_1 Do you wish to participate in Focus Group Discussions related to the study in about two months?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No
		K3_2 Phone number?			
End		L1	L Register GPS coordinates		

Focus Group Discussion Question Guide

Topic 1	Questions:
Daily life in the neighbourhood- cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In which ways do you think that your neighbourhood has changed over the past few years? And how do you explain this change?• How safe is your neighbourhood? Are these situations where you or others family members do not feel safe? Has your neighbourhood become more or less safe the past years, and how do you explain this?• How do you think that the arrival of IDPs affects the neighbourhood?• In which ways/situations do you interact with the IDPs?• Do you see the return of IDPs as a realistic option? If not, which options do you see?• If the IDPs stay for several years, what would be the best way to allow for it?• Are there situations where you are treated differently than others in the community? For example: Do you think that employers treat people differently? Do you think that schools treat people (parent, students) differently? Do you think that health centers treat people differently? In which ways?• What is important in order to get a job? Who in this neighbourhood finds jobs easier than others and why?• We have found out from a recent household survey that very few women are working; why do you think this is the case?
Topic 2	Questions:
Migration intentions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who are planning to move abroad, e.g. to Europe?• Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who have already migrated?• When you think about the families you know/hear about, which family members are usually migrating?
Topic 3	Questions:
Views on the economic situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• When you think about the current economic crisis, what are the most important effects on the everyday life of families in this neighborhood?• How do families cope with the difficult economic situation?• What do you think are the main reasons for the current economic crisis?

C. Statistical Analysis of the Factors Affecting Willingness to Return to Area of Origin

The household factors that determine the relative household welfare situation are explored with a basic linear regression model. The independent variable of the model is the household expenditure per capita (used as a proxy for welfare). The set of explanatory variables used are the following:

- Gender of the household head, binary variable comparing female headed-households with male-headed ones.
- Dependency ratio, a value dividing dependent household members and non-dependent members.
- Overcrowding ratio, a value dividing the rooms in the house by the household size.
- Rent costs ratio, a percentage dividing the monthly rent (if household is renting) by total household expenses.
- Emergency indebtedness, binary variable comparing households with emergency debts (as a coping mechanism) and the rest of households.
- Non-sustainable income ratio, a percentage dividing the recurrent income from non-sustainable sources by total household income.
- Literacy rates, binary variable comparing illiterate household heads with literate household heads.
- Strata division, used as a control variable for the geographical structural differences.

Results of the regression model:

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Standard error
Female headed-household	-0.101	0.067
Dependency ratio	-0.101 ***	0.014
Overcrowding ratio	0.471 ***	0.034
Rent costs ratio	-0.225 ***	0.092
Emergency indebtedness	-0.036	0.038
Non-sustainable income ratio	-0.139 ***	0.055
Literacy rates	-0.136 ***	0.041
Strata: (base = Sulaymaniyah district centre)		
Periphery districts	-0.222 ***	0.040
Kalar and Kifri	-0.175 ***	0.051
<i>Number of observations (N)</i>		<i>1,079</i>

Note: independent variable is the log of household per capita expenses; * denotes significance at 10% margin of error, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.

