



# **Displacement** as challenge and opportunity

*Urban profile:  
Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community*

*Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq*

*April 2016*

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**DISPLACEMENT AS CHALLENGE  
AND OPPORTUNITY**

**URBAN PROFILE OF REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED  
PERSONS AND HOST COMMUNITY**

**ERBIL GOVERNORATE, KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ**

## Acknowledgements

This profiling assessment has been conducted in December 2015 in order to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation of refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities in Erbil Governorate. We hope that this profiling assessment will contribute to establish an evidence base and will help the Kurdistan Regional Government and the humanitarian and development partners to develop comprehensive, long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns and improving the living standards of all population groups living in the urban areas of Erbil Governorate.

This assessment received the support since its initiation from his Excellency, Ali Sindi, the Minister of Planning of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and his Excellency, Nawzad Hadi, the Governor of Erbil. We offer deep gratitude to them.


The work undertaken is a result of a partnership between the Erbil Refugee Council (ERC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Erbil Statistics Directorate (ESD), the Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) offered technical support throughout the exercise.

A Technical Working Group consisting of ESD, UNHCR and ERC, and with the support of JIPS, have developed the methodology and conducted the analysis.


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# INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

Erbil Governorate, with a total population of 2.01 million people<sup>1</sup>, hosts the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The governorate, like the rest of the Kurdistan Region, has been deeply affected by recent waves of displacement resulting from the conflicts in Syria and the rest of Iraq, as well as a pervasive financial crisis affecting the public and private sectors of its economy.

Erbil Governorate has taken in Syrian refugees over the last 5 years. This displaced population has arrived as a direct consequence of the violent conflict in Syria or due to the economic opportunities that Erbil offered. When this influx started, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq enjoyed relative stability and economic progress. People seeking refuge thus entered a benign and even welcoming environment with both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and host community willing to support them.

The situation changed in 2014, given the evolving security and economic dynamics in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq resulting from both the Islamic State's violent entry into Iraq and the economic downturn. The deteriorating security situation caused by the Islamic State's take-over of large portions of western and northern territories in Iraq, including the country's second largest city, Mosul, unleashed a severe displacement crisis within Iraq. Of the 3.4 million people internally displaced in the country, around 1.5 million are now in the governorates of the Kurdistan Region. This resultant 30% increase in population in just 2 years has put the region's authorities under immense strain, particularly with respect to the provision of public services. Coupled with this, the current conflict in Iraq has also negatively impacted the economic outlook for the country, including the Kurdistan Region. Foreign investment has drastically decreased, trade routes have been disrupted and the dynamics within the labour market have been altered dramatically after the large inflow of people into the workforce.

Unrelated to the current conflict, but no less important, is the fact that the Kurdistan Region's economy has also been directly and negatively affected by budget disputes between the KRG and Iraq's Federal Government and decreasing oil prices. Prior to 2014, the vast majority of Kurdistan's financial resources came out of the federal budget from Baghdad. This transfer came to a halt in 2014 in response to the Kurdistan Region's attempt to sell oil independently. As a result, the KRG has received irregular and intermittent funds from Baghdad in the absence of a renegotiated revenue-sharing agreement. Because an adequate taxation system does not exist in Iraq or in the Kurdistan Region to complement public revenues, the KRG has been almost completely dependent on its own oil exports to cover costs. These revenues have been drastically reduced after international oil prices dropped by around 70% starting in mid-2014.

The national and regional economic challenges highlighted above quickly spread across the domestic economy in the Kurdistan Region. The economy is highly centralised around the government spending, from business sustainability to household income and consumption. Public employees, which form about half of the local workforce, have not received regular and timely payment of their salaries for 2014 and 2015. Pension, allowance, and public contractor payments also slowed over this time. This sudden lack of income for a large sector of the population has had ripple effects that are still being felt, particularly as the private sector is still too weak and underdeveloped to provide alternative employment opportunities and anchor the economy to weather these budget constraints.

Taken together, conflict, displacement, and a weak economy are negatively impacting government function, household resilience, private sector survival, and public services provision in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, including Erbil Governorate. Solutions to redress the situation must come from a holistic analysis taking into account all the dynamics outlined above. This profiling exercise, hence, takes place within a complex environment, affected by many layers of external and internal shocks.

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<sup>1</sup> KRSO (2014). Report on population estimates for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in the period 2009-2020.

## Why profiling?

While a significant amount of information is available on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees residing in camps, less is known about those residing out of camps. Furthermore, most of the existing strategies to mitigate the effects of displacement focus on addressing the needs of either IDP or refugee populations, while the needs of the host communities living alongside these populations, do not receive as much attention. This profiling exercise, whose findings are outlined in this report, was conducted in order to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation as relates to both displaced and host populations in Erbil Governorate. The overarching aim being to establish an evidence-base for policy and practice recommendations for the KRG and humanitarian and development actors in developing comprehensive, long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns.

To lead the exercise, the Erbil Refugee Council (ERC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initiated a Profiling Steering Committee consisting of representatives from the Erbil Statistics Directorate (ESD), Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) offered technical support throughout the exercise.

The specific profiling objectives, as agreed by the Steering Committee, were the following:

- a. To provide demographic profiles disaggregated by gender, age, and displacement status (i.e. refugees, IDPs and host communities) in the targeted areas;
- b. To provide profiles of urban areas with high concentration of out-of-camp displaced populations;
- c. To analyse the capacities, vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of the population in these areas;
- d. To analyse the relationships between displaced and host populations;
- e. To analyse the resilience of urban areas in relation to the availability and limitations of services;
- f. To provide a dataset available to the KRG and humanitarian / development community.

## A collaborative and capacity sharing process

A collaborative approach was taken in designing and implementing this profiling exercise, with Steering Committee members engaged at different stages, as appropriate. Capacity building activities were also undertaken with local and international partners, such as a 3-day training session on profiling in September 2015, with the participation of ERC, ESD, KRSO, JCC, UNHCR, UNHABITAT, World Health Organization (WHO), UNFPA, UNDP, IOM, OCHA, IRD, Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF), Qandil, and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

In addition to this, a Technical Working Group (TWG) made up of representatives from the ERC, ESD, UNHCR Information Management Unit and JIPS led the different phases of the exercise, as follows: all members developed the survey questionnaire with topics agreed upon collaboration with relevant UN agencies and Governorate actors to ensure data collected served both their information needs; ESD administered the household survey; ERC and UNHCR organised the focus group discussions (FGDs); and all members were involved in data analysis.

Preliminary findings were shared and validated with UN and Governorate stakeholders in a one-day workshop. The recommendations for the report were subsequently developed through bilateral meetings with Steering Committee members. This inter-agency collaboration resulted in significant knowledge and capacity sharing including the introduction of new data collection and processing / analytical methods.

# **METHODOLOGY**

## **1. TARGET POPULATIONS AND AREA COVERAGE**

The profiling exercise aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the displacement situation in urban areas of Erbil Governorate. This involved taking an area-based approach looking at all populations groups (i.e., Syrian refugee, IDP, and host communities) impacted by displacement living in these locations. Such an approach allows for a comparative analysis of not only displaced and host populations but of different urban areas with the highest concentrations of displaced populations which were the focus of the exercise. The exercise then targeted the urban centres in the following subdistricts, categorised in three geographic strata:

- Erbil district centre, formed by the city of Hawler (Nawandy Hawler) and Ainkawa.
- Erbil district periphery, formed by the urban nucleus immediately surrounding Erbil district centre and directly connected to it: Baharka, Bnaslawaw (Dashty Hawler Centre), Daratu, Kasnazan, Khabat Centre (Nawandy Khabat), and Rizgari.
- Towns, formed by the inner urban centres in the governorate: Harir, Koya Centre (Nawandy Koya), Shaqlawa Centre, and Soran Centre (Nawandy Soran) jointly with Diana.

## **2. DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

### **Desk review and informant interviews**

An analysis of existing socioeconomic information, including previously conducted research, surveys, needs assessments, and FDGs conducted across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, has been included in this report. This analysis resulted from extensive desk review in conjunction with informational interviews with relevant stakeholders and entailed a consolidation of existing data on availability and capacity of services and infrastructure in the region.


### **Household survey and sampling strategy**

A sample of 1,222 households was selected for the survey, stratified by population group and urban typology. The final sample included 1,163 successfully completed surveys, which were administered by the ESD using tablets for data collection over December 2015 and January 2016. The household survey questionnaire can be found in the Annex.

The Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office (KRSO) calculated the sample size (Table 1) as well as the data weights that were applied to the findings. The sample size used allows for an extrapolation of significant results at a 95% confidence interval for the different geographical strata and the population groups assessed. Results at subdistrict level are only statistically significant at a 90% confidence interval due to smaller sample size (without the possibility to disaggregate between population groups in each sub-district). The sample drawn from each of the targeted sub-districts was proportionate to the size of each population group in that sub-district (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Distribution of the observations in the coverage area by geographical strata



Data source: administrative boundaries provided by the Erbil Statistical Directorate (EDS)  
 Projection: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N

Table 1. Distribution of sample (successful interviews) by urban typology and population group

Urban typologies	IDPs	Refugees	Host community	Total
Erbil District Centre	61	158	95	314
Erbil District Periphery	217	140	174	531
Towns	125	72	121	318
<i>Grand total</i>	<i>403</i>	<i>370</i>	<i>390</i>	<i>1,163</i>

The baseline estimation (frame) of households for each population group in each target area relied on different sources. The frame used for IDPs was based on the first phase of KRSO’s Comprehensive Registration of Displaced People (CRDP) conducted in June 2015 —the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in the CRDP was the quarter. The sampling frame used for refugees was based on UNHCR’s registration database (ProGres), which provided phone numbers of refugees per area —a simple random sample was drawn per area. The sampling frame used for the host community was based on the preparation process for the 2009 census, which did not take place, and a listing conducted in the sampled blocks —the PSU was the block.

### Focus group discussions

The FGDs aimed at providing in-depth and contextualising information on some of the topics addressed by the household survey. Based on the preliminary findings from

the survey, it was decided that additional information was required on intercommunity relations and perceptions in order to better understand the degree of social cohesion between (and within) the communities; as well as future intentions of migration in order to further explore survey findings indicating that very few households in the local and IDP community planned to migrate. The focus groups were conducted by UNHCR in collaboration with ERC in March 2016. The FGD question guide can be found in the Annex.

8 FGDs were conducted in total with the host community, targeting women, men, adults and youth separately, in two types of neighbourhood in Erbil district centre: those with high or low concentration of displaced populations. The host community was specifically targeted for FGDs to avoid duplication of information, as many focus groups were regularly conducted with displaced populations in 2015. Host communities were not included in these discussions.

### Limitations

It must be taken into account that the sampling approach was not designed to estimate the total number of the three target populations in Erbil district centre, Erbil district periphery and towns. As such, the results cannot be used to validate the available population estimates for out-of-camp populations or the local population.



Street scene near Erbil Citadel, Erbil Centre, where refugees, IDPs and host community meet daily. May 2016. Freelance photographer. F. Hindi



# WHO ARE THE DISPLACED

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Over the last 5 years, the Kurdistan Region has been host to different waves of displaced populations, with a significant number of families seeking refuge in Erbil Governorate in particular. The first wave occurred immediately after 2010, with the influx of Syrian refugees entering into the region, fleeing civil war. A second wave began in late 2013, and spiked up in 2014 and 2015, with an increasing flow of IDPs seeking shelter and safety from the armed conflict that erupted in Iraq during that time. The majority of the internally displaced come from Anbar (44%) and Niniveh (37%), followed by Salahaddin, Baghdad and other governorates.

The largest part of the displaced population, both refugees and IDPs, live in the urban areas of the governorate, as opposed to rural areas. In addition, according to UNHCR, 72% of all refugees are out of camp, while 27% reside in the 4 refugee camps in Erbil Governorate (over a total of 9 camps across the Kurdistan Region). For IDPs, according to IOM, the number of persons out of camp in Erbil Governorate by the end of 2015 stood at 95%.

The refugee population in urban areas tends to cluster in Erbil district centre. Refugees are likely to arrive here after spending time elsewhere in displacement, as our

governorate, particularly those in Erbil district centre, have been driven to the area pursuing better economic opportunities. This is confirmed in greater detail in later sections, but the fact that this population is comprised of individuals at the young end of the working age spectrum and over half (54%) of their households are made up of just 1 to 3 members, supports this idea. The heads of household among refugees here tend to be younger than IDPs and host community, and report that they did not arrive with all their family members, who are displaced elsewhere.

For IDPs, as a consequence of the direct conflict in Iraq, relocation into Erbil Governorate was driven more by proximity and existing networks than economic factors. The IDP population consists mainly of very large families who have a substantial proportion of dependents, especially children and youth. Most of the IDP households arrived in Erbil district periphery areas such as Baharka and Daratu where affordable housing and shelter is most readily available. Existing community networks also played a role in the arrival to Erbil Governorate: many IDPs moved into Khabat which is close to the border with Nineveh, or to Shaqlawa, where there is already a very large settled Iraqi Arab population.

# 1. MIGRATION HISTORY OF THE DISPLACED

## Distribution of the displaced urban population

In the last 5 years, a total of 77,600 displaced families, or 335,000 individuals, have sought refuge in the urban areas of Erbil Governorate (257,400 IDPs and 77,600 Syrian refugees)<sup>2</sup>. These recently displaced populations have been added to an urban host community of about 1.35 million inhabitants<sup>3</sup>. IDPs and refugees now comprise about 25% of the total urban population in Erbil Governorate. In urban locations like Baharka, Khabat or Shaqlawa,

<sup>2</sup> Data for Syrian refugees facilitated by UNHCR's registration database (ProGres) and data for IDPs facilitated by KRISO's Comprehensive Registration of Displaced People (CRDP).

<sup>3</sup> Data facilitated by the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRISO) based on the publication KRISO (2014) Report on population estimates in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq for the period 2009-2020.


IDPs and refugees together make up almost half of the population, pointing to a significant and sudden increase in the number of residents.

The displaced population is clustered across the governorate in different patterns (Figure 2). 3 out of 4 Syrian refugees are located in Erbil district centre, with most of the remainder spread in the periphery districts and a minority in towns. When looking at IDPs, 44% are located in Erbil district periphery (mostly Baharka and Daratu), 40% within Erbil district centre and 16% in towns.

In addition to the IDPs and refugees hosted in urban areas, some displaced households established themselves in the rural areas of Erbil Governorate (about 5,500 refugees and 76,800 IDPs), while some others sought shelter in camps (about 31,200 refugees and 17,900 IDPs)<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Estimations for Syrian refugees based on UNHCR's Syria Regional Refugee Response and, for IDPs, based on IOM Iraq's Displacement Tracking Matrix.

Figure 2. Population distribution in the profiling coverage area (urban areas in Erbil Governorate) by strata



**In the last 5 years, a total of 335,000 individuals have sought refuge in the urban areas of Erbil Governorate. IDPs and refugees now comprise about 25% of the total urban population in the Governorate.**

**Clusters of IDPs by governorate of origin**

In displacement, IDP families tend to cluster depending on their location of origin, usually in order to be close to relatives, or to stay as close as possible to their area of origin. The governorates from which IDPs in Erbil have been displaced are primarily: Anbar (44%), Niniveh (37%), and Salahaddin (13%).

The largest majority of IDPs in Erbil district centre are from Anbar, followed by households from Salahaddin, while the quarter of Ainkawa mainly received IDPs from the Christian communities in Niniveh. The periphery subdistricts of Khabat and Baharka have only


received IDPs from Niniveh because of their proximity to this governorate. Other periphery subdistricts such as Kasnazan, Daratu and Bnaslawa have a mixed IDP population from Anbar, Niniveh and Salahaddin. Finally, 9 out of 10 households in Shaqlawa, Harir and Soran are from Anbar, while in Koya a more diverse population is found.

Furthermore, an analysis by ethnic background indicates a great diversity among the IDPs displaced from Niniveh, with 56% of the individuals self-identifying as Kurds, 22% as Christians (including Chaldeans and Syriacs), 16% as Arabs and 6% as other minorities. The IDPs from other governorates are for the most part Arab.

**Time of displacement**

The majority (70%) of Syrian refugees that now reside in Erbil Governorate were displaced between 2010 and 2013, while 20% were displaced in 2014 and 10% in 2015. For IDPs, 7% were displaced in the early stages of the current conflict in Iraq by the end of 2013 (mainly coming from Anbar), while the bulk of households were displaced in 2014 (72%, half of them from Niniveh and the rest mostly from Anbar and Salahaddin), when the conflict scaled up in Central Iraq. The remainder were displaced in 2015 (20%, almost entirely from Anbar).

Figure 3. Distribution of population groups by age (%)



## 2. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

### Age and gender

While there is no significant difference between population groups (host or displaced) in terms of gender distribution (51% of the populations are men and 49% are women), there are noticeable differences regarding age distribution (Figure 3). Compared to the host community, the IDP population is significantly younger, with half being below the age of 19. For the refugee population, 40% are between the ages of 20 and 39, with a very minor presence of individuals older than that. The bulk of the refugees then comprise a young, working age population<sup>5</sup>.

This characterisation of the refugee population as particularly young is reinforced when looking at the average age of heads of household. Refugees tend to have the youngest heads of household, with an average age of 34, compared to an average of 45 for IDPs and 46 for host community.

### Household size in relation to displacement situation

IDP households are the largest in size, with an average of 6 members. The host community has smaller households (average of 5 members). However, household size for refugees differs depending on geographical location (Figure 4). Refugee households in Erbil district centre are on average formed by 3.6 members. This contrasts significantly the average of 5 members found in the refugee households residing in Erbil district periphery and towns.

<sup>5</sup> More disaggregated data is provided in Section A of the data annex.

A large number of refugee households in Erbil district centre comprise either bachelors (alone or in small groups) or couples: 19% of the refugee households include only 1 person, 17% include 2 persons and 18% include 3 persons. This is not seen in any of the other areas nor within the other population groups.

**Compared to the host community, the IDP population is significantly younger, with half being below the age of 19. The bulk of the refugees comprises a young, working age population.**

The smaller size and younger composition of refugee households in Erbil district centre is indicative of a migration into Erbil driven by economic factors. A significant number of individuals and young couples seem to have moved to the city seeking wider economic opportunities after several years in displacement. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that almost 50% of the refugee households in Erbil district centre stated that they did not arrive in their current location with all their family members, indicating that other family members are staying elsewhere. This is only the case for 10% of the refugee households in Erbil district periphery or towns, and only 3% for IDP households across all areas.

Figure 4. Average household size per strata and population group

Strata	Host	IDP	Refugee
Erbil District Centre	4.7	5.7	3.6
Erbil District Periphery	5.1	6.2	5.0
Towns	5.0	5.8	5.2

# URBAN SPACES AND COHESION

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

As noted in the previous chapter, the influx of displaced populations into Erbil Governorate brought with it a dramatic and sudden increase in the number of residents in most subdistricts; in some cases, nearly doubling the existing population as happened in Baharka, Khabat or Shaqlawa. In general, the areas that have experienced the highest number of new arrivals and therefore the largest change in urban and social dynamics are in the Erbil district periphery and some towns. These events however are not isolated but rather fit into an ongoing and wider transformation of the urban landscape in Erbil Governorate. One telling finding from our data highlights this in particular: over half of the host community living in urban areas has moved to their current location in the last 6 years. The implication of this is that the social fabric in these areas is very fluid, with a continuous evolution of not only physical surroundings but community relations as well. This is the setting into which displaced populations have entered and their influx does not come up against deep-seated and established neighbourhood ties, but rather a more permeable and flexible urban environment.