Variables. Percent	Total				Sulaymaniyah District Centre				Periphery district centres				Kalar and Kifri districts				
	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	
SECTION D (cont.)																	
Population (15 years+) by total actual or expected income from work last 30 days (IQD)	0	4	5	4	4	3	2	3	3	6	23	11	5	0	0	2	0
	100 - 499	52	49	46	53	51	47	32	54	51	66	65	50	61	59	66	60
	500 - 999	34	43	38	34	36	47	49	33	35	10	20	36	27	22	26	27
	1000 - 4999	9	3	12	9	10	3	16	10	8	0	4	8	12	19	6	13
	5000 and more	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (15 years+) by problem experienced in payment of salaries / wages last 30 days	Delay of payments / non payment	17	8	16	17	10	5	20	10	26	25	18	26	10	10	3	14
	Reduction of payment	37	3	16	40	40	3	23	43	34	0	6	36	31	0	8	36
	None	46	89	68	43	49	91	58	47	38	75	76	36	57	89	89	50
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (15 years+) by having a written contract for the main work last 30 days	Yes	74	9	52	79	73	10	65	77	77	0	35	81	70	4	30	81
	No	26	89	48	21	27	88	34	23	22	100	63	19	30	96	70	19
	Do not know	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION E: HOUSING																	
Households by share of dwelling with others	Yes	17	23	32	15	17	22	31	14	18	29	31	17	16	52	39	11
	No	83	77	68	85	83	78	69	86	82	71	69	83	84	58	61	89
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households by written documentation for the house ownership /	Yes	80	70	59	83	88	79	83	89	74	7	19	80	67	13	48	71
	No	20	30	41	17	12	21	17	11	26	93	81	20	33	87	52	29
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households such as in rural areas or institutions, camps and other non-permanent resident households are excluded.																	
Households by experience of eviction from their dwelling last 12 months	Yes	6	16	22	4	5	16	11	3	19	21	4	6	12	29	56	2
	No	94	84	78	96	95	84	89	97	81	79	96	94	88	71	44	98
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households that experienced eviction from dwelling last 12 months by main reason for eviction	Could not pay rent	36	52	42	29	43	53	59	33	19	44	29	13	49	29	39	100
	Owner no longer wanted to rent out	12	20	18	6	5	20	9	0	16	26	27	12	15	0	18	0
	Demolition	8	4	10	6	2	2	5	0	11	18	4	14	13	0	16	0
	Development projects	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	5	0
	Neighbourhood pressure to leave	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
	Other	44	23	28	59	50	24	27	67	55	10	40	61	18	71	21	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION F: HEALTH ACCESS																	
Households by rating of their access to private or public health centers/ hospitals	Very good	12	14	18	11	14	15	27	12	14	6	10	14	1	13	5	0
	Good	45	55	48	44	47	54	50	47	51	61	64	50	16	63	21	15
	Satisfactory	23	21	23	23	20	22	16	20	21	17	20	21	39	21	48	38
	Insufficient	20	10	8	21	19	9	7	21	14	16	6	15	41	4	13	47
	Not accessible	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	13	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households that rate access to private or public health centres / hospitals as insufficient or not accessible by reasons	Too far from home	4	0	2	4	2	0	0	3	11	0	0	12	0	0	4	0
	Cannot afford	17	55	27	16	33	60	60	31	1	35	30	0	4	0	0	5
	Too low capacity of clinic	5	3	4	5	5	4	0	5	8	0	0	8	1	0	8	0
	Low quality of services provided	32	13	22	33	30	16	13	31	16	0	15	17	53	0	30	56
	Services provided not	31	6	22	32	19	0	7	21	49	30	37	50	34	0	29	35
	Language barrier	0	6	2	0	0	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Discrimination	0	3	5	0	1	4	13	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
	Health facility closed	8	3	4	8	7	4	0	8	13	0	15	13	5	100	4	5
	Other	2	10	12	1	2	4	0	3	0	35	0	0	3	0	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION G: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY																	
Share of household income by source in the last 30 days	From salaries/wages	42	62	63	40	42	63	66	39	33	46	46	32	59	60	64	58
	From businesses earnings	11	8	7	12	10	8	7	11	14	16	14	14	9	37	5	10
	From support family members/remittances	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	2	1	3	2	1	1	0	3	1
	From pensions	5	0	8	5	4	0	8	3	5	0	8	5	11	0	8	11
	From assistance (government / UN /	0	10	2	0	0	11	2	0	0	4	1	0	1	0	6	0
	From renting out	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
	From selling off assets	22	3	6	24	26	3	6	29	24	4	4	26	1	0	5	0
	From using loans (formal and family/friends)	15	16	11	16	14	15	9	14	19	25	23	19	15	3	8	16
	From savings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	From charity	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
	From begging	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	From other sources	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Total household income	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Data are weighted. Source: SSO / UNHCR 2016.