This is especially important to understand when taking into account the fact that the bulk of IDPs, and to lesser extent refugees, have moved into newly constructed areas in Erbil Governorate. These areas offer two key features that, based on our data, displaced populations are looking for, apart from a safe haven: space and affordable rents. Host community families also increasingly took these factors into account when moving to new areas, particularly after 2014, when Kurdistan's financial crisis was most profoundly felt. Of lesser importance but still significant, particularly for refugees, is the desire to move to areas that contain better employment opportunities.

All of this has put strong pressure on the built environment, especially in Erbil district periphery, as the availability of existing housing proved insufficient for the sudden population increase and new properties have not been developed quickly given the lack of funds available to invest in them. As a result, overcrowding in existing dwellings is extended and it is a serious concern to contend with, because as the quality of living

conditions significantly decreases within this context, pockets of vulnerability emerge. Strain on public services is another major challenge as the areas where displaced populations settled were more affordable in the first place because they had a lower supply of such amenities. Due to these neighbourhoods' rapid urban development, the government has not been able to scale-up the number of schools, medical facilities, and utilities to supply these new areas. This further reduces quality of living conditions. Such deterioration has made some households across all population groups plan to change location again seeking better housing and, as vulnerability raises, lower cost of living. That said, the most concerning cause for further relocation though is evictions. The ratio of evictions during the 12 months preceding our survey stands at 12% for IDP households, 8% for refugees and 3% for the host community — the vast majority due to an inability to pay rent, implying that significant numbers of families are consequently pushed out to cheaper, less well served districts.

As competition increases for urban space and the resources contained within it, pre-existing distrust and tensions between the host community and the displaced, in particular Arab IDPs, ratchets up even higher. Fortunately, for the moment, there is no overt opposition from the host community in taking in displaced populations nor has anyone across groups reported feeling a sense of insecurity in daily life. The lack of interaction between groups and lack of understanding of each others' needs and respective hardships however is increasingly polarising host and displaced communities to the extent that we find that none feel they are being treated equally and with the same rights in their day-to-day co-existence in the urban space.

These negative dynamics clearly influence community members' thinking and yield extreme positions when people are asked how to resolve issues facing their neighbourhoods. For example, in all FGDs with host community members, participants agreed that segregating displaced communities, in particular Arab IDPs, into separate, specifically designated places outside of urban areas is the most desired outcome for easing strain, irrespective of the human and economic costs this involves. Other more rights-based approaches, that involve inter-community dialogue and cooperation, must be designed in response to such antagonism.



## 1. NEW AND OLD NEIGHBOURS: SETTLING INTO CITIES AND TOWNS

### A recently arrived host community in urban areas

Over the last decade, urban areas in Erbil Governorate underwent enormous transformation and modernisation, with the expansion of existing cities and towns, creation of new neighbourhoods and arrival of new families. A rapidly expanding population and Kurdistan’s economic boom contributed to these changes. Some areas within and around Erbil district centre are entirely new, having developed in the last few years. Authorities made important investments in order to scale-up the provision of public services, such as education, health and electricity supply in these areas, although the capacity has not always been able to match the increased demand, particularly in the midst of Kurdistan’s economic and displacement crises. Host community focus group participants also noted these changes within these new residential areas.

“There has been a clear before and after the crisis. Before there was growth, we saw a boom in the development of our quarter and the neighbourhood businesses were getting really better.”

Shop owner, Serweran, host community.

“Thanks to the recent development, we now have roads and a school, although we still lack of cultural centres.”

Adult woman, Serweran, host community.

“Before, our neighbourhood was not that crowded. I remember when my family moved here, there were many empty slots of houses, we knew everyone in the neighbourhood. But now we do not know the people and it is not giving a good feeling.”


Female student, Serweran, host community.

“Before in this neighbourhood, the land was very expensive, now it became cheaper. There were lots of houses to be built, but now the process is very slow.”

Male student, Sarbasti, host community.

**Nearly two-thirds of IDP households and half of Syrian households moved to newly built-up areas, which had a greater availability of housing stock.**

Figure 5. Year of arrival to the current neighbourhood for host community households in the survey per strata



Note: the size of the dots represent the number of households surveyed that settled in their current neighbourhood in that precise year; the percentages within the grey area is the proportion of households that settled between 2010 and 2015.

The ‘age’ of these locations as residential areas shapes the social networks found within them, in this case implying a more fluid dynamic given their relatively recent establishment. For instance, nearly 40% of the host community in urban areas lives in relatively newly built neighbourhoods, that is, residential areas of recent construction (between 2009 and 2013). Most of these new neighbourhoods are within Erbil district centre or the surrounding areas of Baharka and Kasnazan, with towns having experienced least expansion or renewal. Linked to the predominance of new locations and neighbourhoods, is the fact that most of the host community families in these areas are also relatively new to their current neighbourhood (Figure 5). Within our sample, a little over half of the households in Erbil district centre settled in their current locations within the last 5 years, while only a minority settled before the year 2000.

### Arrival of Syrian and IDP households

Although Syrian refugees have been displaced for more than 4 years and most of the IDPs for at least 2 years, their arrival to their current locations in the urban areas of Erbil governorate is similarly more recent. 53% of

Syrian refugees and 52% of IDPs arrived to their current neighbourhoods in 2015, having resided in other locations since their displacement. It should be noted however that those refugees living in towns report having lived in their locations for longer periods than the average.

Nearly two-thirds of IDP households and about half of Syrian households moved to recently developed neighbourhoods, in newly built-up areas. This larger presence of displaced populations here can presumably be linked to a greater availability of housing stock as well as an expectation that settling in would be easier than in more established neighbourhoods, given the more fluid social fabric in newer areas (Table 2).

**Proximity to relatives and better affordability are by far the most frequently cited reasons for choosing a neighbourhood over others, overall across all groups.**

Table 2. Proportion of urban population living in new and old build-up areas

		Living in new build-up areas	Living in old build-up areas	Total
Host community	Erbil District Centre	46%	54%	100%
	Erbil District Periphery	21%	79%	100%
	Towns	19%	81%	100%
IDPs	Erbil District Centre	67%	33%	100%
	Erbil District Periphery	70%	30%	100%
	Towns	12%	88%	100%
Refugees	Erbil District Centre	50%	50%	100%
	Erbil District Periphery	55%	45%	100%
	Towns	3%	97%	100%

### Pull factors for moving to urban areas

Given that the majority of households, regardless of population group, are relatively new to the neighbourhoods they currently reside in, it is worthwhile to understand the reasons that brought them there, examining both commonalities and differences between the groups in this regard.<sup>6</sup>

Proximity to relatives and better affordability are by far the most frequently cited reasons for choosing a neighbourhood over others, overall across all groups. However, while the host community tends to give priority to proximity to relatives as the main reason for neighbourhood selection, for both IDPs and refugees the main preference is a neighbourhood with affordable living costs —with a special predominance among those living in Erbil district periphery and towns, given that these areas tend to have lower rents while still being relatively well supplied in terms of public services. Importantly, refugee households also tend to highlight better employment opportunities as a relevant factor in this selection, especially in Erbil district centre.

<sup>6</sup> Disaggregated data on the pull factors is available in Section H of the data annex.

## 2. HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS

### Housing situation

97% of the total population residing in the urban areas of Erbil Governorate live in either individual houses or apartments, with no significant difference between the geographical strata. The remaining 3% lives in either hotels or informal settlements. This small subgroup is predominantly made up of IDPs and, to a lesser extent, by refugees. That is, of the total IDP households across geographic strata, 7% are in hotels or an informal situation, while the number for refugee households is 12%, predominantly clustered in Erbil district centre (Figure 6). Around half have been residing in these conditions (hotel or informal settlement) for more than a year.

Table 3. Primary reason for choosing the current neighbourhood by population group and strata

		Relatives, friends are also here	Better affordability	Better safety location	Bigger, better home	Better employment	Other	Total
Host community	Erbil district centre	45%	16%	6%	16%	4%	13%	100%
	Erbil district periphery	47%	25%	9%	8%	4%	7%	100%
	Towns	40%	27%	6%	21%	3%	3%	100%
IDPs	Erbil district centre	20%	36%	27%	7%	3%	7%	100%
	Erbil district periphery	21%	40%	16%	10%	3%	10%	100%
	Towns	7%	40%	17%	19%	4%	13%	100%
Refugees	Erbil district centre	18%	33%	6%	7%	26%	10%	100%
	Erbil district periphery	17%	46%	10%	9%	13%	5%	100%
	Towns	7%	62%	6%	9%	15%	1%	100%

Note: for the host community group, only households that arrived to their current location after 2009 are included.

With respect to those living in houses or apartments, 74% the host community households own the dwellings in which they live, 19% rent and the remainder are provided with free housing<sup>7</sup>. Since IDPs and refugees face restrictions regarding the ownership of physical property, including houses, the majority (87% of IDP households and 92% of refugee households) pay rent. Renting is also more predominant (43% of all households across groups) in Erbil district periphery than in Erbil district centre or towns.

While having a written rental contract helps provide protection against evictions, discrimination, and other forms of housing vulnerability, 28% of renters in Erbil district centre are without a written rental contract, 13% are without in Erbil district periphery, and 50% are without in towns —this is across population groups, with no significant differences found between them. Of note, particularly as it results in a significant pocket of vulnerability, is that in towns up to 86% of refugee households do not have a contract.

<sup>7</sup> It has to be noted, that households owning their dwelling may also be paying financial installments for the land or the building. In many cases, families incur debt either with relatives or apply for government funds.


### Sharing domestic space and availability of housing stock

Sharing housing with other families seems to be a frequent practice among displaced populations, with 48% of refugee households and 57% of IDP households living in shared quarters in houses or apartments. In the case of IDP households, family size tends to be higher than the other population groups, reducing the individual space available. The instances of house sharing within the host community are significantly less at 22%.<sup>8</sup>

**Sharing housing with other families is more likely in Erbil district periphery where, for instance, 2 out of 3 IDP households share a house or apartment with other families.**

<sup>8</sup> Disaggregated data on the housing situation is available in Section D of the data annex.

Figure 6. Housing situation in urban areas per strata and population group



Geographically, sharing is more likely in Erbil district periphery where, for instance, 2 out of 3 IDP households share a house or apartment with other families — a proportion significantly above the average. In periphery locations it is relatively more frequent to find sizeable displaced families, either IDPs or refugees, sharing dwellings and using only 1 or 2 rooms for sleeping. This points to a situation where, as a consequence of displacement, residential infrastructure is currently under heavy stress, as the reported overcrowding is not only caused by lack of affordability but also by lack of housing availability.

### 3. MOVING WITHIN AND OUT: PUSH FACTORS FROM URBAN AREAS

#### Moving out of the place of residence

While the data presented so far explores how households settled into urban areas of Erbil Governorate and the stress to the housing situation given the displacement crisis, it is also important to understand the consequences of this housing situation. Data collected suggests that some households are pushed to certain areas within the urban space or even out of it entirely, often due to lack of affordability and the deterioration in living and livelihood prospects in the region.


In terms of planned moves, only a very small proportion of households had firm plans to change residence within the next 6 months: 6% in Erbil district centre, 6% in Erbil district periphery and 5% in towns. When looking at the differences between population groups, 9% of both refugee and IDP households (primarily in Erbil district periphery) and just 4% of the host community intended to move away. 75% of households with firm plans to move seek to do so within Erbil Governorate, and the remainder elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region. Only the group of refugees have different targets, as 50% of the households with plans to move are willing to reach Europe.

Given these small numbers overall, it is difficult to draw solid conclusions from survey responses about reasons for planned moves. Nevertheless, a clear trend emerged in the reported reasons for planned moves by refugees and IDPs: half of these households are seeking lower rent costs. Host community households on the other hand are seeking better physical housing.

#### Rent and cost of living as factors for internal mobility

Affordability with respect to living costs, including rent, is a recurring topic in the analysis, particularly as relates to IDPs and refugees given that they make up a larger proportion of renters in these urban areas. The price of rent has steadily risen in the last 3 years with average rent inflation increasing to 19%, even before the influx of

Figure 7. Quarterly evolution of the inflation rate for house rent in Erbil governorate (2013-2015)




IDPs in June 2014 (Figure 7). Though rents have stabilized over all of 2015, these increases occurred while livelihood opportunities were also substantially negatively affected by the economic and displacement crises in the Kurdistan Region. As a result of livelihoods disruptions, some refugee and IDP households may increasingly not be able to afford displacement living costs and may be forced to move again or return to insecure conditions, while some host community households may be pushed to cheaper areas due to the hike in rent prices.

Significantly high percentages of IDP and refugee households (between 70% and 80% depending on the strata) report having difficulties in paying rent, while 50% of host community households report this as an issue. There is a direct correlation between higher average rents and higher proportion of households with difficulties in paying rent —this is exemplified particularly in Shaqlawa,

Kasnazan, Bnslawa, Daratu, and Baharka, which are the areas where households reported more difficulties in paying rent.

Housing unaffordability can also be evaluated through the proportion of the total household monthly expenditures allocated to rent (Figure 8). This data only takes into account the households that reported paying rent (hence excluding house owners or hosted families). Among all strata, households in Erbil district centre have the highest proportion of their expenditures (33%) allocated to rent, followed by households in Erbil district periphery (29%) and towns (25%). Therefore, Erbil district centre and the immediate surrounding areas, including Kasnazan and Bnslawa, are where increased housing pressure is felt, given that the higher proportion of income allocated to rent indicates greater housing challenges. The most frequent action taken to cope with affordability issues, as seen before, is to share housing with other families.

Figure 8. Average proportion of rent expenses per total monthly household expenses per location for households that rent




**Households in Erbil district centre have the highest proportion of their expenditures (33%) allocated to rent, followed by households in Erbil district periphery (29%) and towns (25%).**

**Evictions**

The number of evictions reported during the 12 months preceding the survey is significantly high (Figure 9), considering the human and social costs that they imply, though not entirely surprising given the housing affordability data above. Up to 12% of IDP households report having been evicted, with higher rates than the average mostly seen in Erbil district centre and many locations in Erbil district periphery. On average, 8% of the refugee households have experienced eviction, with half residing in Erbil district centre (where most refugees live) and almost a quarter residing in towns<sup>9</sup>. The average percentage for the host community is at 3%, with a predominance of evictions reported in towns.

<sup>9</sup> The survey questionnaire did not ask from where a household was evicted, hence it is not possible to say whether the households that experienced eviction in the towns, were evicted from other locations.

Figure 9. Proportion and total number of households evicted per location




Higher eviction rates are directly correlated with households not possessing a written rental contract and, instead, relying on verbal agreements, which, while legally binding, seem more difficult to enforce in practice. Taking this into account, towns in particular are hotspots for eviction risk, as the practice of writing rental contracts is almost non-existent in these areas.

The main reason for eviction as reported across all population groups and geographic strata is the inability to make rent payments. This is the case for 92% of evicted households in Erbil district centre, 45% of evicted households in Erbil district periphery and 53% of households in towns. The second most cited reason for eviction is the property owner's intention to undertake new development projects. Very few evicted households reported tensions or pressure from neighbours as a reason for losing their homes.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Disaggregated data on evictions is available in Section D of the data annex.

**The number of evictions reported during the 12 months preceding the survey is significantly high. Higher eviction rates are directly correlated with households not possessing a written rental contract.**

Figure 10. Ratio of workers in health and education activities per 1,000 inhabitants





## Onward migration abroad

In addition to challenges affording rent, another ‘push factor’ is access to livelihood opportunities in the Kurdistan Region. The lack actual and perceived lack thereof has resulted in migration abroad. Europe received thousands of refugees in 2015, mainly from Syria and Iraq. In the vast majority of cases, this movement occurs informally by crossing borders by boat and on foot. Many of this group consisted of refugees and IDPs having temporarily resided in the Kurdistan Region, as well as host community members. The desire of host community members to migrate was corroborated by a recent survey, according to which 71% of the youth in Erbil city stated that they would be willing to migrate if they had the means<sup>11</sup>. FGDs held with host community members also bore this out.

“I work as a taxi driver and, to be honest with you, I also help sending people to Europe through my connections. Anyone who comes and asks for help to go to Europe, I try to convince him not to go. If it does not work, I tell the head of the household but sometimes even that will not work and they end up going.”

Adult man, Hasarok, host community.

“I personally want to migrate to Europe because I do not see a future here. I would like to study astronomy but here we do not have a department in the university. Instead, there is just war and a financial crisis.”

Male student, Sarbasti, host community.

“You have the war and the refugees coming here, taking the jobs. What do you expect from the young people to do? They will try to get a better life in Europe.”

Elder man, Serwaran, host community.

At the same time, host community focus group participants seemed to agree that the momentum for leaving the Kurdistan Region was receding, with those who had wanted to leave having done so in 2014 and 2015. Instead, people are holding on to their funds to face life here rather than spend it on a journey abroad, though many acknowledged that this may change once again as spring approaches improving weather conditions for attempting such a crossing. While family success stories in Europe were shared, participants mainly recalled the hardships experienced by some of their peers in Europe and their decisions to return. The groups often expressed negative perceptions of people leaving for better opportunities abroad, indicating that those who left were not as strong and able to cope with difficulties as previous generations had done.

<sup>11</sup> Reform Institute for Development (2015). Assessment on youth migration in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

“One of my relatives went to Europe recently, saw the type of life he could expect there and decided to return.”

Adult woman, Serwaran, host community.

“Most of the people have this wish to go to Europe. But this becomes a kind of running away.”

Adult man, Serwaran, host community.

“We have a lot of misunderstandings and misconceptions about Europe.”

Female student, Serwaran, host community.

The profile of migrants, as described by host community members, was that of young, single men. This seems to hold true for Syrian refugees as well, as described in FGDs conducted by UNHCR in 2015 in Erbil district periphery with this population group. Furthermore, refugee population members listed poor living conditions, the high cost of living in urban areas, lack of opportunities for education, and the difficult financial situation as reasons driving them to risk their lives to reach Europe.

## 4. CAPACITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

### Education services in urban areas

Basic and high school education are provided mainly through public schools, which are free to the residents of the Kurdistan Region. Before the current crisis, the KRG made substantial efforts to address existing bottlenecks in education service provision. Although the percentage of the population enrolled in school has been stable over the last 7 years in Erbil’s urban areas<sup>12</sup>, the overall population, including young people, is growing and, with it, the demand for education services, particularly at the high school level<sup>13</sup>.