Variables. Percent	Total				Sulaymaniyah District Centre				Periphery district centres				Kalar and Kifri districts				
	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	
SECTION G (cont.)																	
Households where one or more members have outstanding loans	Yes	40	48	34	40	35	47	22	37	46	55	49	46	39	25	47	37
	No	60	52	66	60	65	53	78	63	54	45	51	54	61	75	53	63
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more member has outstanding loans/borrowed money by purpose of loans (1st purpose)	Business related	9	0	4	10	9	0	2	10	11	2	8	12	0	0	0	0
	Personal consumption	37	33	52	35	26	34	41	25	47	27	59	46	41	50	57	36
	Purchase & improvement of dwelling	17	3	4	18	24	4	5	26	11	0	4	12	9	0	5	10
	Religious, wedding,	2	1	1	2	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	5	0	2	6
	Consumer durables, e.g.	11	2	2	12	15	2	2	16	3	0	1	3	30	0	5	37
	On-lending	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	1	0	0	1	1	0	5	0
	Farm, agriculture	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	46	19	4	0	0	0	0
	For paying housing rent	7	41	26	5	10	39	34	7	0	0	0	0	5	33	25	0
	Other	15	18	9	15	11	17	14	10	21	25	10	21	8	17	25	0
	Do not know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more member has outstanding loans/borrowed money by purpose of loans (1st purpose)	Business related	1	0	1	1	12	31	27	10	2	0	0	3	1	0	2	0
	Personal consumption	15	33	29	13	7	3	7	7	19	44	27	18	12	17	34	6
	Purchase & improvement of dwelling	7	3	2	7	1	0	0	1	8	1	0	9	0	0	0	0
	Religious, wedding,	1	0	0	1	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Consumer durables, e.g.	2	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	On-lending	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Farm, agriculture	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	For paying housing rent	3	15	21	1	2	17	18	0	4	5	27	1	8	0	14	6
	Other	8	12	8	8	8	12	0	9	7	13	14	7	12	0	9	12
	Did not have a second	61	35	40	64	63	36	48	65	58	36	32	60	68	83	41	75
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Distribution of total household expenses per item in the last 30 days	Food expenses	47	37	35	49	45	35	31	48	49	42	37	50	50	47	42	52
	Rent / house installments	7	35	31	3	9	36	37	5	4	30	27	2	5	17	22	2
	Health expenses	13	8	10	13	12	8	9	13	13	10	12	14	13	5	12	13
	Water and electricity	5	6	4	5	5	4	3	5	5	4	6	5	6	4	5	6
	Fuel and transport	9	6	6	9	9	6	7	10	8	5	7	8	8	10	5	8
	Other expenses	19	8	14	21	20	11	13	19	21	8	11	21	18	17	14	19
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION H: SAFETY																	
Households by experience of safety in their neighbourhood	Very safe	69	66	76	68	73	70	90	71	55	51	62	54	71	41	56	73
	Safe	30	34	24	31	27	30	10	29	42	49	38	42	27	59	44	25
	Unsafe	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	2	1	0	2
	Very unsafe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION I: MIGRATION / MOBILITY																	
Households that experienced displacement by if all members have arrived to the current location	Yes	90	67	96	-	88	70	95	-	92	48	95	-	100	50	100	-
	No	10	33	4	-	12	30	5	-	8	52	5	-	0	50	0	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-
Households by year of arrival to the current location	2016	5	17	20	2	7	19	22	4	2	3	12	1	4	13	25	0
	2015	8	31	29	5	11	32	38	6	5	22	16	4	4	13	25	0
	2014	12	21	42	8	11	18	34	8	10	44	58	6	16	42	44	11
	2013	6	26	5	5	9	27	3	9	3	21	10	2	2	25	2	2
	2012-2010	8	5	1	9	9	4	2	10	9	10	0	10	4	8	1	5
	Before 2010	62	1	2	70	53	1	1	62	71	0	5	77	69	0	3	82
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more household member have firm plans for changing their residence location	Yes	5	4	8	5	7	4	9	6	3	2	3	3	8	25	14	7
	No	95	96	92	95	93	96	91	94	97	98	97	97	92	75	86	93
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more household members have firm plans for changing residence location by destination	Within Erbil Governorate	72	95	73	71	77	100	83	75	45	35	76	42	86	33	55	100
	Within KRI	4	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	18	2	0	8	0
	Elsewhere in Iraq	10	0	9	10	15	0	11	17	0	0	0	0	2	0	8	0
	Neighbouring countries	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Return to place of origin	2	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	24	0	9	0	30	0
	Europe	12	5	3	14	8	0	6	8	36	65	0	39	0	67	0	0
	Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households currently displaced by if they consider moving back to the location of origin	Yes	80	85	79	-	80	84	78	-	78	90	90	-	69	79	69	-
	No	18	11	19	-	18	12	20	-	22	6	10	-	29	13	29	-
	Do not know	2	4	2	-	3	4	2	-	0	4	0	-	2	8	2	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-
Households displaced by assets left behind at the location of origin	Yes	-	-	-	-	77	65	77	-	80	69	81	-	85	50	85	-
	No	-	-	-	-	23	35	23	-	20	31	19	-	15	50	15	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-

Data are weighted. Source: SSO / UNHCR 2016.



SULAYMANIYAH STATISTICS OFFICE (SSO)



SULAYMANIYAH GOVERNMENT