Beyond this, the education sector had undergone a rapid adaptation process with the influx of displaced populations entering urban areas particularly since a substantial proportion of these newly arrived displaced persons are school-aged. A further challenge is that most displaced families, especially IDPs, have settled in Erbil district periphery, which have fewer schools in general and some sub-districts including Baharka, Kasnazan and Rizagari have very few high schools. Survey data also corroborates this lower endowment of education resources in these

<sup>12</sup> Based on the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (World Bank, CSO & KRISO, 2007 and 2012) and the present assessment, between 28% and 33% of the total (host) population is currently attending school, without much variation between years. Specifically, between 5% to 7% of the population is attending high school.

<sup>13</sup> RAND (2014). Strategic priorities for improving access to quality education in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

areas: while the number of individuals working in the education sector in Erbil district centre and towns is about 50 people per 1,000 residents, the ratio for Erbil district periphery is just 15 people per 1,000 residents. Within specific location, Khabat and Rizgari especially show the lowest ratio for education employees (Figure 10 —note that the figure aggregates workers in education as well as health).

Other recent assessments on education provision reported that class sizes in the schools in Erbil's urban areas were between 28 and 35 students per class at one time, depending on the neighbourhood<sup>14</sup>. The most frequent coping strategy in schools for such overcrowding is to have multiple shifts, up to 3 per day, in order to accommodate all the students as well as the different Kurdish and Arabic curricula. These bottlenecks in education provision in urban areas coupled with the fact that public school teachers have not received regular salaries in 2 years has potential to impact quality of education received.

### Health services in urban areas

Health is defined as a basic human right in the Kurdistan Region and access to health services is free of charge for all population groups. Over the last decade, the KRG has effectively increased health expenditure, in real terms, over and above population growth to cover for an expanding demand. More recent data on service quality and capacity for public health are not available but, according to a recent assessment by the World Bank<sup>15</sup>, recurrent health expenditure per capita has decreased significantly due to a lower budget available related to the financial crisis —especially affecting the payment of regular salaries to health care personnel, the supply of enough medications, and the expansion of some health facilities. The World Bank expects that this has the potential to negatively impact on the overall performance of the public system.

Survey data collected for this report noted a relatively positive perception in experiences accessing public health services in all urban areas. Approximately 71% of the households in Erbil district centre, 58% in Erbil district periphery and 65% in towns rated access to public health as good or very good. Satisfactory access was the second most frequent answer, while insufficient or no access was very minor. Poor access ratings to public health services were reported primarily in Erbil district periphery with 23%

<sup>14</sup> REACH Initiative (2015a). Multi-sector needs assessment of host communities across Kurdistan Region of Iraq. March 2015.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank (2015). Kurdistan Region of Iraq: economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict and ISIS crisis. February 2015.

of households (concentrated in Baharka and Kasnazan) reporting limited access to services.

The two main reasons provided in these areas for limited access related to the lack of enough facilities nearby and that services the provided are not the ones needed. Households in towns reported the low quality of services in addition to lack of nearby facilities and relevant services as factors limiting their access. By contrast, low rating for health services in Erbil district centre focused on affordability and related to this, having to pay more for medicines due to limit capacity and supply in health facilities. This was a recurrent topic in FGDs with host community members.<sup>16</sup>

“There is discrimination in the hospitals, generally in terms of medication. If you go in the morning shift, you will be referred to the evening shift in order to get the medication and you have to pay.”

Female student, Sarbasti, host community.

“There is just a morning shift in the health facility in our neighbourhood. During the morning, you cannot get any medication or medical test at all. By the end of the day, we have to go to the private services.”

Adult woman, Hasarok, host community.

### Water and electricity provision in urban areas

While most of the public services in the Kurdistan Region are provided for free, residents must pay service fees for water and electricity. Electricity supply data for 2014 suggests that the amount billed is approximately 10% of the total operating cost incurred by the government (not including capital investment), while collection rates were around just 75%<sup>17</sup>. Survey data collected for this report indicates that 90% of households actually pay electricity fees, while only 30% do so with regards to water fees. Both water and electricity supply underwent shocks due to the sudden increase in demand on one side stemming from an influx of displaced populations, and lack of available budget to fund the operations on the other side due to financial crisis. The following data on supply reliability originate from secondary sources<sup>18</sup>.

In terms of electricity provision, there is virtually universal, though not 24 hours, connection to the national grid across all urban areas. Displaced families living in informal settlements (3% of the total households in urban areas), however, may not have access to this supply. In Erbil district centre, 46% of households reported having

<sup>16</sup> Disaggregated data on health access is available in Section E of the data annex.

<sup>17</sup> MERI (2016). In the best of times and the worst of times: addressing structural weaknesses of the Kurdistan Region's economy. January 2016.

<sup>18</sup> REACH Initiative (2015a).



IDP mother and child overlooking Erbil from a balcony at Amal Centre – an unfinished building in Erbil.  
Dec 2015. UNHCR C. Covés.

more than 10 hours of electricity (national grid), while the rest had less. In Erbil district periphery, this percentage goes up to 53% and in towns it is 55%. Data is not available regarding alternative sources of electricity, such as generators<sup>19</sup>.

Fewer challenges were reported regarding water supply, when compared to electricity provision. Around 90% of households rely on individual municipal supply as the main source of drinking water, while the rest use bottled water and only 5% of households reported having 1 or 2 days per week without water —this percentage being similar across all strata.

## 5. SOCIAL COHESION AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

### Host community perceptions of the displaced

Understanding social cohesion within this context involves looking at societal components, such as level of co-existence between communities, acceptance of social, cultural and ethnic differences, degree of equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and sense of safety and security. Perceptions on co-existence between the populations derive mainly from FGDs with host community members. Participants identified the arrival of IDPs as the main change in their neighbourhoods, associating this influx of families to a perceived increase in insecurity and tension. Less references were made to Syrian refugees, perhaps because of their smaller number and cultural proximity to the host community.

“There are not many IDPs in this neighbourhood because here the rents and houses are very expensive. But some of them are occupying the empty land and putting tents to live in it. We do not feel good about them.”

Male student, Sarbasti, host community.

“The Kurds are leaving, Arabs are occupying shops, malls... we are afraid of the Arabs. If you count twenty shops, half of them are controlled by Arabs.”

Adult woman, Serwaran, host community.

“This arrival of IDPs has affected our culture and manners because, at the end of the day, we are different people.”

Male student, Serweran, host community.

At the same time, such perceptions were not followed by

<sup>19</sup> The impact of unstable electricity supply on living conditions in periods such as winter is only relative, as virtually all households rely on kerosene as the source for heating.

an overt and outspoken opposition to the arrival of new people, including IDPs, and the host community seemed to accept the fact that they need to cope with this new reality due to the conflict in the rest of Iraq. A few focus group participants even mentioned some of the positive effects that IDPs have on the local community including the fact that their arrival has injected money into a very depressed local economy and keeps the income of local businesses at sufficient levels. Some went so far as to point out that the return of IDPs to their places of origin would have its downsides, as there would be fewer customers for local businesses. These opinions however were in the minority and usually countered by other participants who rejected such claims.

“The arrival of Arabs at least has a positive effect on the market activity, there are more customers. The return will be bad because it will have a bad effect, less customers will lead to more unemployment and other type of problems.”  
Shop owner, Serwaran, host community.

### Spaces for interaction between populations groups seem to be few and limited to the transactional and unavoidable, such as in the market, at school or at medical facilities.

Spaces for interaction between populations groups seem to be limited to the transactional and unavoidable, such as in the market, at school or at medical facilities. Many focus group participants pointed that the language barrier between locals and IDPs is a contributing factor to this lack of interaction, as a significant portion of the host community does not speak Arabic well. In schools, IDPs and locals do not share the same classes or curriculum. Interactions then are limited to the time between and outside of class, where tense situations were reported — mostly linked to cultural differences on appropriate social behaviour. In addition, data from the survey also indicate very few interactions between younger children of different groups. For example, just 13% of host community households in Erbil district periphery (where most IDPs live) report that their children regularly play with children from other population groups. For IDP households in the same area, the percentage raises to 43% but it is still relatively low, indicating some degree of isolation.

“One day I went with my father to a shop and had a question. But the man who owned the shop asked to speak in Arabic because he did not understand Kurdish. I really feel bad being a foreigner in my neighbourhood.”

Female student, Serwaran, host community.

“There are problems and quarrels between IDPs and local kids who are studying in the same school. Arab boys are concerned with local Kurdish boys; they do not allow them to look at or speak with the Arab girls at all. This is such a dangerous attitude. It creates constant quarrels and they hit each other most of the time.”

Female teacher, Hasarok, host community.

“In our neighbourhood, there are not many IDPs. They are not very social and they even do not come out, just if they need to buy something. Then, we see them, and our relationship is good and we respect them.”

Adult woman, Hasarok, host community.

### Divides between communities

There are a number of factors that contribute to this mistrust between communities. Some of these factors relate to deeper unresolved historical grievances between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq and concerns about a gradual demographic change that might become permanent and impact Kurdistan's identity. Other factors, linked to daily life, are more pliable and thus perhaps easier to resolve. Focus group participants describe IDPs, for example, as unwilling to adapt to their new context in terms of acceptable public behaviours and learning and/or speaking Kurdish. They also point to inequities in salaries and assistance as another source of tension. Displaced Iraqi public employees still receive salaries from the central government while the majority of host community households' salaries from the KRG have not been paid due to public budget restrictions and the cut-off of KRG's finances from the Iraqi government. This coupled with humanitarian assistance given primarily to the displaced, contributes to a lack of understanding for each other's needs and hardships.

“After all these years fighting for my country now I need to speak in Arabic when I go to a shop. They invaded the shops and do not respect us at least by learning Kurdish and understanding our culture.”

Peshmerga, Serwaran, host community.

“Why we should study Arabic language while the schools for Arabs are not studying Kurdish language?”

Female student, Serwaran, host community.

“There are some Syrian refugees in our neighbourhood. You see them, they are poor, they hardly find to eat, not like the Arabs getting their salary every month.”

Adult man, Hasarok, host community.

### Sense of safety in everyday life

Despite all these changes in the neighbourhoods, the sense of safety within communities, across population groups, remains very high. For instance, only 2% of households reported that their neighbourhood felt unsafe or very unsafe while 25% of households felt safe and 73% felt very safe. Similarly, virtually no households indicated that any of family members experienced physical violence<sup>20</sup>.

Despite of these high levels of reported safety, many host community focus group participants indicated that the increasing economic insecurity and vulnerability is “pushing some people to commit actions against others”. Distrust towards the displaced population also shaped focus group participants' perceptions regarding their own security and protection. In fact, many called for a stronger role for Asayish (internal security forces) in protecting the residents from external threats to their daily safety that participants saw on the rise.

“The neighbourhood is very safe, although we would like to see a higher presence of Asayish.”

Adult woman, Serwaran, host community.

“I feel safe and secure but, to be honest, I am more cautious than before and I take more measures for safety because of this economic situation that is affecting the people in this neighbourhood. I was parking my car in front of the house but now I think twice before doing that.”

Shop owner, Serwaran, host community.

“Well, look around us, all these Arabs. Last week Asayish arrested some Arabs here who came as migrants, but they were planning to commit terrorist actions. Sometimes other incidents happen, but thankfully Asayish and the police are taking care of it.”

Female student, Serwaran, host community.

### Perceptions from the displaced communities

The perceptions reported above of course bear implications for how displaced populations are treated, which also affects their daily lives. As such, displaced populations also raised concerns regarding social cohesion, cognisant as they are of the level of distrust with which they are seen in their new communities.

Non-camp Syrian refugees participating in UNHCR led focus groups in 2015 described how the current job competition in the region is creating a negative attitude towards them and that this has resulted in a worse

<sup>20</sup> Topics such as safety, violence, and co-existence between population groups are difficult to assess based solely on household survey findings due to the limitations of exploring such perceptions through a questionnaire. Respondents may not always be willing to share such feelings or experiences. Therefore, limitations to the representativeness of the response on these topics should be kept in mind.

treatment by their employers and lower payment in the labour market.

Non-camp IDPs also raised concerns over their situation in the region and their acceptance by the host community in UNHCR focus groups in 2015. In particular, they reported that they would like to see a greater involvement of authorities, local institutions and community leaders in facilitating a better co-existence between communities. Participants requested, for instance, sensitisation of the local population and particularly of the security forces on the issues faced by IDPs in general. They also pointed to the lack of forums for interaction between both groups as a cause of distrust. IDP focus group participants also noted that strained interaction between communities also puts constraints on their daily actions and ability to live more autonomous lives. IDP groups in Koya, for instance, highlighted problems when moving between checkpoints: they require travel documentation which local authorities are usually reticent to grant. This affects the whole community not only socially (no freedom of movement), but economically (more difficulties in terms of securing livelihoods) and physically (no access to medical treatments not available in their area) as well.

**More rights-based approaches must be considered as they are in the end key drivers of successful and sustainable urbanisation strategies, which should include peaceful co-existence.**

## **6. RIGHT TO THE CITY AND SOCIAL CONTRACT**

### **Alienation and competition**

The combination of the displacement crisis and the deep financial crisis in the Kurdistan Region has helped generate negative dynamics in the management of public space and the use of public resources. FGDs with host community members revealed a sense of alienation in their own city linked to experiences of competition between themselves and the newly arrived displaced populations over the urban space and services provided therein. Focus group participants described incidents where the arrival of IDP families limited the public resources that should have been available primarily to the host community. These discussions often characterised IDPs as being more privileged than locals, while not showing enough comprehension of and compassion toward the situation of the host community.

“There are special schools for Arabs, as they do not want to study in Kurdish. But we are obliged to share our school building, which is posing challenges.”

Teacher, Hasarok, host community.

“There is a well-known former Peshmerga commander, he is suffering from cancer. He is not able to get treatment because he was in a queue in the hospital. There were Arab IDPs, before him in the list, who got treatment. He did not.”

Shop owner, Serwaran, host community.

“Where do they get the money from? Even in the wealthiest areas, you will find IDPs. They are buying bottled water while we are drinking from the tap water.”

Adult woman, Serwaran, host community.

These concerns indicate deeper fissures in the social contract that has so far kept society together. The foundation of this social contract was that all residents in Kurdistan have a guaranteed access to services such

as health, education, protection and even livelihoods. This is an achievement that is now difficult to sustain given primarily the economic situation in the Kurdistan Region. Host community members perceive ‘outsiders’ as having more rights than they do, but what is actually happening is that there is much greater demand for services and provision capacity has become limited due to budget restrictions; restrictions that would have occurred regardless of the displacement crisis.

“They come here, they get their salaries and live their life. They do not fight ISIS while, on the other hand, our young people are going to Europe because they cannot find any opportunity to work.”

Adult man, Hasarok, host community.

“There should be a law to regulate their coming and their staying. Also, they should have responsibilities too, not only rights.”

Female student, Serwaran, host community.

“The issue should be raised with the population in general and ask their approval on whether they accept to have all this IDP population.”

Adult man, Serwaran, host community.

### Separating populations versus a rights-based approach

This perception of IDPs ‘taking over’ the city also influences the types of solutions that the host community envisages in order to ‘regain’ their right to the city. Host community members participating in FGDs were asked to think about what the best way would be to manage the displacement crisis within their neighbourhoods, if IDPs were to remain in the Kurdistan Region. Across all FGDs, the primary suggested solution involved different ways of separating IDPs from the host community. Proposals included placing IDPs in specific areas or camps away from the city, in order to “provide for them and protect them better”.

Other ideas included instituting quotas on the number of businesses IDPs can own and types of economic activities they can participate in. These suggestions were given with the conviction that they would free up services and jobs for the host community as well as contain the risks of a demographic and identity change in the region.

“If they are isolated from the host community and settled in a camp, this will help them to have job opportunities inside the camp. Then also service can be provided to them easily.”

Female student, Sarbasti, host community.

“It is better if they go outside of the cities, may be they can be gathered in a specific place. A separate neighbourhood for Arabs would be better.”

Adult woman, Serwaran, host community.

“Return is the best solution for everybody. But if there is no other option, they should have a specific place special to them, and there should be quota for businesses and other activities that the IDPs should not take beyond a specific percentage, so we provide opportunities to the unemployed Kurds.”

Adult man, Serwaran, host community.

These proposals, however, must be confronted with the practicality of separation. How feasible is it in the first place, considering that the majority of the IDP population resides and works within urban areas? Regaining the ‘right to the city’ implies guaranteeing that one group cannot and must not be prioritised over another. Reducing the rights of some while asking the whole population to assume the responsibility of such a decision is contrary to the very essence of the right to urban space. The current strained situation and the prevalent perceptions among the host community seem to gradually reduce the scope of approaches to be considered, however more rights-based approaches must be considered as they are in the end key drivers of successful and sustainable urbanisation strategies, which should include peaceful co-existence.

# EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

One of the most pressing concerns in such a crisis context is how the arrival of a very large number of people into the workforce affects the labour market. Understanding this is important because employment is key for an autonomous life in urban areas for all people, and is particularly critical for those groups who cannot access public safety nets. In Erbil Governorate, we find that employment opportunities have largely withstood the shock and the situation has not reached for the moment critical levels. The host community population has maintained similar employment rates to those prior to the crisis. Employment for the Syrian refugees is extraordinarily high, with rates for the adult male population at about 80%. IDP households have relatively lower employment rates in comparison and a higher number of people searching for jobs, but this situation is compensated in general by IDPs' access to public transfers by the Federal Government of Iraq for their previous employment in their place of origin.

These relatively positive findings however mask more troubling issues arising from the labour market with respect to potential vulnerability and inequality. The first issue has to do with the informality of the job market and concerns over labour conditions. With respect to informality of employment, some sectors are more prone to it than others. For example, in the construction and wholesale/retail sectors, only 30% of workers are employed under legal contracts and the vast majority are paid wages as opposed to salaries, indicating more informal and sporadic employment. Syrian refugees seem particularly susceptible to this arrangement and are employed in different sectors without contract and reliant on wages—in towns in particular, virtually all employment is informal, without a contract. Combined, these indicators—informality and reliance on wages—introduce a critical aspect to monitor for those areas in the private sector that are more able to absorb workers. We found no direct evidence of discrimination towards IDPs or refugees in terms of employment, but the situation in which they are frequently immersed given their status in accessing only certain types of employment implies that they are penalised in terms of income earned.

Unemployment is not evenly distributed across urban areas. Erbil district centre has been able to generate more employment opportunities in spite of receiving most of the Syrian refugee population and a significant number of IDPs. Excluding Erbil district centre, the areas that have received a huge influx of new arrivals are also those with a higher proportion of people that were unable to find a job in the month preceding the survey. These areas, such as Shaqlawa, Baharka, Daratu and Khabat, have construction and small direct services as the main employment sectors however both are linked to informal conditions in terms of contractual status. These sectors are also highly depressed, although recovery potential is possible if the housing crisis mentioned above is translated into higher investment and a reactivation of economic opportunities.

As regards employment of women, the proportion of women working is extremely low and few opportunities exist outside of public sectors jobs. This comes in large part from traditional cultural norms and beliefs across communities regarding the role of women. Most women currently at working age, displaced or not, are illiterate, which virtually excludes them from the labour market. Young women are gradually accessing higher education levels and will be seeking to enter the labour market. Their entrance will be critical to growing the economy of the area, but will pose a challenge for the labour market if it does not modernise and allow them access by diversifying jobs.

Finally, labour market conditions may negatively evolve in the near-term if the host community employed in the public sector starts looking for livelihoods in the private sector—this is a possibility if the payment of government salaries continues in its current, sporadic and reduced state. We may then see an increase in the number of people unsuccessfully searching for jobs, a further decrease in wage amounts, and a movement of households into vulnerability, if the private sector is not strengthened and more employment opportunities in some key sectors are not generated.




## 1. WORK STATUS OF THE POPULATION

### Explanation of concepts

The work status of the population is analysed through three different indicators. First, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have been employed at some point during the month preceding the survey, either as a self-employed or paid employee, full-time or sporadically. Second, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have not been working but have been actively searching for a job, either for the first time or after losing their previous job. Third, through the remainder percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who are out of the labour force, which means that they are full-time students, disabled persons unable to work, home-makers, early retired persons, or simply persons unwilling to work. These individuals are 'economically inactive' and do not count as part of the unemployed population. All three categories sum up to 100%.

The traditional concepts of employment and unemployment rate do not fully apply to the context of the Kurdistan Region and to a complex displacement setting as the present one. The definition of employment is an example of this: informal employment or underemployment is common within this context, which means that individuals may not have worked the full month, but rather sporadically in different places, for some days. In the survey approach for this report, such an individual is counted as employed, even if s/he has only worked one week during the month and spent the remainder of the time searching for a job. Underemployment is thus not available in the data. In addition, self-employment is also a fluid category that in many cases hide precarious employment situations. This makes it complex to define the boundaries of unemployment, especially because there are no safety nets for someone officially declared unemployed or jobless, as is seen in other countries. Finally, some additional limitations apply for the data on work status of the IDP

Figure 11. Work status of the individuals between the age of 15 and 64 by gender, population group, strata and age groups



Note: employed population include both full-time employed and underemployed individuals.

population related to the lack of clarity regarding current employment in Erbil Governorate, as many IDPs have retained their job positions and payment in their places of origin<sup>21</sup>.

## The main finding on work status is the significantly high percentage of employment among the male Syrian refugees, with only a very small number of them out of the labour force.

For all of the above reasons, the analysis of the population's work status is divided in the following three indicators: 'employed', 'searching for a job' and 'out of the labour force' (Figure 11). Gender plays an important role in this analysis, as the percentage of women out of the labour force is extremely high as compared to men. Therefore, work status is here always disaggregated by gender.

### Data on work status

The average employment rate for the areas covered in the assessment for Erbil Governorate, taking together both men and women, is at 41%. This is disaggregated into 67% for men and 15% for women.

The main finding by population group is the significantly high percentage of employment among the male Syrian refugees, with only a very small number of them out of the labour force. Such a low percentage of people out of the labour force is indicative of a very small number of individuals attending full-time education. Host

<sup>21</sup> An IDP survey respondent, asked about his/her employment situation, might have answered that he/she is employed, but at their place of origin, not in Erbil Governorate. His/her employment status is maintained, especially if a public employee. For instance, a teacher from Anbar would declare he/she is employed and still receiving salary, although not actually working anymore due to displacement. Technically, this person does not work in Erbil Governorate. However, other IDPs may be working in fact as employees within Erbil Governorate. This distinction cannot be made with the survey data available.

community and IDPs, on the other hand, have similar labour force participation rates but, from these, the IDP group has a higher number of individuals searching for a job. Regarding women's employment, the relatively higher number of host community women in the workforce is linked to employment posts within the public sector, to which the other population groups have no access. Grouping together men and women, the employment rate for refugees remains the highest (46%), followed by host community members (43%) and IDPs (33%).<sup>22</sup>

In analysing work status by geographical distribution, the only significant difference refers to the percentage of persons searching for a job, which tend to be significantly higher in Erbil district periphery and towns. Female employment tends to be concentrated in Erbil district centre and the towns, again due to the higher prevalence of governmental positions available there as opposed to the periphery areas.

Analysing work status by age groups, the lowest employment levels are found among youth (32% on average), mainly because most of them are still full-time students. The only exception in this group would be Syrian refugees, as up to 77% of those between the ages of 15 and 24 are actually employed. Interestingly, there are no large differences when looking at individuals searching for a job by age group. This may indicate that youth unemployment is not a particularly pressing concern. However, youth unemployment differs by population group, as the percentage for young male IDPs and refugees is significantly lower than that for the host community (15.2% and 14.5% compared to 4.7%, respectively).

Finally, the survey data provides a disaggregation regarding the type of employment for those individuals employed. 73% are paid employees, with very few differences between population groups. The rest are mainly self-employed. Only a small minority are employers and business owners (observed only within the host population). Refugees, in particular, are more likely to be self-employed as compared to other groups.

<sup>22</sup> Detailed data on work status is available in Section C of the data annex.

Table 4. Ratio of workers in selected activities in the private sector per 1,000 inhabitants

	Construction	Wholesale & Retailing	Accommodation	Home / Electronic Repair	Transportation	Manufacturing
Erbil district centre	18.6	24.9	8.9	28.9	17.0	8.9
Erbil district periphery	33.0	14.1	5.0	23.0	23.6	6.7
Towns	9.8	14.4	4.4	14.3	7.6	10.0

## 2. GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT


Employment and livelihood opportunities are not distributed evenly across Erbil Governorate, with some of the areas being more attractive for some jobs than others. Erbil district centre absorbs about half of the employed population, with the majority in the public sector. The Erbil district periphery has less governmental employment and people rely more on private sector jobs in a diversity of sectors —although mostly concentrated in the construction and small services sector. For instance, the periphery areas have a higher ratio of workers in construction than the average (Table 4) although, in absolute numbers, the centre still concentrates half of the jobs in this sector. Other activities in the service sector, such as wholesale, retailing and accommodation are more developed in Erbil district centre compared to other areas. Data also suggests that manufacturing is not a sector developed anywhere in the region.

When looking at types of occupation, the Erbil district periphery has a higher ratio of semi-skilled jobs compared to other areas (73 workers in semi-skilled occupations per 1,000 inhabitants, slightly half of them being host community members). Erbil district centre, conversely, has the highest ratio of high-skilled positions, most of them within the public sector (160 workers per 1,000 inhabitants, with 135 of them being host community members).

**Erbil district centre absorbs about half of the employed population. The district periphery has less governmental employment and people rely more on private sector jobs, although mostly concentrated in the construction and small services sector.**

Lastly, looking in more detail at the distribution by geographic strata of individuals currently searching for job provides information on where the labour market is more stressed (Figure 12). As expected, Erbil district centre is still the place that is able to generate more employment opportunities as suggested by the relatively low ratio of individuals searching for jobs among the population. With the city centre receiving most of the Syrians and a significant portion of IDPs, the local economy has been able to absorb most of the new arrivals. Other urban areas, such as Shaqlawa, Baharka, Daratu and Khabat, face the complete opposite situation, with much higher unemployment. These are the districts where the population has nearly doubled, because of the arrival of displaced population. This shows a serious struggle to cope with the situation and generate employment, especially in towns, where the private sector is least developed.

Figure 12. Ratio of individuals searching for job per 1,000 inhabitants, by subdistrict and strata



### 3. LABOUR CONDITIONS AND INFORMALITY

There are two elements that provide insights on the labour conditions and informality of employment of the urban population: the possession of a written employment contract and the reliance on wages, which are typically linked to sporadic jobs rather than full-time or permanent employment.

Regarding the legal conditions of employment, survey findings show that 78% of the employed population, predominately in the public sector, has a written employment contract. Written contracts are primarily held by IDPs and host community members (71% and 83%, respectively). Only 36% of the employed refugees hold a contract and, specifically for the refugees in towns, virtually all employment is informal, without contracts. These differences between groups are linked to the types of job they have access to. Public employment provides the security of a contract, and is where the majority of host community are employed as well as a significant portion of IDPs (via federal public employment). Other activity sectors with high employment within the displaced communities and where they have more access to jobs, such as construction and wholesale / retail, are rife with


informality. In these sectors, only 30% of workers have a legal contract, while the rest of the private sector shows somewhat more appropriate levels of formality (a percentage slightly above 50%).

**A substantial proportion of the individuals searching for jobs are highly educated, with university or technical degrees.**

The reliance on wages, on the other hand, is widespread among Syrian refugees, with 70% receiving wages as opposed to salaries. The situation is relatively better for IDPs and the host community, as only one-third of these employed individuals rely on wages. As expected, the sectors that offer wages are mainly construction and, to a lesser extent, wholesale / retail —note that the hospitality sector pays predominantly through salaries.

Combined, these indicators —informal labour conditions and reliance on wages— introduce a worrying aspect for those areas in the private sector that are more able to absorb workers. For instance, salaries in these sectors

Figure 13. Categorisation of individuals currently searching for a job in Erbil governorate



have been widely impacted since 2013, with up to 30% decreases in the average wage prior the crisis due to job competition<sup>23</sup>. Our data also suggests that not having a written contract is a strong penalising factor in terms of income earned. In addition, the testimony of some workers in the construction sector gathered in other assessments<sup>24</sup> indicates that it is becoming more frequent to find workers not being paid their corresponding wages by contractors at the end of their assignments, and hence being forced to keep working while waiting for their payments to be cleared.

#### 4. SOCIAL CAPITAL, HUMAN CAPITAL AND OTHER FACTORS FOR EMPLOYABILITY

##### Who are the unemployed?

Disaggregating the unemployed population by demographic factors, such as age and gender, as well as structural factors, such as education and experience, is helpful in identifying some of the key gaps that need to be addressed to increase the employability of the adult population in Erbil Governorate (Figure 13).

First, the data indicate that more than half of the unemployed population consists of IDPs both in Erbil district centre and periphery, while in towns most of the unemployed come from the host community. The predominance of IDPs among the total unemployed population may be linked to their more recent arrival to Erbil Governorate and transaction costs when entering

<sup>23</sup> UNDP & DRC (2014). Emergency market mapping and analysis of the construction and service-sector labour market system: a study of the opportunities in employment for Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees, Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

<sup>24</sup> MERI (2015). Pathways to resilience: transforming Syrian refugee camps into self-sustaining settlements. June 2015.

and moving within the labour market. A second factor, age distribution, indicates that the main age group of the unemployed population is formed by individuals aged 15 to 25 years, which represents between 40% to 45% of all unemployed individuals. An important element in this is level of previous experience, which can be a determining factor in situations of high competition for jobs. Most of the young population searching for jobs has no prior experience and options such as vocational training or apprenticeships are still scarce in Erbil Governorate. Data suggests that vocational training, in particular, improves the chances of an individual of becoming employed.

Finally, it is important to note that a substantial proportion of the individuals searching for jobs are highly educated, with university or technical degrees. The fact that there are so many graduates unemployed points to structural deficiencies in the job posts that the economy is able to offer. Those individuals with low education levels, on the other hand, tend to find jobs more often as self-employed workers, mastering certain types of skills. Options for the self-employed are highly competitive in this context, as most of the displaced population, especially refugees, have had to find their way as self-employed workers due to barriers to accessing other types of job.

##### Human capital

Focusing on the employed population, there are some differences between the types of occupation that individuals can access (low-, semi- or high-skilled positions). It is expected that employability for each of these occupations is dependent on the education and knowledge levels of the individual (the human capital).<sup>25</sup> This is analysed per population group in order to identify obstacles to accessing certain types of skilled positions (Table 5).

<sup>25</sup> Disaggregated data on education levels of the population and the occupation type is available in Section B and C respectively of the annex.

Table 5. Type of occupation held by the employed male population by population groups and education level

Population group	Education level	Low skilled	Semi skilled	High skilled	Total
Host community	None or below grade 9	39%	27%	34%	100%
	Grade 9 (basic education)	18%	31%	51%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	2%	23%	75%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	1%	23%	76%	100%
IDPs	None or below grade 9	28%	46%	26%	100%
	Grade 9 (basic education)	34%	22%	44%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	30%	28%	42%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	1%	28%	71%	100%
Refugees	None or below grade 9	29%	46%	25%	100%
	Grade 9 (basic education)	27%	36%	38%	100%
	Grade 12 (high school)	23%	30%	47%	100%
	University, technical studies or beyond	9%	32%	59%	100%

## **A significant portion IDPs and refugees with high school education levels work in low-skilled positions, pointing to signs of barriers in accessing semi- and high-skilled positions for these groups.**

The data suggest a certain correlation in this regard, showing that individuals with lower education levels are frequently more likely to work in low skilled-positions (operators and elementary occupations) or semi-skilled positions (administrative, service or craft workers). Higher education levels facilitate access to high-skilled and better quality jobs (managers, professionals and technicians). However, while this pattern is perfectly matched in the case of the host community, data for the other population groups show signs of barriers in accessing semi- and, especially, high-skilled positions. A significant portion of employed IDPs and refugees with high school education levels still work in low-skilled positions (30% and 23%, respectively), while this is the case only for 2% of the host community. In addition, employment levels in high-skilled positions for refugees with university degrees (59%) also seem to be lagging behind other groups.

### **Social capital and networks**

The two main methods used to obtain employment, according to the responses obtained from the survey, were either 'through an employment agency' or 'through friends and relatives'. Refugees, in particular, tend to rely more on personal contacts (62% highlighted this as their main method for job seeking), whereas contacting employment agencies is a seldom method for finding a job (9% reported this approach). This indicates relatively strong bonds within their community. The young population overall is also more likely to ask relatives or friends for work instead of searching through unemployment offices. This mismatch is important to note in that it indicates that job placement schemes and similar platforms do not adequately target the needs of youth.

### **Women's participation in the labour force**

As earlier noted, women's employment is very low: 15% of women on average across all groups are employed, 1% searching for jobs and 84% are inactive. Half of all

employed women surveyed work in the education sector, with the majority of the remainder working in general administration in the public sector. Employment in private companies is rare.

With the aim of understanding the reasons for such low labour force participation by women, the preliminary findings from the survey on this topic were presented in FGDs with the host community. Male and female host community participants indicated the high illiteracy rates among adult women as the principal factor preventing them from accessing job opportunities. Female focus group participants also pointed to the traditionally strong opposition of male family members to women attending school and working. It was mentioned that women aiming to work might experience criticism in some socio-economic groups.

*"In the past, families were not sending women to school and then they grew illiterate. How can they work now!"*

Male adult, Serwaran, host community.

*"Our fathers and brothers do not want women to work, we are usually criticised."*

Female adult, Serwaran, host community.

*"Although the women in my community has the ability to work, it is not that frequent because years ago women were not given the chance to complete their studies. It culturally became more common for the men to work and be the source of income."*

Female teenager, Serwaran, host community.

The survey findings support the explanation above based on illiteracy rates: 50% of host community women older than 35 years cannot read or write, 65% of refugee women in that age group cannot read or write and 34% of IDP women cannot. The women that are employed tend to be relatively well-educated, with about two-thirds of them having completed university or technical school.

This situation and the norms surrounding it seem to be gradually changing, as enrolment rates of young women in school are high. This would enable future generations to participate more in the workforce. However, for these changes to take full root, acceptance must come from all parts of society. While most men in the FGDs viewed women's employment as desirable, many still do not (including those in leadership roles in society) and did not receive this discussion topic easily.

*"We have strong tribal bonds and we have a culture and tradition where our women work in the house and we work outside. Women do the thing they are happy with, which is taking care of the house and the kids."*

Tribal leader, Hasarok, host community.



Young IDP girl in Erbil. UNHCR. M. Prendergast.


# 7 FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HOUSEHOLDS

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The weakening of the financial positions of households in Erbil Governorate primarily comes from the financial crisis in the Kurdistan Region and the general deterioration of the economic outlook of the country as a whole, more than it does from the displacement crisis. Salaries in the public sector (both for the host community working for the KRG and IDPs still receiving payment from the Federal Government) were not fully paid in the preceding year due to budget restrictions and other irregularities and delays, and wage earners are in a delicate situation due to employment insecurity and high competition. We see this by comparing the household expense levels pre-crisis and at present, where monthly expenses for host community households now is less than half the levels reached in 2012, at the height of the region's economic boom. The situation is not comparatively better for IDP and refugee households, who have similar expense levels plus the added financial burden of rent to which they generally have to allocate 30%-40% of their total domestic budget.

Employment insecurity and low expenditure levels, coupled with the families' dependency ratio, are good indicators of households' financial vulnerability. Mapping these indicators points to pockets of vulnerability in some urban areas, with the Erbil district periphery scoring relatively higher than Erbil district centre or other towns. The sub-districts of Khabat and Rizgari, on the western edge of the governorate and usually the first point of arrival for IDPs, are especially vulnerable.

Extended indebtedness also weakens the financial position of households. The host community overall currently carries a large debt burden acquired during pre-crisis periods, at the height of urban development in the area and linked to the purchase of long-term assets (land or housing). More than 50% of the families in Erbil district periphery and in towns are indebted, whereas only 35% are indebted in Erbil district centre. While borrowing for large investments are expected to have stopped —rates now are very similar to those in 2012— these debts still need to be paid back, either to relatives or to the government through its housing support fund. What does seem to be on the rise however is emergency borrowing to sustain regular domestic expenditures. The survey tool used here may not have been nuanced enough to appropriately capture this type of borrowing for the host community (see notes below), but data indicated that about 40% of the IDP and refugee populations acquire debts primarily for daily needs. In total, 1 out of 10 families in urban areas have entered into debt to support their rent payments, while 2 out of 10 families have done so to support direct domestic consumption.





## 1. HOUSEHOLD BUDGET

The total monthly expenditures incurred by households from this survey is an indicator of both relative well-being and vulnerability. These figures are also comparable with expenditure levels available from previous assessments, and thereby determine whether the situation is improving or deteriorating (Figure 14). The expenditure data used from previous assessments must be read with an understanding of the particular limitations of the methodology and the contextual situation<sup>26</sup>.


The most significant finding from the time series is the large drop in average household expenses, when comparing 2014 levels to 2012 levels, the year before the beginning of Kurdistan's economic downturn and the influx of Iraqi displaced population. This approximately 40% decrease in expenses in about 3 years is consequence of the changes seen in the region and, specifically, the burst of the economic boom between 2007 and 2013. The shock is especially noticeable if comparing 2012 to the latest data from 2015, when household expenses are reduced by more than half during the height of the displacement crisis and the worsening of budget restrictions in the public sector.

<sup>26</sup> Limitations refer to the economic situation of Kurdistan Region, where a very large part of the host community has not received public salaries or pensions regularly since early 2014, affecting the expenditure. Other type of limitations refers to the month of the data collection with different seasonal expenditures (e.g. winter vs summer). In addition, it has not been possible to obtain the same type of data from the multi-sector needs assessments for refugees conducted in 2014 and 2015.

**The 40% decrease in average household expenses in about 3 years is consequence of the conflict seen in the region and the burst of the economic boom between 2007 and 2013.**

Data also show that IDP households have similar total expenditure levels as the host community. However, this similarity is due to the fact that IDPs are more likely to be paying monthly rent for housing, which absorbs 30% to 40% of households' budgets. In addition, IDP households tend to be larger than those of the host community and, as some expense items such as food are proportional to the size of the families, the data suggests that average expenditure per capita for IDPs is lower than for host community households.

Figure 14. Evolution of the average household expenditure in the urban areas of Erbil Governorate



Source: World Bank, CSO & KRSO (2012), REACH (2015a) and REACH & WFP (2015). Figures from 2012 and 2014 adjusted to prices of 2015 using inflation rates for Iraq (obtained from Iraq Central Statistics Office). For all datasets, only the urban population in Erbil has been taken in order to ensure comparability.

## 2. ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY ACROSS THE URBAN AREAS

The subdistricts with a higher number of vulnerable households have been identified based on the following set of indicative vulnerability criteria: an indicator for employment security (Figure 15), for household dependency (Figure 16), and for expenditure levels (Figure 18). All population groups are aggregated together by sub-district.


A correlation can be drawn between the presence of displaced households and higher values of vulnerability at the district level. The areas that tend to show high values in all three indicators are Khabat and Rizgari and, to a lesser extent, the neighbourhoods immediately east

of Erbil district centre (Kasnazan, Daratu and Bnslawa). Most of the towns tend to show a lower vulnerability, while Erbil district centre has relatively high values only for employment insecurity, which is explained by the higher number of households with just one income earner dependent on wages.

## 3. INDEBTEDNESS

During the height of the economic boom in the Kurdistan Region in around 2012, many host community households procured large loans, from either relatives or the government. In that year, the average number of households with outstanding debts across the urban areas of Erbil Governorate stood at 44%. Only a minority

Figure 15. Percentage of households with either no income earner, or one income earner whose main income source is not salary



borrowed money to sustain domestic consumption, while the most common purpose was the purchase of assets such as land or vehicles, or the construction of houses<sup>27</sup>. The current situation has not changed excessively from then; the current percentage of households in the host community with outstanding debt is 41%. Under the current financial crisis, indebtedness for big investments are expected to decrease rather than increase<sup>28</sup>. The ratio of host community members holding debts is higher in areas with new urban developments, such as Erbil district

27 World Bank, CSO & KRSO (2012). Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey 2012.

28 This survey tool may not have been nuanced enough to appropriately capture an increase of borrowing used to sustain domestic consumption for the host community. As a single choice question, respondents may have only selected the most relevant indebtedness purpose in the event of potentially a loan for the house plus, in addition, borrowing money for direct consumption.


periphery (Baharka, Bnaslawa, Khabat). Indeed, most of the reported purposes for loans point to long-term asset purchases (Figure 17). Information on the amount of debt<sup>29</sup> indicates that the average debt is up to 4 million IQD per household.

Indebtedness levels for IDPs and refugees are similar to host community, at 41% and 36% of households holding debt, respectively. However, unlike the host community, the majority of loans acquired by displaced households are used to support domestic consumption and, importantly, for covering rent costs. In general, 1 out of 10 households across the total number of IDP and refugee households have acquired a debt to support rent payment.<sup>30</sup> A previous

29 REACH Initiative (2015a).

30 Disaggregated data on indebtedness and purposes for debts is available in Section F of the data annex.

Figure 16. Percentage of households with 2 dependent members or more for each non-dependent member



assessment<sup>31</sup> found that the levels of debt were steeply increased in 2015, suggesting that some households were critically over-relying on debt. The average debt load for refugee families in particular was found to be around 1 million IQD.

Paying back loans may become an issue in a context of economic recession. In this sense, those households engaged in debt for long-term asset purchases are more likely to be reliant on salaries, while those household with emergency borrowing are more likely to rely on wages or other non-secure sources of income. For instance, 60% of the households that took a loan to support the payment of rent rely exclusively on wages to cover expenses. This is a more irregular and insecure form of payment, consequently indicating that reimbursing these debts will be much more challenging.

**Those households engaged in debt for long-term asset purchases are more likely to be reliant on salaries, while those household with emergency borrowing are more likely to rely on wages or other non-secure sources of income.**

<sup>31</sup> REACH Initiative (2015b). Multi-sector needs assessment of Syrian refugees residing in host communities. April 2015.

Figure 17. Main reported purpose for acquiring a loan per population group





Figure 18. Percentage of households within the 4th and 5th (poorest) expenditure quintiles



# V THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Education data in this context must be analysed through gross enrolment rates, which shows the percentage of students enrolled in each grade regardless of whether they are in the official age group corresponding to their respective level of education. This is done because students in the areas analysed for this report do not follow a direct path from basic education to high school to university, but rather intersperse their schooling with periods of non-attendance. Dropout rates between basic education and high school are high, but most students do re-enter higher education in later stages of life. For instance, two-thirds of students in grades 10 to 12 are actually 3 to 5 years older than the official age group to which these levels correspond (15 to 17 years old).

Enrolment rates for the overall population are relatively high for basic education, but significantly lower for high school. The data available suggests that enrolment rates in high school would be higher were it not for a series of limiting factors. In a previous chapter we noted that the number and capacity of high schools had increased in recent years, but this is still not enough to fully cope with the current demand. The Erbil district periphery show a lower enrolment rate than the other geographic strata, with most of households citing lack of school capacity for why children / youth are not enrolled. IDPs in particular highlighted experiencing bottlenecks in terms of service provision, so their children could not attend basic education or high school. Many of them also pointed the high cost of education-related expenses —not in the form of school fees, but for transport and materials.

The refugee population here poses the biggest challenge for institutional and humanitarian partners in the field of education. Enrolment rates for both basic education and high school for this population in their districts of origin in Syria appear to be quite close to that of the host community in Erbil governorate; but, in displacement, Syrian households seem not to be sending children and young people to school, with enrolment rates at 63% and 0% for basic education and high school for the male population, and 64% and 22% for basic education and high school for the female population. Irrespective of gender, these enrolment rates are 2 times lower for basic education and 4 times lower for high school than that of host community households. A large proportion of male Syrian teenagers between the ages of 15 and 17 are employed or searching for jobs, while female teenagers remain at home. For those aged 12 to 14, only half attend school. No information is available on what they are doing instead, but presumably most of the males not attending school are part of the workforce. This points to a very important potential trade-off between education and livelihoods that needs to be addressed. The main questions that remain are why this group is not attending school as opposed their similar cohorts within the host and IDP communities and how to bring these students back to school.

## 1. ENROLMENT RATES AND IMPLICATIONS

### Enrolment rates by strata

School attendance can be analysed through either gross enrolment rates or net enrolment rates<sup>32</sup>. In this context, it is preferable to rely on gross rates given the fact that the students in a given grade are frequently older than the age cohort that technically corresponds to that grade. Therefore, examining only net rates would largely underestimate school attendance (Figure 19).

While enrolment in basic education (grades 1-9) seems to stand at relatively appropriate levels, data show a sharp decline in terms of enrolment in high school (grades 10-12). The drop-out rate between basic education and high school is high, as less than half of the students continue directly into high school. However, many individuals do re-enter high school in later stages of their lives, indicating that there is a back and forth shift between entering the labour force and continuing studies. The fact that gross enrolment in high school grades for the male population is 82% and the net enrolment is 38%, for instance, implies


<sup>32</sup> Gross enrolment is obtained by dividing the number of students, independently of their age, in each grade (basic or high school) by the total number of children of the age group that corresponds to each grade. Net enrolment divides the total number of students only of the age that corresponds to the grade they should be attending, by the total number of children of that age group. Gross enrolment, in practice, includes kids that are attending a specific grade 'out of their corresponding cohort'. For instance, a 19-year-old kid attending high school would be included in gross enrolment but not in net enrolment rates.

that almost two-thirds of the students in high school are older than the standard corresponding age cohort. Most of the students in high school are actually between 18 and 22 years old, older than the standard age cohort of 15 to 17 years.

**The drop-out rate between basic education and high school is high, as less than half of the students continue directly into high school. However, many individuals do re-enter high school in later stages of their lives.**

Enrolment rates between strata tend to be similar in basic education, with no significant differences. However, for high school rates, there is a substantial difference between Erbil district periphery and the rest of urban areas. As indicated in the sections above on public service provision, these sub-districts are less well provided for in terms of education coverage and the service experiences bottlenecks. This could explain in part the lower high school attendance rate in these areas, which is just around 60%, while it stands at around 80% on average for the other strata.

Figure 19. Net and gross enrolment rate in basic education and high school per strata and gender





Mid-year exam at Awat school in Erbil. About 400 girls grades seven to twelve are enrolled at the school this year, with an additional 100 students from the host community. UNHCR C. Covas.



### Enrolment rates by population group

An analysis by population group reflects a clear division between the Syrian refugee population and the remaining groups (Figure 20). Enrolment rates for refugee children, either net or gross rates, are substantially below standard. More than 30% of children between 6 and 14 years of age do not attend any kind of formal school. The situation is even more critical at the high school levels, where none of the families in our sample enrolled any of their boys, while only a very low number of girls were enrolled.

Regarding the other population groups, enrolment rates in basic education are relatively similar for host community and IDP children. Rates for high school show some differences, with less IDPs attending high school, presumably linked to the fact that a significant portion live in Erbil district periphery which has lower education coverage than other areas.

### Reasons for not attending school


The survey explored the reasons behind school non-attendance for children / youth aged 6 to 18 (Table 6). For the host community, although the percentage children / youth of out of the education system was very low, most of the answers related to culture as the heads of household disapproved of the idea that young people needed to study. This was substantially more frequently in the case of girls not attending school.

**Enrolment rates in basic education are relatively similar for host community and IDP children. However, more than 30% of the refugee children between 6 and 14 years of age do not attend any kind of formal school.**

For IDPs, the most frequent reason, by a significant margin, pertained to bottlenecks in education provision. This points to a lack of sufficient spots in those schools specifically adapted to offer curriculum used in the rest of Iraq and taught in the Arabic language. The second most cited reason refers to the cost of education —presumably referring to the cost of transportation and school supplies.

The reasons for Syrian children / youth not attending school are more complex. Their non-attendance may be linked to a number of factors including unaffordability, difficulties in accessing education, need to generate income, and issues with language curriculum taught in. These are the similar reasons provided by IDP households and yet, they have completely different outcomes in terms of school attendance. Hence this issue is explored in more detail below.

Figure 20. Net and gross enrolment rate in basic education\* and high school per population group and gender



\*Basic education for the case of IDPs integrate primary education (grades 1-6) and intermediate education (grade 7-9).

## 2. THE EDUCATION CHALLENGE FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES

The low level of school attendance among Syrian refugee children / youth is particularly concerning. The school enrolment rate for children aged 6 to 11 is 63% (considering boys and girls together), while for the 12 to 14 age group it is 54%. Above the age of 15, enrolment drops substantially, especially for boys. Such low rates could be linked to the fact that Syrian families and children / youth, especially the boys, face a trade-off between employment and education. Some data contributes to this narrative:

- Looking at the work status of boys between the ages of 15 to 17, 38% are paid employees, 17% are self-employed, 4% are unpaid family workers, and up to 21% are actively searching for jobs instead of studying. Half of the children / youth employed are in the construction sector. Only 4% are reported as full-time students. For girls in the same age group, 28% are students and 59% are participating in the domestic activities at home. No information is available regarding boys and girls below the age of 15 who are not attending school.
- Low enrolment rates cannot be attributed to poor education standards in their areas of origin in Syria (mainly, in Hassake Governorate), as school attendance

levels before the conflict started were substantially higher than the levels now in displacement and were comparable to the ones for the host community in the Kurdistan Region. Data from 2006<sup>33</sup> indicates that gross enrolment rate in basic education in Hassake Governorate was 94%. For high school levels, the rate was 46%.

- Finally, there is no visible correlation between the education of the head of household and school attendance levels. This correlation exists for IDPs and host community, where households in which the head has a higher education level have higher school attendance. For Syrian refugees, 27% of children / youth in households where the head of the household has a university degree are not attending school; this figure is sizable if compared to the 8% and 1% seen for the other groups respectively (Figure 21).

The information available, however, still does not provide a full picture of the situation faced by young refugees not attending school, as gaps in information remain. The main challenge is how to bring these children / youth back into the education system. Gaining better understanding of why they are not in it is a critical first step in this endeavour.


<sup>33</sup> UNICEF (2006). Multiple Indicator Clusters Survey.

Table 6. Reported reasons for children not attending school

	Host community	IDPs	Refugees
Erbil district centre	N/A	Schools were full (67%) Costs too much (14%)	Costs too much (27%) No easy access to school (17%)
Erbil district periphery	Family disapproves (22%) Disability (14%)	Schools were full (39%) Costs too much (9%)	Costs too much (20%) Schools not accepting kid (19%)
Towns	N/A	Schools were full (25%) No easy access to school (10%)	Missing documentation (23%) Costs too much (15%)

Note: N/A indicates that there are not enough observations available to provide a reliable picture.

Figure 21. Proportion of children between the ages of 6 to 14 not attending school per education level of head of household\*



\*For high school education levels, data for the host community is not displayed due to a low number of observations available.



# FEASIBLE RETURNS FOR DISPLACED COMMUNITIES

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Many of the Syrian families hosted in the Kurdistan Region are facing their fifth year of displacement, while most IDP families are entering into their third year. Despite this, our focus group data found that there was a strong perception amongst host community members in Erbil Governorate that the displaced communities would be able to return to their areas of origin as soon as hostilities cease. The process of return however is not straightforward. Data described below combined with experiences from comparative contexts illustrates the difficulties and challenges for return to even be a possibility let alone actually occur.

First, while the large majority of refugee and IDP households are still holding out hope to return to their places of origin, there is a significant number of families (25% of Syrians and 11% of IDPs or about 11,000 families in total) that increasingly see themselves as either remaining in Erbil Governorate or moving somewhere else, but not returning to Syria or the rest of Iraq. What compels them to flee indefinitely from their place of origin is frequently linked to other social cohesion issues in these areas of origin as well as their level of integration and livelihoods prospects in Erbil Governorate. Those in better financial positions here are more likely to delay any prospect of return.

Second, even families with strong desire to return must face a series of challenges that in some cases may be insurmountable for them alone in the medium-term.

With respect to refugees, the conflict in Syria is far from resolved, making voluntary repatriation unlikely at the moment. Challenges exist for IDPs as well. For example, if a family happens to be from Anbar or Nineveh, it is very likely that their village is within the large swathes of territory in these governorates still not cleared of insurgency or still at risk for violence. Stabilisation processes have only just started and will require time to reconstruct damaged infrastructure. Furthermore, return is also a costly process. Families need to be able to fund transport back to their places of origin and cover costs for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of their properties there. Many households are in fact requesting financial assistance for this purpose. Finally, and perhaps most critically, families need to have access not only to return to but reclaim their property as well. Due to the widespread destruction of built structures and the fact that some areas are disputed between different ethnic-religious groups or tribes, families may face issues in reclaiming and proving the legal ownership of their assets back home.

The whole process of return may take many years for most families. Categorising these challenges and identifying the households that cannot return because of them will allow institutional and humanitarian stakeholders to design interventions that can ease these burdens.

## 1. WILLINGNESS TO RETURN

### Many households returning, some staying

The potential return of displaced communities to their areas of origin is a topic of particular relevance. While the majority of displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable in the medium-term, there are some households that are unwilling to return (Figure 22). With respect to refugees, 25% of households report that they are not willing to go back to Syria—that is, around 4,500 households, or 19,400 individuals. 11% of IDP households are not willing to return—that is 6,500 households, or 28,300 individuals. Out of the total 11% of IDPs not willing to return, the biggest group is formed by IDP households from Niniveh, with slightly more than half of those households not willing to return.


Analysis of survey data helps explain which socioeconomic and demographic factors determine the likelihood of households to return or settle somewhere else<sup>34</sup>. These factors fall into 3 groups. First, the current socioeconomic situation of households sheltered in Erbil Governorate, as the more income a household has and the longer they have been residing in their current location, the less likely they are to return. Households that hold debt are also

<sup>34</sup> These factors are explored in more detail in the annex through a statistical regression for refugee and IDP households.

less likely to return any time soon. Second, demographic factors play a role as, on one hand, the majority of female-headed households are willing to remain in Erbil Governorate (potentially due to a higher vulnerability of these households upon return) and, on the other, the community of Christians is significantly less likely to return as compared to the displaced Arab or Kurdish communities, presumably linked to social cohesion issues between communities in their areas of origin. The third factor influencing return are the physical ties that households has in the area of origin, as households that do not have any property in their place of origin are significantly less likely to return.

**While the majority of displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable in the medium-term, there are some households that do not show any intention to return at this moment.**

Figure 22. Distribution of households by willingness to return by area of origin





IDPs at an overcrowded Primary School in Erbil City Centre. November 2015. UNHCR M.Prendergast.

## 2. CHALLENGES FOR AN EFFECTIVE RETURN

Those households who stated that they were willing to return to their place of origin were also asked about the conditions that must be in place for that to occur. Virtually all households stated that the primary condition for return is the 'liberation' of the place of origin. As this response was expected, households were also asked to prioritise the second most important condition for return (Figure 23). This second response provides a more nuanced picture of the challenges facing return in both Iraq and Syria even upon stabilisation of those areas.


The first challenge relates to the 'liberation' of the governorate of origin. Although no information is available in our survey about the households' district of origin in Iraq<sup>35</sup>, most governorates of origin are still within

<sup>35</sup> A previous assessment by REACH in June 2015 indicates that, for the IDPs from Anbar living in out-of-camp Erbil governorate, 53% come from the district of Fallujah, 37% from Ramadi and 7% from Kaim. Those from Niniveh, 52% come from Hamdaniya, 37% from Mosul and 6% from Sinjar. Finally, those from Salahaddin, 36% come from Tikrit, 30% from Shirqat and 16% from Baiji.

the conflict zone and there is presence of hostile armed groups. A majority of IDP households come from Anbar, followed by a significant number from Niniveh (mainly Mosul city and the immediate surroundings, such as Hamdaniya). As regards to refugees, the Syrian context makes returns even more challenging.

**The first challenge for return is the lack of access to most of the district where IDPs come from. The second challenge pertains to the high financial costs of return. The final one refers to the ability to reclaim the property in the place of origin.**

Figure 23. Second most important condition for facilitating return to the place of origin\*



\*Only data for the second most important condition is shown. Virtually all respondents selected 'liberation of the area and security' as the first most important condition.

A second challenge pertains to the financial costs of return, including transportation to the area of origin and rehabilitation or reconstruction of houses, businesses or farmland. The financial capacity of households in displacement strongly determines their ability (though not necessarily their willingness) to return. A precondition for return often stated, and as noted above, is financial support or help for reconstruction. In addition, many households are already indebted to cope with the higher daily costs of living in displacement, making the procurement of further loans an even more difficult burden. While some support may be provided by relatives still potentially in the area of origin, it has to be taken into account that in 96% of cases, IDPs report that the whole of their families are displaced with them (67% of refugees report the same).

The third challenge pertains to the ability to reclaim property in the place of origin, which is one of the most cited conditions for return, specifically to Niniveh. This is entrenched in legal and political issues, where different communities in officially 'disputed territories' have conflicting claims over rights to inhabit those areas. These disputes can become additionally sensitive upon liberation of an area. The ability to prove legal ownership of property left behind will be a key factor in return. About 95% of IDP households that are willing to return report that they own an asset (usually a house) in their place of origin. However, accurate information on the ability to prove legal ownership is currently still missing and necessary to map in further understanding land claim issues, particularly in disputed areas. Furthermore, appropriate restorative justice interventions to address claims and grievances between neighbouring or mixed communities, will be crucial if social tensions are to be mitigated prior to or on return.





Itinerant sellers from refugees, IDPs and host community frequent near bazaar, Erbil Centre. May 2016. Freelance photographer. F. Hindi

# 9 CONCLUSIONS AND KEY RECOMENDATIONS

The principal objective of this profiling assessment is to establish an empirical base for the design and improvement of programming and advocacy to bolster the living conditions of the urban populations of Erbil governorate, irrespective of status. The assessment compared the situation of displaced households (both refugees and IDPs) to that of host community households, as well as the situation of people residing in Erbil district periphery and towns against those in the district centre.

As a result of this approach in the analysis, some findings regarding the improvement of living conditions may be attributed to differences in geographical areas (such as housing), while others (such as employment or financial security) are related to the population group to which households belong. The recommendations presented below are sensitive to these differences and aimed at governorate authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community present in Erbil. They also span from immediate application to longer term implementation. These recommendations, particularly those that fall under the remit of governorate authorities, take into account the current economic and budgetary crisis facing Kurdistan and have been developed to fit into the reform framework necessary to propel the overall economic recovery process in the region.

## 1. URBANISATION PROCESS, PUBLIC SERVICES AND SOCIAL COHESION

**Facilitate spaces and events for interaction between host and displaced communities, to strengthen relations between neighbours, mitigate social tensions and enable peaceful co-existence**

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with host community members highlighted that competition for access to public services, perceived unwillingness of the displaced to adapt to their new social environment, and historical grievances from the pre-2003 regime have altogether generated a somewhat tense co-existence between the host and displaced communities. FGDs with displaced communities, on the other hand, highlighted that they are sometimes facing obstacles limiting their ability to have an autonomous life and, instead, increase their dependency on external support. Many of the obstacles mentioned

are also relevant to the host community. The role that communal spaces and joint events (such as community centres, sport activities or youth/women groups) can play as a point of connection between residents of all groups can be further developed. The importance of community-based activities in strengthening peaceful co-existence was highlighted in the FGDs. Community-based activities can support the interaction and bonding between population groups. They can also be anchors for the provision of multi-purpose services –education, leisure and skills acquisition, but also information points for the community on issues affecting them, legal awareness raising, protection-related information and advice, teaching on common social and economic rights, etc.

- Support already available spaces such as communal halls, sport centres, etc. or extend the network of community-based interventions in urban areas, with the support of humanitarian agencies and through the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) benefiting the whole community;
- Facilitate community interaction at the neighbourhood level, to allow members of the different communities to engage with each other in a positive, constructive and meaningful way. Share religious or cultural events and spaces to organise common activities and support this strategy;
- Initiate a programme to offer Kurdish language classes to IDPs to ease adaptation to the new environment and enhance interaction and co-existence.

**Carry out more regular FGDs, including with the host community, as a way to improve communication**

While various agencies hold regular FGDs with men, women and youth from the refugee and IDP community in order to understand their pressing needs and concerns, the host community is not frequently consulted on such matters despite being a key part of the equation in community development overall. As such, these FGDs should be extended, especially to gather insights in terms of social cohesion and perception over the economic situation and the hosting of refugees and IDPs in urban areas. More particularly:

- UN agencies, international and national NGOs are encouraged to promote and enhance dialogue with host communities, through FGDs and other forms of consultation, including the engagement with the Mukhtars in the community;
- Erbil Refugee Council should initiate its own programme of regular FGDs in urban areas, targeting all population groups, to build further trust between governorate authorities and the communities they serve.

### **Increase the number and capacity of public health and education services offered in urban areas, particularly in the Erbil district periphery**

Data from our desk review and survey suggested that there are severe shortages in medical and educational facilities in some sub-districts. Considering that the population has doubled in some locations, the capacity of services to address the population needs in those areas is severely challenged. There is an urgent need to increase the public health and education services offered, either through the expansion of capacity of existing services and/or the building of new infrastructure to house additional services. To ensure the sustainability of these services in the long-term, this action should fall under the remit of the Government. Its response, however, is largely limited by the overall budgetary crisis in Kurdistan Region and, as such, needs to be placed within a broader set of actions related to public services at the regional level. The humanitarian and development communities can hence step in to support governorate authorities with emergency actions, such as QIPs, in those communities that currently face critical public service gaps.

- Expand the offer of critical public health and education services in urban areas, with a focus on high school education facilities in Erbil district periphery;
- Build temporary facilities, with the support of the humanitarian and development community (e.g. through QIPs), to increase the offer of public health and education services in the most underserved neighbourhoods, as part of a rapid, emergency response.

## **2. HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS**

### **Increase the affordability of housing for rent considering the current financial crisis**

The main challenge with respect to housing in Erbil urban areas is the lack of affordable accommodation to rent and to move in. In fact, it stays unaffordable not only because of the high cost of rent, but because of the financial crisis. This affects all population groups equally. Investment in new housing stock stopped due to the financial crisis and many building structures remain unfinished –or actually not available to rent due to lack of trust on new tenants. In addition, there is no public housing programme in place in these areas to help create new housing and offset unaffordable rental costs. Measures to increase the availability of affordable housing are necessary to combat overcrowding, rising rents, increasing eviction risks and the relocation of poorer families to peripheral neighbourhoods. The need for this kind of measures with a focus on short term as well as medium term is very urgent in some sub-districts including Shaqlawa, Baharka, Bnaslawa and Khabat, which have nearly doubled in population without the available housing pool having increased.

- Create incentives for new private developments of non-luxury and affordable real estate in order to increase the supply of housing for low-income families or, alternatively, provide incentives to current house owners to undertake expansions of their properties to increase units available for rent;
- Explore the legal and financial status of empty or abandoned buildings with the idea that local authorities can reconvert these into low-cost or subsidised housing if it is proven that no one has ownership interest with respect to those properties;
- Explore possibilities for humanitarian shelter actors or governorate authorities to adopt the role of guarantors in the rental process in the most critical subdistricts in order to motivate property owners to open houses/apartments for rent –especially targeting displaced communities;
- Undertake a deeper analysis of current determinants driving rent levels in urban areas, availability of housing for affordable rent vis-à-vis demand, and risks and obstacles in the development of new accessible real estate, with a focus on both immediate actions and longer term policies in Erbil Governorate or the wider Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

### Provide rental support for the most vulnerable families

While the previous measures would gradually bring a decrease in average rents, they may take time to have a tangible effect. Many families, across all population groups, are currently struggling to pay their rents and it is leading to indebtedness or constant relocation, in search of cheaper housing at the expense of appropriate living standards. Support in making housing affordable to those families facing economic hardship is required to reverse a deteriorating housing situation, especially in Erbil district periphery. In addition, targeting those households currently living in informal or vulnerable housing situations (e.g., makeshift structures, caravans or unfinished buildings) would help them move into more secure dwellings. The support can be direct or indirect, as follows:

- Explore the potential for the establishment of cash-for-rent programmes, either as an extension of current cash programmes or as a new separate and targeted programme, by first ensuring that such a programme does not generate inflationary effects on the rental market and does not trigger a surge of potential renters into already overcrowded areas;
- Expand the scope of programmes, and increase the number of actors, undertaking medium-scale rehabilitation and refurbishment of buildings in exchange for rent-free or rent-controlled housing, with the involvement of governorate authorities to reinforce the trust of property owners.

### Increase protection against evictions and support families at risk for eviction

Some of the households across all population groups have been evicted over the past 6 months. Evictions are mostly linked to the inability to pay rent. This is especially common in the towns, including Shaqlawa and Soran. Not having a written rental contract or lease agreement is highly correlated with being at higher risk for eviction. Although oral agreements are legally binding, they do not seem to provide enough protection in the face of eviction and the impact of legal action in these kind of disputes between landlords and tenants is minimal. Supporting actions are required to increase the protection of vulnerable households, in particular:

- Regulate verbal agreements and promote the use of written agreements instead. This will also facilitate to obtain rental approval from Asayesh, in order to guarantee the protection and rights of the residents;

- Reinforce the mechanisms applied by legal assistance actors where families can report evictions and receive support in contesting evictions, finding new accommodation, and determining if they are eligible for emergency cash support.

## 3. LIVELIHOODS GENERATION

### Reinforce emergency livelihood schemes in Erbil district periphery and towns

Emergency employment, such as cash for work programmes linked to the implementation QIPs, should be reinforced in particular in the Erbil district periphery, where the highest levels of people searching for jobs are found. Such programs usually restricted to refugees or IDPs, should explore to integrate also host community members as they are equally affected by lack of employment, especially for private sector jobs. In addition to employment, emergency livelihood schemes help reintroduce cash liquidity to areas particularly affected by the financial crisis, reinvigorating the local economy. Vocational training is also critical as our data indicate that having such training increases individuals' chances of obtaining a job. Based on this discussion, specific recommendations are the following:

- Target the Erbil district periphery and towns for emergency livelihood programming such as cash for work for both displaced populations and host community, as appropriate;
- Continue and enhance vocational training programmes in these geographical areas and introduce programs to subsequently facilitate apprenticeships related to the skills learned;
- Continue and enhance the support to unemployed members of all communities in finding employment through job placement programmes as part of the programming by livelihood actors, as an alternative to having to rely on personal networks;
- Explore and evaluate the private sector performance in Erbil governorate in order to understand the main barriers to their expansion and increase in employment levels, in addition to an impact evaluation of livelihood programming undertaken so far from both public and humanitarian actors (e.g. coverage, achievements and effectiveness), in order to inform more targeted programming.

### Facilitate mechanisms for refugees to turn into entrepreneurs and develop joint businesses with host community members in Erbil governorate

Given their refugee status, Syrian individuals cannot set up businesses in non-camp settings. Those households with sufficient financial resources could contribute to invigorating the local economy by establishing businesses, participating in existing or new value chains and generating employment opportunities for others. While granting refugees the legal right to own a business in the governorate requires of a lengthy legal reform in policies that need to be advocated by local and international partners, other alternative solutions such as joint ventures with host community entrepreneurs should be explored within the current framework. Based on this, the specific measures may include:

- UN agencies, national/international NGOs and the Chamber of Commerce are recommended to establish a mechanism or platform to support refugees in identifying, linking and partnering with local entrepreneurs to establish joint businesses in order to overcome formal obstacles and ensure the legal protection of the refugee partner.

### Promote better working conditions and labour protection to combat informality and bad practices in some sectors of the job market

Data indicate that working without an employment contract or any kind of legal protection is a frequent practice in the private sector. This is often the case for refugees. In a displacement crisis context, this poses an even bigger risk for workers than in ordinary circumstances, as it increases the unregulated competition for jobs and the institution of abusive practices by some employers. It also allows for greater income disparity given that our data indicate that job earnings for those without a written contract are significantly lower than those formally employed. While it is extremely challenging to ensure that the majority of individuals have formal employment contracts, corrective actions can help in improving workers' rights and improving labour conditions in general.

- UN agencies, national/international NGOs and local authorities can establish legal aid centres where workers experiencing labour exploitation can file complaints —especially targeting displaced communities who are less familiar with Erbil's legal environment;
- International development partners could initiate collaboration with chambers of commerce and

business groups to evaluate the situation in the informal economy and propose reforms;

- Local authorities are recommended to explore possible employment-related regulations to apply to the working conditions in the construction sector, a key economic sector that not only provides most jobs but also allows for very irregular working conditions.

### Support the development and strengthening of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the governorate

Erbil governorate currently has an existing fabric of SMEs that can potentially employ a large proportion of the available workforce. However, they frequently lack the resources, knowledge, and appropriate channels to improve their value chains, or are restricted due to red tape and established oligopolies. Supporting this network of local enterprises is the most effective and sustainable way of increasing the level of salaries to which the population has access as well as increasing the available places for women and university graduates to be employed in the medium-term. Local authorities and development actors have been working closely with chambers of commerce and business groups in this regard, and such initiatives should continue. The specific recommendations are as follows:

- Evaluate where businesses find inefficiencies within the local economy by identifying where entry barriers and obstacles to a healthy private sector remain, and developing policies to eliminate them;
- Empower institutions such as Chambers of Commerce to have a larger role as business promotion platforms that would accompany and support SMEs in their expansion;
- Encourage the participation of microfinance mechanisms to provide financial resources for local enterprises.

## 4. FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO VULNERABLE FAMILIES

Advance towards a gradual coordination and convergence of cash assistance programming, ensuring baseline criteria for assistance is predicated upon an expanded, following a more context-driven definition of vulnerability

Several cash assistance programmes currently target IDPs and/or refugees separately, while the governorate has its own safety net for the most vulnerable of the host community through the Department of Labour

and Social Affairs. It is important, first, to coordinate these different humanitarian and public mechanisms and gradually have them converge to provide the same type of assistance (unconditional cash transfers) to all population groups, based on the same baseline criteria. Although a full integration of cash assistance into a joint programme between local authorities and humanitarian actors (which would facilitate sustainability in the years to come) is not yet on the horizon, convergence helps to avoid unequal treatment and provision of benefits between population groups. Secondly, this assessment identified additional sources of vulnerability that equally affect all population groups and that may need to be included in the criteria for eligibility of assistance –or part of a new cash support program as suggested above. These criteria include difficulty in paying rent, eviction risk, and unstable employment, among others. Finally, an area-based approach needs to be considered for such programming, as the data presented in this report suggests that vulnerability is particularly more pervasive in some areas in Erbil district periphery than elsewhere, including Erbil district centre and towns. To achieve these aims, the following steps are necessary:

- Initiate discussions with the humanitarian actors providing cash assistance to the different population groups, including Erbil Governorate’s Department of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Migration and Displacement to put the basis for a framework aiming to coordinate and converge the cash and welfare programmes;
- The Department of Labour and Social Affairs is encouraged to evaluate their current welfare system and criteria in order to adequately target the vulnerable population and increase efficiency and effectiveness of its programming;
- Expand vulnerability criteria to ensure the inclusion of risks linked to housing (inability to pay rent or eviction risk), employment (linked to sporadic employment) or financial security (linked to indebtedness), based on an area-based approach that prioritises the most vulnerable geographic areas and the populations therein.

## 5. EDUCATION AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

### Facilitate re-access to education for children and youth not currently attending school

In order for children and youth currently not attending either basic or high school education to return to formal education, it is necessary to develop solutions that target

the root causes of their absenteeism. Some children and youth are out of school because of bottlenecks in the provision of public education and lack of available spots in schools, for which a rapid response in increasing school facilities was recommended above. However, in the majority of cases, children and youth are not in school because they are working (the case for boys) or because they are occupied with domestic work (the case for girls). This is true particularly for Syrian refugees, who had an extraordinarily higher rate of school drop-out across age groups when compared to the host community or IDP populations. It is necessary to sensitise these children and youth and their families of the importance of entering the formal education system. The following actions are aimed mainly to partners involved in the education sector:

- Analyse in more detail why Syrian children and youth are not attending school in disproportionately higher numbers, as more nuanced information is needed to design programming and policy to increase their attendance;
- Develop campaigns across displaced communities in urban areas promoting the need for families to bring children and youth to school, providing information on the procedures and paperwork required and clearly explaining the differences between the Syrian and the Iraqi Kurdish educational systems;
- Offer subsidies on transportation and school supplies to help offset costs preventing some students from attending school;
- Implement bridge programmes, especially by local authorities, for those students willing to attend school after a period out of formal education and adapt courses offered to their needs (e.g., intensive courses offered over shorter durations, remedial courses to allow students to make up learning they have missed, holding classes in the evening after working shifts are complete, etc.) and ease the bureaucratic procedures (e.g. proof of education achievements in Syria) to access these programmes.

## 6. BARRIERS TO RETURN

### Facilitation of returns through financial assistance or loan-granting programme

The financial costs of returns, including transportation to place of origin and/or the rehabilitation of properties, are a significant challenge and burden for many displaced families. Syrian households particularly indicated these concerns, more so than IDP households. As many

households are already indebted in order to deal with the higher daily costs of living in displacement, in many cases a programme with targeted financial assistance, such as unconditional cash for the initial period of return, would help to make returns feasible, once it is safe for households to go back.

### Support and strengthen processes for displaced households to reclaim properties in areas of origin

The largest obstacle to return reported by IDPs, principally for those originally from Niniveh, is the ability to prove ownership of properties in their places of origin. In some areas of return ownership of property may be contested by different families, and it is important that actors from the federal and regional governments, displaced community leadership, and the international community work to avoid any injustice in this very sensitive process. The following measures are suggested:

- Gather more information on IDP households' current possession of legal documentation for properties in the areas of origin in order to identify where the concrete challenges are;
- Create a unit to support households in the legal and bureaucratic reclamation processes where necessary;
- Sponsor a go-and-see visit programme for IDPs to the areas of origin accessible by the international community, in order to facilitate opportunities to check the state of property and make informed decisions to return or not.

### Accept and support those displaced households who have no intention to return to their area of origin, facilitating improvements in their current legal situation

The current displacement situation is becoming protracted for most displaced households. Our data revealed a significant number of households, both IDP and refugee, that had no intentions to return to their area of origin. Some of them may seek to relocate to other countries, but many will remain in the Kurdistan Region for many years –until new conditions to return are in place. To respect this situation of protracted displacement, as is required under international human rights law, some immediate actions have to be reinforced with the collaboration of all actors, including the following:

- Provide solutions to resolve legal gaps with regard to residency status to avoid forced return to areas of origin;

- Facilitate the administrative and legal procedures to transfer some benefits received from the governorate of origin, such as monthly food distribution and other subsidies, to the Kurdistan Region, should they opt to establish their residence here.

## 7. FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BUDGET RESTRICTIONS

### Continue the necessary reforms and develop new policies for resolving the budget crisis and spurring economic recovery

Resolving the budget restrictions that brought the Kurdistan Region into its current financial crisis would substantially contribute to the implementation of most of the recommendations deriving from this assessment. Many of the recommendations listed above require further spending and investment from the local authorities, which can be done when the financial crisis will be resolved. Advancing towards economic recovery would bring immediate socioeconomic relief to those in the most affected subdistricts by reintroducing cash into the economy, gradually reinvigorating consumption and investment, and re-generating employment opportunities that disappeared at the onset of the financial crisis (e.g. the construction sector). This recovery implies maintaining and expanding the path of reforms highlighted in other available assessments and reports, and includes focusing on achieving a sustainable and balanced public budget; diversifying public revenues and introducing policies at the governorate level to ensure fee collection for utilities such as water and energy; and reinforcing initiatives for private sector development.

An aerial photograph of a circular urban development, possibly a planned city or a large-scale residential project. The image shows concentric roads and a central area with various buildings and structures. The word "ANNEXES" is overlaid in the center in a blue, serif font.

*ANNEXES*



## A. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Cover	Location	A1	Filled by enumerator prior to interview: A1_1 Governorate: A1_2 District: A1_3 Subdistrict: A1_4 Neighbourhood: A1_5 Type of household: A1_6 Household number:	A1_1: Erbil A1_2: Pick from list A1_3: Pick from list A1_4: Pick from list A1_5: 1.Refugee, 2. IDP, 3. Host community	n/a
		A2	Name of enumerator		n/a
	Meta data	A3	Introduction of survey & consent for interview		n/a
		A4	Would you allow us to do an interview with you?	1. Yes 2. No	n/a
		A5	Filled by enumerator: Who is the respondent? [in relation to the household head]	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. Brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
Household roster	Household composition	B1	What is the first name - starting with the head of the household.		All
		B2	What is [Name's] relationship to the head of household?	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. Brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. Son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
		B3	Is [Name] male or female?	1. Male 2. Female	All
		B4	How old is [Name]?	0= less than a year 95= over 95 years old 99= don't know	All
		B5	What is [Name's] marital status?	1. Never married 2. Married 3. Widowed 4. Separated 5. Divorced	All Age 12+
		B6	During the past 12 months, how many months did [Name] live in this household?	Number of months [write 0 if less than 1 month]	All
		B7	What is [Name's] nationality? [multiple response]	1. Iraqi 2. Syrian 3. Other	All
		B8	What is [Name's] main ethnic or cultural background?	1. Kurd 2. Arab 3. Turkman 4. Chaldean 5. Syriac 6. Assyrian 7. Armenian 8. Other 9. Prefer not to answer	All
		C1	Can [Name] read and write?	1. can read and write 2. can read only 3. cannot read nor write	All Age 6+
		C2	Is [Name] currently attending school?	1. yes, 4 days a week or more 2. yes, less than 4 days a week 3. no	All Age 6+
C3	[if yes] what level?	1. Primary (1-9) 2. Secondary/ highschool (9-12) 3. Institute 4. University 5. Postgraduate	All Age 6+ Attending school		

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Household roster (cont.)	Education: 6+	C4	[If less than 4 days a week, or not attending & less than 18 years] What is the main reason for not attending school regularly, or not attending at all?	1. No easily accesible school 2. Teaching is of poor quality/ teachers absent 3. Mistreatment by the instructor or other students 4. Has to work to support the family 5. Family disapproves/does not think the child needs to study 6. Early marriage 7. Sickness or disability, 8. Helping in house duties 9. Schools were full 10. Schools were not accepting the student 11. Schools are mixed gender 12. Does not understand the language 13. Too many costs involved 14. No documentation 15. Family does not expect to stay long time here 16. Other reasons	All Age 6 - 18 Irregularly attending school
		C5	What is the highest level of education ever completed by [Name]?	1. None 2. Primary 3. Highschool/Secondary 4. Institution 5. University 6. Post graduate	All Age 6+
		C6	Has [Name] ever attended any kind of vocational training?	1. Yes 2. No	All Age 15+
	Employment: 15+	D1	What is [Name's] main work status in the last 30 days?	1. Employer 2. Self-employed (Kurdish: working owner) 3. Paid employee 4. Unpaid family worker 5. Student who also works 6. Full-time student 7. Home maker 8. Don't work, looking for work (has worked previously) 9. Don't work, looking for work (never worked before) 10. Not looking for a job because of lack of papers 11. Not looking for a job due to frustration/discouragement 12. Not interested in working 13. Retired / too old 14. Disability/illness 15. Under age 16. Other	All Age 15+
				D2	What is [Name's] occupation in main job during the last 30 days?
		D3	In what industry did [Name] work in his/her main job during the last 30 days?		
				D4	D4 What was [Name's] total cash income (actual or expected) from the work last month? (IQD)?

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Household roster (cont.)		D5	Does [Name] have a written work contract for the main work the last 30 days?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know	All Age 15+ Labour force active
		D6	What is the main method [Name] used when searching or finding a job?	1. Contacted employment office 2. Placed/answered job advertisements 3. Asked friends, relatives or other personal connections 4. Contacted employer directly 5. Tried to find land, workplace, equipment, financial resources/credit to start own business, applied for relevant licenses, permits, et 6. Went door to door looking for employment 7. Other	All Age 15+ Labour force active Job seeking
		D7	What is the main reason for why [Name] finds it difficult to, or don't want to, find a job?	1. Too many people searching for jobs 2. Education/qualifications not matching available jobs 3. Legal issues 4. Available jobs are too far away 5. Discrimination 6. Lack of personal or political connections 7. Don't have enough time to look for work 8. Wages are too low 9. Disability or chronic illness 10. Language barriers 11. Other	All Age 15+ Labour force active Non job seeking
Shelter	Shelter type	E1	What is the main type of dwelling the household lives in?	1. Apartment/flat 2. House/villa 3. Informal settlement/ tent/ makeshift shelter 4. Caravan 5. Collective center 6. Unfinished/abandoned building 7. Hotel/motel 8. Religious building 9. School 10. Garage/ house annex 11. Other	All
		E2	Does your household share this dwelling with other households?	1. Yes 2. No	All
	Tenure conditions & security	E3	What is the main tenure status of this dwelling?	1. Owned 2. Rented 3. Housing provided as part of work 4. Hosted with rent 5. Hosted for free 6. Provided dwelling for free 7. Occupied/squated	All
		E4	[If owned, or rented] Does someone in the household have a written documentation for ownership/renting the dwelling?	1. Yes 2. No	All Renting or owning
		E5	[If dwelling is rented] how much rent in IQD do you pay each month to stay in this dwelling including both rent on the dwelling and the land underneath?	<i>Insert amount</i>	All Renting
		E6	How many rooms total does this dwelling have (excludig bathroom/toilet)?	<i>Total number of rooms</i>	All Except living in tent
		E7	How many rooms are used for sleeping?	<i>Total number of rooms</i>	All Except living in tent
		E8	Has your household experienced eviction from its dwelling during the past 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		E9	[If experienced eviction last 12 months] What was the main reason for eviction?	1. Haven't paid rent 2. Rent was increased 3. Owner no longer wanted to rent out 4. Demolision 5. Development projects 6. Neighbourhood pressure to leave 7. Other	All Evicted
		F1	How do you rate your household members' access to private or public health centres/hospitals?	1. Very good 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Insufficient 5. Not accessible	All

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Access to services	Access to health	F2	What is the main reasons for rating low on access to health care?	1. Too far from household location 2. Can't afford 3. Too low capacity of clinic 4. Low quality of services provided 5. Services provided is not relevant 6. Language barrier 7. Discrimination 8. Other	All Low rating of access
	Access to energy	F3	What is the main source for energy of cooking for your household?	1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Other sources 6. No cooking	All
		F4_1	What is the primary source of energy for heating for this household?	1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Kerosene stove 6. Other sources 7. No heating	All
		F4_2	If any, what is the secondary source of energy used for heating for this household?	1. Public grid electricity 2. Shared generator 3. Private generator 4. Gas 5. Kerosene stove 6. Other sources 7. No heating	
	Access to information sources	F5	How many of the household members have used Internet on a personal device, in an internet cafe or elsewhere during the last month?	<i>Insert number</i>	All
Livelihood and coping mechanisms	Household economy (income sources, expenditures, debts)	G1_1	What is the primary source of income/money for this household the last 6 months?	1. Salary 2. Wages 3. Rent income 4. Business earnings (incl household enterprises) 5. Remittances (support from friends/family abroad) 6. Pensions 7. Support from Government/UN/NGO's 8. Consumption of own production 9. Selling off own assets 10. Using loans 11. Charity 12. Begging 13. Other 14. No income	All
		G1_2	If any, what is the secondary source of income/money for this household the last 6 months?	1. Salary 2. Wages 3. Rent income 4. Business earnings (incl household enterprises) 5. Remittances (support from friends/family abroad) 6. Pensions 7. Support from Government/UN/NGO's 8. Consumption of own production 9. Selling off own assets 10. Using loans 11. Charity 12. Begging 13. Other 14. No income	All
		G2	Do any of the members in your households have outstanding loans/ borrowed money that he/she has to repay?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		G3	What is the main purpose of the household loan(s)?	1. Business related 2. Personal consumption needs 3. Purchase and improvement of dwelling 4. Religious/wedding/burial 5. Consumer durables (e.g. car) 6. On-lending 7. Farm/agriculture purpose 8. For paying housing rent 9. Other 10. Don't know	All Indebted

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Livelihood and coping mechanisms (cont.)		G4_1	During the last 12 months did your household receive any assistance in cash or kind?	1. Yes 2. No	All Received assistance
		G4_2	[if yes] What is the main source of assistance that your household received?	1. UN aid programs 2. Government benefit 3. NGO 4. Charity 5. Friends or relatives 6. Other 7. Did not receive any	
	Coping mechanisms	G5	Did your household experience any of the following economic shocks during the past 12 months? If more, select the shock which had the economically most severe impact for your household	1. Unexpected loss of job or shutdown of business 2. Involuntary reduction in working hours 3. Non-payment or delay in payment of wages 4. Cut-off or decrease in support from friends/relatives (remittances) 5. Increase in cost of housing rent 6. Forced eviction or loss of assets 7. Loss of livestock, crops, or other agricultural assets 9. Death of a household member 10. Serious illness or injury to a household member (including yourself) 11. Involuntary breakup of family 12. Reduced or suspended assistance 13. Savings ran out 14. Other shocks 15. No severe shocks	All
		G6	What was your household's main response to this shock, in order to cope or regain its former welfare?	1. Depended on cash or in-kind assistance from others 2. Relied on own savings 3. Reduced food purchases 4. Reduced expenditures on health/education 5. Employed HH members took on more work or, if not working, household member started working 6. Child taken out of school 7. HH members (inc. children) migrated 8. Loans 9. Sold assets (buildings, land, gold, etc.) 10. Begging 11. Nothing 12. Other	All With shock
		G7	Did your household have difficulties in paying (housing) rent over the past 6 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All Renting
	Expenditure	G8	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on food in the past 7 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G9	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on healthcare (Includes medicines, treatment) past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G10	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on water/ utilities (Water as utility or purchase of water for drinking) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G11	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on electricity (as utility) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G12	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on fuel (Propane for cooking; kerosene for heating) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G13	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Transportation (Taxis, bus, etc) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G14	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on communications (phones, etc.) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G15	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on education (school fees, uniforms, supplies) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All
		G16	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on clothing in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY				
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population	
		G17	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on winter related purchases (blankets, winter jackets, etc.) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All	
		G18	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on House/shelter repairs in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All	
		G19	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on giving to friends or family members in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All	
		G20	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on other needs in the past 30 days (in IQD)	<i>Insert amount</i>	All	
Daily interactions	Relations between population groups	H1	Do the children in this household have any friends from the "other" community (Syrian refugees/IDPs/host community - choose depending on who is interviewed)?	1. Yes 2. No	All with persons < 18 years	
	Perceptions of safety and trust	H2	Has any household member experienced being physically harassed within the past 6 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All	
		H3	How safe do you consider your neighbourhood?	1. Very safe 2. Safe 3. Unsafe 4. Very unsafe	All	
Migration history and future plans	Migration history	I1	I1 Has your household ever been displaced from your place of origin?	1. Yes 2. No	all	
		I2	[if yes] When was your household displaced from your place of origin?	<i>Insert date</i>	All	
		I3	[If yes] Where is your place of origin?	I3_1 Country: Iraq, Syria, Turkey, other [if not Iraq skip to next] I3_2 Governorate: pick from list	If displaced	
		I4	[if Iraqi and displaced] was your household displaced from your place of origin after December 2013?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013	
		I5	[if displaced] Did your household come directly to your current location?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced	
		I6	[if no] how many times have you in total moved?	<i>Insert number</i>	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced	
		I7	[if displaced] Did all the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, arrive with you to Erbil Governorate?	1. yes 2. no	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced	
		I8	[if no] Which of the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, did not come with you? [Multiple answers allowed]	1. Spouse / cohabitant 2. Sons/daughters 3. Parents/Grandparents 4. Siblings 5. Other relatives 6. Others non-relatives	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Household split	
	Mobility		I9	When did your household arrive to this location/neighbourhood?	<i>Insert year</i>	All
			I10	[if HH hasn't lived here always] What was the reason for your household to choose the current location for residence? [For displaced households]	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also here 7. Cost of living/rent in in this location is lower 8. Better safety 9. Bigger/better home 10. Location is safer 11. Other	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		I11	Are there persons in your household who have left to live in another place within the last 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All	

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Migration history and future plans (cont.)	Future plans	I12	[If yes] why did this person(s) move?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Better employment opportunities</li> <li>2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities</li> <li>3. Availability/better quality of health services</li> <li>4. Availability of humanitarian assistance</li> <li>5. To join other family members</li> <li>6. Relatives/friends are also there</li> <li>7. Marriage</li> <li>8. Cost of living/ rent is lower</li> <li>9. Location there is safer</li> <li>10. Bigger/better home there</li> <li>11. Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility</li> <li>12. Has land and/or house there</li> <li>13. Other</li> </ol>	All With moved members within last 12 months
		I13	Does anyone in your household have firm plans to change (permanent) residence from your current location within the next six months? [For all households]	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Yes</li> <li>2. No</li> </ol>	All
		I14	[If yes] Where are you/other household members planning to go? [if more members are moving to different places, answer this question about the most economically active member]	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Within KRI</li> <li>2. Elsewhere in Iraq</li> <li>3. Neighboring countries</li> <li>4. Return to place of origin</li> <li>5. Europe</li> <li>6. Other</li> </ol>	All Plan to move
		I15	What is the main reason for choosing to move there?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Better employment opportunities</li> <li>2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities</li> <li>3. Availability/better quality of health services</li> <li>4. Availability of humanitarian assistance</li> <li>5. To join other family members</li> <li>6. Relatives/friends are also there</li> <li>7. Marriage</li> <li>8. Lower rent there</li> <li>9. Location there is safer</li> <li>10. Expecting to be evicted by landlord</li> <li>11. Expecting to be evicted by municipality or local government</li> <li>12. Bigger/better home there</li> <li>13. Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility</li> <li>14. Has land and/or house there</li> <li>15. Other</li> </ol>	All Plan to move
		I16	[if displaced] Would you consider returning to your place of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. yes</li> <li>2. no</li> <li>3. don't know</li> </ol>	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		I16_1	[If yes] What is the most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Liberation of area</li> <li>2. Reclaim of house/ land</li> <li>3. Reconstruction of house</li> <li>4. Financial/ in kind assistance</li> <li>5. Other</li> </ol>	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Consider return
		I16_2	What is the second most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Liberation of area</li> <li>2. Reclaim of house/ land</li> <li>3. Reconstruction of house</li> <li>4. Financial/ in kind assistance</li> <li>5. Other</li> </ol>	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Consider return
Documentation	Documentation	J1	Does the head of household have any of the following documents? [multiple response]	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. nationality certificate (Iraqis)</li> <li>2. civil ID (Iraqis)</li> <li>3. passport (ALL)</li> <li>4. PDS card (Iraqis)</li> <li>5. residency permit (IDPs and Refugees)</li> <li>6. Household card of address (information card) (Iraqis)</li> <li>7. UNHCR certificate (Refugees)</li> <li>8. none (all)</li> </ol>	All
		J2	[For refugees and IDPs who do not have a residency permit] What is the main reason for not having a residency permit?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Unaware of the process</li> <li>2. Don't know how to apply</li> <li>3. Cost, distance or difficulty of reaching the Asaysh/issuing office</li> <li>4. See no benefit in having a permit</li> <li>5. Waiting for the permit</li> <li>6. Application rejected</li> <li>7. Planning to apply</li> <li>8. Missing documents</li> <li>9. Other</li> </ol>	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 and Syrian Refugees

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			
		#	Questions	Answer options	Responding population
Housing, Land and Property	Assets left behind	K1	Did your household leave any assets in your place of origin?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		K2_1	Which of the following assets did your household leave in your place of origin?	1. housing 2. non agricultural land 3. agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment 4. business assets 5. jewelry/savings/cash 6. car(s) 7. other 8. prefer not to answer	All With assets behind
		K2_3	[if yes] Did you leave {asset} in the care of?	1. Yes 2. No	All With assets behind
		K2_4	Do you have proof of ownership to reclaim or recover {asset}?	1. Yes 2. No	All With assets behind
	Assets in current location	K3	Do you currently own any of the following Assets in your current location?	1. housing 2. non agricultural land 3. agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment 4. business assets 5. jewelry/savings/cash 6. car(s) 7. other 8. prefer not to answer 9. Don't own	All
End	GPS	L1	Register GPS coordinates		All



## B. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTION GUIDE

TOPIC 1		QUESTIONS
DAILY LIFE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD- COHESION	•	In which ways do you think that your neighbourhood has changed over the past few years? And how do you explain this change?
	•	How safe is your neighbourhood? Are these situations were you or others family members do not feel safe? Has your neighbourhood become more or less safe the past years, and how do you explain this?
	•	How do you think that the arrival of IDPs affects the neighbourhood?
	•	In which ways/situations do you interact with the IDPs?
	•	Do you see the return of IDPs as a realistic option? If not, which options do you see?
	•	If the IDPs stay for several years, what would be the best way to allow for it?
	•	Are there situations where you are treated differently than others in the community? For example: Do you think that employers treat people differently? Do you think that schools treat people (parent, students) differently? Do you think that health centers treat people differently? In which ways?
	•	What is important in order to get a job? Who in this neighbourhood finds jobs easier than others and why?
	•	We have found out from a recent household survey that very few women are working; why do you think this is the case?
TOPIC 2		QUESTIONS
MIGRATION INTENTIONS	•	Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who are planning to move abroad, e.g. to Europe?
	•	Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who have already migrated?
	•	When you think about the families you know/hear about, which family members are usually migrating?
TOPIC 3		QUESTIONS
VIEWS ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION	•	When you think about the current economic crisis, what are the most important effects on the everyday life of families in this neighborhood?
	•	How do families cope with the difficult economic situation?
	•	What do you think are the main reasons for the current economic crisis?

## C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS AFFECTING WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN

The socioeconomic and demographic factors that determine the likelihood of households to return or settle somewhere else are explored in more detail with a basic logistical regression. Two separate regressions, one for IDP households and another for Syrian refugees, are estimated where the independent variable is the willingness of the household to return to their area of origin. The set of explanatory variables used are the following:

- *Ethnic group*, divided in three categories: Arab, Kurdish, and Christian. Arabs are taken as the base category and the other two categories are compared against it.
- *Total household income*, expressed in logarithm.
- *Date of arrival*, expressed in the year when settled into the current location.
- *Gender of the head of household*, comparing male and female-headed households.
- *Household indebtedness*, comparing whether a household is indebted.
- *Assets in origin*, comparing whether a household owns property (land, house, business or livestock) in the area of origin.
- *Bad dwelling situation*, comparing households living in a bad dwelling situation defined as living in informal shelters or sharing the dwelling with other families.
- *Number of persons employed*, expressed in the number of household members that currently have an employment.
- *Vocational training*, comparing whether a member of the household has received any type of training.
- *Household size*, expressed in the total number of household members.
- *Dispersed family*, comparing whether the family is all displaced in the current location or some members remain elsewhere.

	IDP HOUSEHOLDS	SYRIAN REFUGEE HOUSEHOLD
Ethnic group		
Kurdish [base category: Arab]	-0.0100 (0.440)	
Christians [base category: Arab]	-0.133 (0.083)**	
Total household income	-0.068 (0.037)*	-0.078 (0.045)*
Date of arrival	0.059 (0.036)*	0.074 (0.023)***
Female head of household	-0.097 (0.056)*	-0.096 (0.120)
Indebted household	0.078 (0.046)*	-0.028 (0.050)
Assets in place of origin	0.138 (0.058)**	-0.049 (0.058)
Bad dwelling situation	0.025 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.051)
Number of persons employed	0.053 (0.036)	-0.005 (0.055)
Vocational training	-0.062 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.081)
Household size	0.008 (0.008)	0.015 (0.013)
Dispersed family		-0.022 (0.058)
N	282	333

Notes: Coefficient shows the Average Marginal Effects of each variable over the willingness of the household to return to place of origin. Standard errors in parenthesis. \* denotes significance at 10%, \*\* at 5% and \*\*\* at 1%.

## D. SELECTED DATA OVERVIEW

Variables, Percent	Total				Erbil district centre				Erbil district periphery				Towns*				
	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	
<b>SECTION A</b>																	
Household size grouped (persons)	1 - 3	27	47	17	28	30	54	21	28	21	30	16	23	29	24	14	32
	4 - 6	51	42	50	52	52	39	51	54	51	48	47	53	47	52	55	45
	7 - 9	18	9	22	18	15	6	16	16	21	16	24	20	22	23	24	21
	10 and above	4	3	11	2	3	1	11	2	7	7	13	4	3	2	7	2
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households by sex of household head	Male	92	96	91	92	92	96	89	92	92	96	90	93	94	96	98	93
	Female	8	4	9	8	8	4	11	8	8	4	10	7	6	4	2	7
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population by sex	Male	51	54	51	51	51	55	52	51	51	52	49	52	51	50	56	50
	Female	49	46	49	49	49	45	48	49	49	48	51	48	49	50	44	50
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population by age (completed years)	0 - 5	16	17	18	16	16	16	15	16	17	21	19	16	15	21	18	14
	6 - 9	8	8	10	7	6	7	9	6	10	8	10	10	9	10	12	8
	10 - 14	11	10	13	10	10	9	12	10	12	11	14	12	10	15	12	10
	15 - 18	10	8	10	9	10	9	10	10	10	8	10	10	8	7	10	8
	19 - 24	11	17	10	11	11	19	9	10	11	12	9	12	11	10	12	10
	25 - 29	10	12	8	10	10	13	10	10	9	11	7	9	9	8	6	10
	30 - 39	12	13	12	13	12	13	12	12	12	14	11	13	13	13	13	13
	40 - 49	9	8	9	10	9	8	9	10	9	6	9	9	10	9	10	10
	50 - 59	7	4	6	7	8	4	7	8	5	6	5	5	6	4	4	7
	60 - 64	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	2	2
	65 +	5	2	3	6	6	2	3	6	3	1	3	3	6	2	2	8
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (6 years +) by ethnicity	Kurd	79	97	18	91	79	97	5	85	75	97	30	100	85	97	6	99
	Arab	13	1	66	1	9	1	74	2	19	3	53	0	15	3	93	1
	Christian**	5	2	9	5	9	2	14	9	3	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
	Other	1	1	3	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	5	0	1	0	0	1
	Prefer not to answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
**The group 'Christians' aggregate Chaldeans, Syrians, Assyrians and Armenians																	
<b>SECTION B</b>																	
Population (6 - 24 y. o.) by full attendance or with low / no attendance of school	Yes, 4 days a week or more	65	27	47	74	69	26	46	76	59	28	44	72	66	37	59	68
	Yes, less than 4 days a week	5	1	21	0	3	1	27	0	9	0	22	0	2	1	11	0
	No	30	72	32	26	27	73	26	24	32	72	34	28	32	63	30	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (6 years +) currently attending school by level	Basic, grade 1-9	56	52	19	67	56	50	15	63	55	48	24	76	56	81	11	68
	Primary, grade 1-6	9	33	38	0	5	31	37	0	15	43	36	0	10	18	47	0
	Intermediate, grade 7-9	4	7	18	0	2	7	17	0	7	8	18	0	4	2	20	0
	Highschool, grade 10-12	19	5	15	20	22	7	19	23	15	1	14	17	16	0	11	18
	Institute	2	1	1	3	3	1	2	3	1	0	0	1	3	0	4	2
	University	9	2	8	10	11	3	10	11	7	0	8	6	10	0	6	11
	Postgraduate	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (15 years +) by highest level of school ever completed	None	34	33	27	36	27	29	15	29	44	43	34	51	40	36	23	43
	Basic, grade 1-9	5	4	1	6	5	5	1	6	3	2	1	5	5	5	1	6
	Intermediate, grade 1-6	19	21	24	18	18	18	13	19	22	26	28	18	19	32	32	16
	Intermediate, grade 7-9	12	12	14	12	14	13	19	13	11	10	12	11	10	14	14	10
	Highschool, grade 10-12	11	14	12	11	13	16	16	12	9	9	9	9	9	7	11	9
	Institute	8	5	8	8	10	6	11	10	4	3	5	4	7	2	10	6
	University	10	11	13	9	13	13	23	12	5	6	9	2	10	3	8	10
	Postgraduate	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>SECTION C</b>																	
Population (15 years +) by main work status last 30 days	Employer	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	3	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
	Self-employed	8	13	7	8	8	8	4	9	10	28	8	10	5	6	5	4
	Paid employee	29	33	24	30	30	41	31	30	23	14	20	26	32	29	25	33
	Unpaid family worker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Student who also works	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Full-time student	17	2	17	18	18	3	19	19	15	1	15	17	16	1	21	15
	Home maker	30	36	34	29	29	34	27	29	37	42	39	35	27	42	32	26
	Unemploy-ed, looking for work / has worked previously	2	5	6	1	1	5	6	0	4	5	5	3	3	8	7	2
	Unemploy-ed, looking for work / never worked before	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	3	1	3	3	3	3
	Not looking for a job because of lack of papers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Not looking for a job because frustrated, discouraged	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
	Not interested in working	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
	Retired, too old	6	2	3	7	7	2	4	7	3	1	3	3	7	4	4	7
	Disability, illness	1	3	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	6	3	1	1	3	2	1
	Under age	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Other	2	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	1	2	1	2	4	1	1	4
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (15 years+) by occupation at main work last 30 days	Managers	3	0	2	3	3	1	1	4	1	0	2	0	2	0	4	2
	Professionals	27	10	29	27	31	12	51	31	15	4	20	13	28	4	10	31
	Technician and associate professionals	17	26	16	16	23	32	18	22	10	13	17	6	6	13	9	6
	Clerical support workers	5	1	7	4	2	2	4	2	2	1	4	2	14	0	30	12
	Service and sales workers	10	10	10	9	8	9	9	8	17	12	13	19	5	6	1	6
	Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	2	2	1	0	5	1	0
	Craft and related trade workers	9	27	13	7	8	21	9	7	14	44	16	11	7	45	14	6
	Plant and machine operators and assemblers	3	4	5	2	2	4	1	2	6	5	7	6	3	6	6	2
	Elementary occupation	14	19	10	14	15	20	5	16	13	16	11	14	10	20	20	9
	Armed forces occupation	13	1	6	15	6	1	3	7	20	2	8	29	24	1	5	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

Note: only for persons that declared to be employers, self-employed, paid employees, unpaid family worker, or student that also works.

Data are weighted. Source: ESD / UNHCR 2016. \*Towns include: Diyana, Harir, Koya, Shaqlawa and Soran.

Variables, Percent	Total				Erbil district centre				Erbil district periphery				Towns*				
	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	
<b>SECTION C (cont.)</b>																	
Population (15 years+) by total actual or expected income from work last 30 days (IQD)	0 - 199	4	5	5	3	2	4	3	2	6	4	5	6	4	22	6	4
	200 - 499	23	29	30	21	22	28	19	22	25	28	34	20	22	46	43	18
	500 - 999	50	63	52	49	45	63	60	42	55	67	48	58	60	32	47	62
	1000 - 1999	21	3	13	23	25	4	19	28	14	0	11	16	14	1	5	15
	2000 - 2999	2	0	1	2	3	0	0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
	3000 - 3999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4000	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (15 years +) by having a written contract for the main work last 30 days	Yes	78	36	71	83	78	38	84	81	74	33	62	82	85	5	63	88
	No	21	62	27	17	22	61	16	19	24	64	35	17	15	93	35	12
	Do not know	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	3	3	1	0	2	2	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>SECTION D</b>																	
Households by share of dwelling with others	Yes	29	47	57	22	26	51	46	21	41	37	65	27	23	33	50	19
	No	71	53	43	78	74	49	54	79	59	63	35	73	77	67	50	81
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households by written documentation for the ownership / renting of dwelling	Yes	84	84	79	86	88	83	91	88	87	98	84	87	71	14	46	77
	No	16	16	21	14	12	17	9	12	13	2	16	13	29	86	54	23
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households such as in rural areas or institutions, camps and other non-permanent resident households are excluded																	
Households by total number of rooms in the dwelling	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	2	9	3	1	2	11	8	1	0	6	0	0	0	6	3	0
	2	4	14	6	3	4	13	10	2	4	14	3	4	7	15	12	6
	3	25	30	23	26	22	27	23	21	27	35	19	31	34	56	33	33
	4	27	23	27	27	23	22	26	23	31	29	24	36	32	20	39	31
	5	24	18	30	23	26	22	21	27	26	10	41	18	16	2	11	17
	6	7	3	6	8	9	3	7	9	6	5	7	6	5	1	2	5
	7	4	0	2	4	5	1	2	5	3	0	3	3	3	0	1	3
	8	4	1	2	5	5	1	2	6	2	1	2	2	2	0	0	2
	9	2	0	0	3	4	0	0	4	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
	10	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Households by experience of eviction from their dwelling last 12 months	Yes	5	8	12	3	4	6	15	2	5	12	8	3	8	23	17
No		95	92	88	97	96	94	85	98	95	88	92	97	92	77	83	94
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households that experienced eviction from dwelling last 12 months by main reason for eviction	Could not pay rent	45	81	46	37	53	90	44	50	36	75	40	20	42	58	57	33
	Owner no longer wanted to rent out	11	3	12	12	0	0	0	0	24	6	20	35	12	6	16	11
	Demolition	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	8	0
	Development projects	11	2	6	16	0	0	0	0	15	0	13	20	21	14	3	31
	Neighbourhood pressure to leave	3	0	4	2	4	0	11	0	4	0	0	10	0	0	0	0
	Other	30	14	29	33	43	10	44	50	20	19	24	15	22	23	15	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
<b>SECTION E</b>																	
Households by rating of their access to private or public health centers/ hospitals	Very good	14	7	14	14	9	4	11	9	18	19	16	20	20	1	13	22
	Good	54	63	53	53	62	69	59	62	41	45	44	39	45	43	71	41
	Satisfactory	16	19	13	17	12	18	10	12	18	17	16	20	27	49	7	30
	Insufficient	15	9	16	15	16	8	20	17	18	12	18	18	6	6	4	7
	Not accessible	1	3	4	1	0	1	0	0	5	7	6	4	1	1	5	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households that rate access to private or public health centres / hospitals as insufficient or not accessible by reasons	Too far from household location	19	17	45	11	5	0	0	6	37	43	63	19	34	61	66	25
	Cannot afford	24	26	23	24	30	27	67	25	17	28	6	24	15	0	12	16
	Too low capacity of clinic	12	16	14	11	14	20	25	13	9	11	11	8	7	0	0	9
	Low quality of services provided	20	10	7	24	28	13	8	31	7	4	6	7	26	0	6	31
	Services provided is not relevant	21	12	8	25	16	13	0	19	29	8	12	41	16	39	0	19
	Language barrier	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	15	0
	Discrimi-nation	1	5	1	0	0	7	0	0	1	3	1	2	0	0	0	0
	Other	4	12	1	4	6	20	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>SECTION F</b>																	
Households by primary source of income last 6 months	Salary	57	29	49	61	56	32	59	58	49	21	43	54	71	5	51	76
	Wages	26	65	29	22	25	62	23	22	35	72	33	33	16	79	31	12
	Rent income	1	0	2	0	1	0	7	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Business earnings, incl household enterprises	4	1	1	5	6	1	0	7	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
	Remittances, support from friends, family abroad	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	0	0	1	0
	Pensions	9	0	8	10	10	0	7	12	7	0	8	7	10	0	8	11
	Support from UN, Government, NGOs	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	8	1	0
	Consumption of own production	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0
	Selling off own assets	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
	Using loans	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	0
	Charity	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
	Begging	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Begging	1	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	4	1	0	0	0	0
	No income	1	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	3	2	1	1	4	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Data are weighted. Source: ESD / UNHCR 2016. \*Towns include: Diyana, Harir, Koya, Shaqlawa and Soran.

Variables, Percent	Total				Erbil district centre				Erbil district periphery				Towns*				
	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	
<b>SECTION F (cont.)</b>																	
Households by secondary source of income (if any) last 6 months	Salary	14	2	9	17	20	1	16	23	6	4	8	5	7	0	6	8
	Wages	14	8	13	15	15	4	12	18	12	21	12	11	10	5	17	8
	Business earnings, incl household enterprises	2	1	1	2	2	1	0	3	1	0	2	0	3	0	0	4
	Remittances, support from friends, family abroad	5	2	4	5	4	2	0	5	4	3	4	4	9	7	10	8
	Pensions	1	0	3	1	1	0	8	0	1	0	2	0	6	0	2	8
	Support from Government, UN, NGOs	3	4	11	1	1	3	8	0	6	1	13	2	4	33	11	0
	Consumption of own production	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Selling off own assets	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	4	0
	Using loans	2	6	5	0	1	4	12	0	2	12	3	0	0	7	0	0
	Charity	2	1	1	2	2	0	0	3	1	4	1	1	1	3	1	1
	Begging	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Other	4	2	4	4	5	3	8	5	2	0	2	1	3	4	2	3
No secondary income	54	74	48	53	47	83	36	43	65	56	53	76	56	38	46	60	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households where one or more members have outstanding loans/borrowed money	Yes	40	41	36	41	34	41	36	34	46	41	36	52	51	45	39	53
	No	60	59	64	59	66	59	64	66	54	59	64	48	49	55	61	47
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more member has outstanding loans/borrowed money by purpose of loans	Business related	7	7	1	8	14	9	0	16	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	1
	Personal consumption needs	24	46	42	19	28	46	59	22	27	41	36	22	14	64	33	11
	Purchase & improvement of dwelling	25	1	14	29	15	0	18	16	24	3	15	29	47	3	4	53
	Religious, wedding, burial	11	10	3	12	9	11	0	9	11	11	5	14	14	3	2	15
	Consumer durables, e.g. car	13	1	4	16	15	2	0	19	12	0	5	16	10	0	8	10
	On-lending	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	2	1	3	3	4	2
	Farm, agriculture purpose	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	For paying housing rent	9	26	26	4	9	25	18	6	12	33	27	4	4	6	34	0
	Other	9	8	8	9	9	8	5	9	11	7	9	12	7	15	13	6
	Do not know	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households with difficulties in paying rent last 6 months	Yes	63	71	70	53	55	67	70	45	68	76	67	69	76	90	82	66
	No	37	29	30	47	45	33	30	55	32	24	33	31	24	10	18	34
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>SECTION G</b>																	
Households by experience of safety in their neighbourhood	Very safe	73	64	84	71	67	60	85	65	78	73	82	76	84	87	86	84
	Rent	25	35	16	26	30	39	15	31	21	27	16	24	16	13	14	16
	Health expenses	2	0	1	2	3	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Fuel and transport expenses	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>SECTION H</b>																	
Households that experienced displacement by if all members have arrived to the current location	Yes	89	68	97	-	79	60	96	-	98	91	99	-	91	80	92	-
	No	11	32	3	-	21	40	4	-	2	9	1	-	9	20	8	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-
Households by year of arrival to the current location	Before 2000	15	0	0	20	17	0	0	20	13	0	0	22	14	0	0	16
	2000-2009	23	0	0	29	22	1	0	26	18	0	1	29	32	0	0	38
	2010-2012	19	5	2	23	21	4	3	24	13	5	1	20	20	7	0	24
	2013	8	15	0	9	10	12	0	11	6	21	0	9	6	24	2	6
	2014	16	28	46	9	13	30	46	8	25	20	50	10	11	25	33	7
	2015	19	53	52	10	17	53	51	11	25	54	48	9	17	44	66	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households by the reason for choosing to live at the current location	Better employment opportunities	7	22	4	6	7	25	3	5	7	13	3	9	6	15	4	6
	Availability, better quality of education opportunities	1	2	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	3	1	0	2	1	5	1
	Availability, better quality of health services	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Availability of humanitarian assistance	1	2	2	1	0	3	2	0	3	0	2	3	0	0	3	0
	To join other family members	2	1	1	3	2	1	2	2	3	2	1	5	2	0	1	3
	Relatives, friends are also here	35	18	18	39	34	18	20	37	33	17	21	41	39	7	7	45
	Cost of living, rent in this location is lower	18	37	38	12	13	33	36	8	28	46	39	20	20	61	40	16
	More safety	13	7	20	12	15	7	28	15	10	10	16	7	9	6	17	8
	Bigger, better home	13	7	10	14	15	7	7	17	7	9	10	5	15	9	19	14
	Other	6	3	4	7	6	4	0	7	5	0	6	5	5	0	2	6
Always lived here, not applicable question	5	1	0	6	7	1	0	8	3	1	0	5	2	0	0	2	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households where one or more household member have firm plans for changing their residence location	Yes	6	9	9	4	6	9	8	5	6	9	7	4	5	12	17	2
	No	94	91	91	96	94	91	92	95	94	91	93	96	95	88	83	98
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households where one or more household members have firm plans for changing residence location by destination	Within Erbil Governorate	75	56	70	81	75	40	80	80	76	100	73	74	75	100	55	100
	Within KRI	15	0	18	16	18	0	20	20	7	0	6	8	18	0	34	0
	Elsewhere in Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Neighbouring countries	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Return to place of origin	6	5	12	3	1	7	0	0	18	0	21	18	5	0	9	0
	Europe	3	34	1	0	6	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0
	Other	0	5	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households currently displaced by if they consider moving back to the location of origin	Yes	83	72	88	-	79	71	85	-	83	71	86	-	97	83	98	-
	No	14	24	11	-	18	25	13	-	14	23	12	-	3	17	2	-
	Do not know	2	4	2	-	3	4	2	-	2	6	2	-	0	0	0	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-
Households displaced by assets left behind at the location of origin	Yes	89	68	96	-	83	66	98	-	91	71	94	-	97	88	98	-
	No	11	32	4	-	17	34	2	-	9	29	6	-	3	12	2	-
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-

Data are weighted. Source: ESD / UNHCR 2016. \*Towns include: Diyana, Hanir, Koya, Shaqlawa and Soran.





ERBIL STATISTICS DIRECTORATE (ESD)



Erbil Refugee Council



JOINT CRISIS COORDINATION CENTRE (JCC)

